Stevenson, Frye, and the structure of romance by Rennie, Alistair







This thesis looks at the work of Robert Louis Stevenson in the context of Northrop
Frye's theory of archetypes and at the operations of the conventions of romance in
relation to structuralist and post-structuralist theories of narrative. It proposes the
unsustainability of the traditional or institutionalised model of romance provided by
Frye and considers, through Stevenson's essays and fictions, the development of
romance as a modern idiom. Using Frye's ideas as a basis for further study, this
thesis seeks to demonstrate that romance is a progressive rather than conservative
mode of fiction. Through the ideas expressed by Stevenson in his various guises as
an author and theorist, it presents a theory of romance as a genre in which the
functions of narrative undergo their most radical shifts and deviations from the
conventional bases of form.
Following the lead of his essays, it is shown that Stevenson's romances
deliberately set in motion a system of conventional elements which, while they
produce a dynamic narrative structure, tend also to exceed the sustainable limits of
the structures they are engaged in. By no means aimless, these activities represent an
attempt by Stevenson to recreate 'the certain almost sensual and quite illogical
tendencies in man'* which, he says, occasion the formation of romance, but which
are paradoxically incompatible with the logical conditions of romance as a
conventional mechanism. Consequently, it is demonstrated that, if Frye represents
the culmination of romance as a 'tradition' (or a point at which the structure of
romance can be audited and catalogued as a tradition), Stevenson, acting prior to
Frye, represents a point at which the underlying assumptions of this tradition are
preclusively denied.
* Robert Louis Stevenson, 'A Humble Remonstrance', Memories and Portraits
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Introduction
This thesis looks at the work of Robert Louis Stevenson in the context of Northrop
Frye's theory of archetypes and at the operations of the conventions of romance in
relation to structuralist and post-structuralist theories of narrative. It proposes the
unsustainability of the traditional or institutionalised model of romance provided by
Frye and considers, through Stevenson's essays and fictions, the generic
development of romance as a modern idiom. Using Frye's ideas as a basis for further
study, this thesis will seek to demonstrate that romance is a progressive rather than
conservative mode of fiction, in the sense that it refuses to inhabit with any degree of
stability the kind ofmodel offered by Frye, a model which has assumed a position of
continued critical orthodoxy, but which fails to account for the full possibilities of
romance as exampled by an author like Stevenson. More broadly speaking, it may
then become possible to offer, through the ideas expressed by Stevenson in his
various guises as an author and theorist, a more accurate theory of romance as a
genre in which the functions of narrative undergo their most radical shifts and
deviations from the conventional bases of form.
This is to imply, firstly, that Frye's writings on romance occupy a position of
authority which has remained largely unchallenged in the event of subsequent
criticism. This, of course, is not true of Frye's theories as a whole, which, for one
reason or another, have become unfashionable and outmoded. In dealing specifically
with romance, however, Frye's ideas - as expressed in Anatomy ofCriticism and The
Secular Scripture: A Study of the Structure of Romance - represent the most
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extensive and comprehensive to date. If no longer accepted as an 'authority', Frye is
arguably the most significant figure among those critics who have attempted to
develop a theory of romance which has enabled us to determine its location and
function within the canon. While this thesis seeks to demonstrate the extent of
Stevenson's contributions to a treatise of fiction which accentuates the importance of
romance, it recognises (in advance) that even he, in spite of his successes, failed to
convince his peers and successors of the essential merits of romance fiction. This is
hardly surprising given the critical attitude that prevailed in the period immediately
during and after Stevenson. As Ian Duncan's brief account suggests, the critical
status of fiction throughout the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries tended
towards an exclusion of romance as a viable medium:
Victorian cultural critics officially ignored or condemned the novel for its
status as an entertaining illusion... Those essayists and reviewers who did
write about fiction occupied themselves with Aristotelian canons of
mimetic probability. The narrative projects of high modernism claimed
aesthetic dignity by repudiating that Victorian fiction that had sold itself
to a mass reading public. When the novel was ushered into the academic
precincts of critical thought by F. R. Leavis, it was on the strength of a
high seriousness residing in social and psychological mimesis alone...1
It is Frye who, in the aftermath of Leavis, injects some credibility into a genre too
often misrepresented as 'wish-fulfilment literature'2 or as the fictional mainstay not
of a great but, as Leavis put it, of 'a bad tradition'.3 And it is here we can begin to
gauge the full extent of Frye's essential contribution to a contemporary
understanding of romance and begin to establish the reasons why he is essential to
this thesis.
Writing as late as the mid-1970s, Frye still felt the need to remind us of the
misleading influence of Leavis' legacy and was inclined to warn that the 'prevailing
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conception of serious fiction is enshrined in the title of F. R. Leavis' book The Great
Tradition'. The critical dictum stood, as far as Frye could see, that the
...serious literary artists who tell stories in prose... also tell us something
about the life of their times, and about human nature as it appears in that
context, while doing so. Below them comes romance, where the story is
told primarily for the sake of the story. This kind ofwriting is assumed to
be much more of a commercial product, and the romancer is considered
to have compromised too far with popular literature. Popular literature
itself is obviously still in the doghouse.
This means that what gives a novelist moral dignity is not the story
he tells, but a wisdom and insight brought to bear on the world outside
literature, and which he has managed to capture within literature.4
The 'difference' between serious and non-serious fiction is the same as the
'difference' between realism and romance, says Frye, and it is with this in mind that
he constructed his 'secular scripture' in an attempt to reconcile the disparities and
biases within and around fiction.5
Whatever its strengths or weaknesses, The Secular Scripture (and the
Anatomy that came before it) issued a necessary challenge to a critical hegemony that
diminished our appreciation of romance by insisting upon an institutional denial of
popular modes. For it is the sheer popularity of romance, Frye argues, that 'raises a
good many questions about common critical assumptions about fiction which have
been fostered by the prestige of a displaced and realistic tradition' (SS, p. 43).
Whatever the processes involved in dissolving the Leavisite 'myth of literary
privilege', Frye's promotion of romance from a second to first division of literary
activity has certainly contributed to the elimination of 'a special category of works
designated as Literature, within which an even more privileged group of works was
set apart and conscientiously re-edited, reinterpreted, and taught'.6 And while, as
Howard Felperin explains, 'the dominant schools of contemporary criticism -
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marxism, structuralism, and deconstruction - have converged upon this myth, and in
dismantling it of its idealist and metaphysical yearnings and trappings, its Arnoldian
inheritance of displaced religion, have inevitably raised another set of questions',
we would do well to acknowledge, like Felperin, the part played by 'Frye's Anatomy
ofCriticism, with its promise of systematic totalization', which ensured that the 'idea
of a canon of literature, for so long the unquestioned pretext and justification for all
this questionable activity, now came into question'.
It was in taking this stance that Frye produced one of his most enduring
contributions to our understanding of fiction in advancing the relevance of romance
as the definitive principle of fiction, where it not only denotes a particular literary
form but, as Gillian Beer suggests, 'a literary quality' that 'is frequently set against
"reality" in literary argument'.9 This subsidiary definition of romance was radically
extended by Frye who went so far as to reverse the canonical designation of fiction
as a strictly representational medium, so much so that Frye's negation of mimesis as
a workable method and the identification of romance as the conceptual determinant
of fiction have gained a widespread critical currency. As Ian Duncan concurs:
Romance is the essential principle of fiction: its difference from a record
of "reality", of everyday life. A novel could describe, by metonym and
metaphor, the shape of the world and everything in it; it could also
narrate its historical formation through time. The modern formation of
concepts of society and culture coincides with the great age of the novel
in nineteenth-century Britain. But even as the novel began to totalize its
mimetic range it reasserted fiction, not mimesis, as its critical principle,
in an elaborate commitment to plot. Fiction in these novels is the effect
above all of plot, conspicuous as a grammar of conventions, that is, a
shared cultural order distinct from material and historical contingency.
To read a plot - to take part in its work of recognition - is to imagine a
transformation of life and its conditions, and not their mere reproduction.
Such is the rhetorical definition of romance by its modern day theorists,
Northrop Frye and Frederic Jameson, and such is the rhetorical agenda of
the great Victorian social novels. The old commonplace of an antithetical
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relation between romance and reality, invoked by the novel in its own
apologies of origin, produces a new, dialectical figure of romance as the
fulcrum against which - positioned on its edge, between inside and out -
reality can be turned around.10
In spite of Frye's efforts, however, there has existed a deal of confusion as regards
the 'statuses' of fiction. As Ian Duncan goes on: '...criticism has continued to find an
innate contradiction between the ambitions of an "authentic" social representation
and the elements of romance, those forms whose appearance measures the difference
between novel and reality'.11 It is apparent that while we have eradicated the myths
of privilege surrounding fiction, we have instilled instead a myth of priorities, or, at
least, a myth of differences which continues to obscure, and probably diminish, our
12critical absorption and acceptance of romance as a worthwhile medium.
Frye's answer to this, as the title of his treatise suggests, comes through an
emphasis on the structural operations of fictional narratives which, when reduced to
their basic structural compounds and uniform levels of plot, reveal a trans-literary
network of recurrent functions, or conventions, which Frye and others, like Robert
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Graves and Joseph Campbell, have characterised as 'archetypes'. It is important to
grasp the extent of Frye's insistence on structure as the great leveller of existing
fictional modes: to dissolve the representational excesses that signal a narrative's
particular formation in (historical and cultural) space and time is to reveal an
encoded series of archetypes which initiate and complete the internal transactions of
literary form, prior to, during and after the prevailing historical and cultural
conditions within which a narrative is conceived. Accordingly, it becomes possible
to trace, as will be explained more fully in the first section of this thesis, a structural
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unity between narratives as diverse as Homer's The Odyssey and Conrad's Heart of
Darkness.
Within this formal arena, the genre of romance occupies a special place of
narrative neutrality, acting as an archetypal plenum towards which the conventions
of narrative most actively refer: 'Archetypal criticism seems to find its center of
gravity in the mode of romance ... which affords an unobstructed view of
archetypes'.14 Romance affords an unobstructed view, says Frye, because it is
'formulaic, and the formulaic unit, of phrase or story, is the cornerstone of the
creative imagination, the simplest form of what I call an archetype' (SS, p. 36).
Frye's entire programme is based on the assumption that the whole of western
literature is embedded in the kind of archetypal formulae made explicitly visible in
romance. As he puts it himself:
It is clear ... that archetypes are most easily studied in highly
conventionalized literature: that is, for the most part, naive, primitive and
popular literature. In suggesting the possibility of archetypal criticism,
then, I am suggesting the possibility of extending the kind of comparative
and morphological study now made of folk tales into the rest of
literature. (AC, p. 104)
The full possibilities of archetypal criticism can be realised if we adhere to Frye's
principle of 'displacement', which refers to the developmental adjustments of literary
form as it undergoes, through time, an increased correspondence to external
contingencies:
In the course of struggling with a world which is separate from itself, the
imagination has to adapt its formulaic units to the demands of that world,
to produce what Aristotle calls the probable impossibility. The
fundamental technique is what I call displacement, the adjusting of
formulaic structures to a roughly credible context. (SS, p. 36)
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Looking at western literary history as a whole, as Frye does, the process of
displacement is simultaneous with a more general shift in ideas about what is
credible or not and, broadly speaking, can be said to reflect the gradual subordination
of religious or superstitious belief-systems to the burgeoning influence of the
empirical sciences. A pattern emerges in the development of fictional modes where,
'Myths of gods merge into legends of heroes; legends of heroes merge into plots of
tragedies and comedies; plots of tragedies and comedies merge into plots ofmore or
less realistic fiction' (AC, p. 51). For Frye, the mimetic tendency is really an organic
modification of narrative 'structure to a demand for greater conformity to ordinary
experience' (SS, p. 39); though, crucially, it reflects changes 'of social context rather
than literary form', while 'the constructive principles of story-telling remain constant
through them, though of course they adapt to them' (AC, p. 51). The penchant for
realism in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries is a case in point. Against the
epistemological backdrop of the empirical sciences, says Frye, 'the prestige of
"realism" in the nineteenth century reflected the prevailing fashions of that culture,
nearly all of which emphasized some form of correspondence, the paralleling of
mental structures with something in the outer world' (SS, p. 45).
The implications of an archetypal reading are such that 'realism' is exposed
as a technical effect, rather than an efficacious method, succeeding only inasmuch as
it conforms to a society's tenets of plausibility: even so, it is always rooted in and
unable to disengage from the conventional apparatuses of literary form that
necessitate the estrangement of literature from any external foundation, so that
romance remains, as Duncan has explained, the fundamental principle of fiction.
'Realism', in this sense, merely subordinates the conventional mechanisms of
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structure (made visible by romance) under a minutia of descriptive and discursive
detail. Such detail, when subject to the penetrating gaze of the archetypal critic,
superfluously conceals the same conventional mechanisms at work in the most
formulaic romances.15 Realism, then, is a generic slight of hand. It merely disguises
its archetypal fundament under an extraneous material and produces an effect of
reality through an implied correspondence between the fictional world and the
perceived 'laws of life'.16
Ultimately, for Frye, this leads to the negation of value-based criteria as a
means of segregating types of fiction, such as those applied by Leavis. The terms
'realism' and 'romance' can now be seen as two extremes acting within the same
sphere of unreality (fiction); and this is a principle which Frye is repeatedly at pains
to stress: 'The words "romantic" and "realistic"... as ordinarily used, are relative or
comparative terms: they illustrate tendencies in fiction, and cannot be used as simply
descriptive adjectives with any sort of exactness' (AC, p. 49). The 'mimetic tendency
itself, the tendency to verisimilitude and accuracy of description, is one of the two
poles in literature' (AC, p. 51), says Frye, the other being the anti-representational
tendencies of romance: 'One direction is called "romantic," and the other "realistic."
The realistic tendency moves in the direction of the representational and the
displaced, the romantic tendency in the opposite direction, concentrating on the
formulaic units ofmyth and metaphor' (SS, p. 37). Or, to put it another way, on 'one
extreme of literature we have the pure convention', which pertains to romance;
while, on the other, 'we have the pure variable, where there is an attempt at novelty
or unfamiliarity, and consequently a disguising or complicating of archetypes' (AC,
p. 103).
8
The implications and complexities of this will be examined in the next
chapter. Likewise, Frye's theory of archetypes, which includes his theory of
romance, will be studied in more detail in the following chapter, which will also
provide a provisional summary of romance in a very general sense. In the meantime,
we notice that it is a consequence of Frye's theory that all narratives, in being
elaborations of, rather than departures from, the universality of form, are the
offspring of romance, which Frye has located, in turn, as the offspring of myth, so
that all narratives are ultimately the offspring of 'myth and romance [which] both
belong in the general category ofmythopoeic literature' (AC, p. 188). But while there
has been a widespread acceptance among critics of certain aspects of Frye's
anatomy, we know, since Foucault and Derrida, that these kinds of totalisations are
no longer possible and that, as will be shown in time, the archetypal schema is
dependent upon a range of assumptions that are no longer sustainable in view of
current critical trends.
There are, though, several reasons as to why Frye's theories remain important
to this thesis, as they do to any study of romance. As suggested, Frye is one of the
most significant romance-theorists of the twentieth-century. It is arguable, moreover,
that archetypal criticism, while failing to sustain a theory of the universality of form,
is nevertheless useful in that it provides us with an accurate grounds for the study of
romance. Romance, after all, is widely conceived to be formulaic. Frye's theories,
we might argue, are sustainable so long as they pertain to formulaic narratives and to
myth and romance in particular. Indeed, in theorising romance, Frye has shaped, or
has simply confirmed, the perception of romance that continues to inhabit our critical
consciousness - that romance, by definition, is a highly conventionalised and
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formulaic genre. This is evidenced when, say, Wallace Martin, in his critique of the
limited applicability of structuralism, takes it for granted that, while modem fictions
resist the conditioning of form, popular or traditional modes of fiction are inherently
formulaic and may continue, therefore, to fall under the various methodologies of
stmcturalist criticism:
Although popular fiction remains formulaic, novels and short stories
have for a century tended increasingly not just to deviate from traditional
formulae but to deride them, and there is little hope of discovering an
underlying set of structural principles in texts that so obviously confute
our zeal for regularity.17
Martin is quick to concede that, where popular fiction is concerned, the tendency
towards regularity is almost mandatory. He is, then, at least half-way to agreeing
with Frye, differing only, if crucially, in that he advocates a rupture, which Frye
denies, between traditional and modem modes of fiction. If we accept that Martin is
giving us an accurate summary of the most Recent Theories ofNarrative, as the title
of his book suggests, then it becomes clear that Frye remains useful in offering a
basis, if not for the study of 'deviant' strains of fiction, then assuredly for the study
of 'traditional formulae'. If we accept, meanwhile, that the conventions inherent in
traditional formulae exist - the recurring functions, images, symbols, tropes and
motifs that can be catalogued as conventions - then Northrop Frye's summation of
literary modes remains a plausible criterion for literary analysis.
Martin's tone is such, however, that we begin to wonder whether Frye's
analysis does justice to the genre he is attempting to exonerate from negative
evaluations. There is a sense in which Frye has merely replaced the institutionalised
attitude towards fiction that distinguished between serious realism and frivolous
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romance with an institutionalised model of romance that, in the end, only confirms
our worst suspicions. To emphasise 'the uniformity of romance formulas over the
centuries' (SS, p. 6), we might say, is to play into the hands of those who would
prefer to see it expelled from the canon. The effect of Frye's insistence on uniformity
is to present romance as a cut and dried phenomenon: in the end, it is critically
accountable and, therefore, critically expendable. If romance is everything Frye says
it is, then there is no need to analyse its function further; its critical value is
exhausted, which is perhaps why romance has often been regarded as having no
critical value at all. The point is substantiated by Frye's insistence on the sheer
simplicity of romance - and the absence, within it, of any aporetic tensions or
ambiguities - as its main source of appeal. Romance, he says, has a
...tendency to split into heroes and villains. Romance avoids the
ambiguities of ordinary life, where everything is a mixture of good and
bad, and where it is difficult to take sides or believe that people are
consistent patterns of virtue or vice. The popularity of romance, it is
obvious, has much to do with its simplifying ofmoral facts. It relieves us
from the strain of trying to be fair-minded, as we see particularly in
melodrama, where we not only have outright heroism and villainy but are
expected to take sides, applauding one and hissing the other ... If we ask
why such a story as the Apollonious romance was so popular, one answer
is that a sequence of archetypes, traditional fictional formulas or building
blocks, has an interest in itself, however poor the logic or "hence"
narrative connecting them might be. (SS, p. 50)
So it is with Frye that romance is made to sound like pantomime. It is formulaic to
the point of consisting of little more than perfunctory functions, so much so, in fact,
that it appears to be functionally redundant. Frye tells us what discerning critics like
Wallace Martin have always suspected about romance, that it is predictable, insipid,
repetitive, lacking relevance and ingenuity. He galvanises the orthodox opinion of
romance as an intensely conservative, formulaic mode of narrative which inhibits or,
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in its most conventional sense, prohibits the development of narrative form. As for
Frye's claim that a sequence of archetypes has an interest in itself - we might stress
again that, in the aftermath of texts like Frye's Anatomy or Joseph Campbell's The
Hero With A Thousand Faces, our interest in formulae is nowadays negligible, a
settled affair, a closed chapter in the history of the critical inquest.
In mounting a sophisticated defence of romance, Frye delivers all the reasons
as to why it needs defending in the first place. We could even say that if romance is
still in the doghouse there is a sense in which Frye himself is to blame. It is arguable,
above all, that Frye's prevalence in this field has inhibited any attempt to discover
and implement a theory of romance as a modern phenomenon. Of course, Frye
would undoubtedly argue, and does, that the structural simplicity of romance is its
strength and that to place a negative value on simplicity (or, vis-a-vis, a positive
value on ambiguity) would mean a return to the Leavisite way of thinking. That may
be true. What is misleading, however, is the suggestion that all romances, by
definition, should somehow fit these primal designations of form without showing
any measure of generic rupture or mutation, or without revealing any structural
malformations against the static organicity of the 'tradition' they belong to.
This thesis argues that, when we look at the work of a writer like Stevenson,
it becomes necessary to readjust our conception of formulaic structures. Some of
Stevenson's fictions are, quite deliberately, intensely formulaic. But by examining
how they work formulaically and by exploring the conditions according to which
they function as structures, we can begin to unravel some of the assumptions,
consolidated by Frye, about the function of romance as a formulaic genre. One such
assumption, which Stevenson quite deliberately refutes, rests on the unquestioned
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acceptation of formulae as stable, regular and functionally compact, as phenomena
that resurface throughout the generic field of romance with behavioural exactitude
and constancy.18 Formulae, critics assume, are uncomplicated inasmuch as they are
easily accessible to the lucid methodologies of a 'science' of literature. But if we are
talking about a science of literature, as formalists and structuralists often do, then
why not talk of literary formulae as we might of chemical formulae, wherein
constituent elements are capable of the mutation and disintegration of structure, or
where the functional ingredients may prove reactionary and incendiary rather than
passive and integral? Or why not think of a 'quantum' level of narrative activity that
reveals unstable processes 'always already' at work within 'structures', or of authors,
like Stevenson, who might seek to exploit these processes in order to produce new or
unrealised effects?
Accepting Frye's theory of archetypes as a basis for the study of romance
gives us a more than adequate platform, the most adequate, probably, to date. The
fact that this is the most adequate platform, however, is symptomatic of the need for
romance to be re-evaluated and re-reasoned in view of its generic development in the
modem epoch. Yet again, there are grounds for claiming that romance needs to be re-
reasoned in terms of how, in itself, it contributes to the development of modem
fiction and how, in itself, it impacts on the development of modem theories of
narrative. By foregrounding Stevenson's version of romance against Frye's, it is
possible, precisely, to formulate a theory of the stmcture of romance that, while it
often coincides with a structuralist agenda, as often supersedes it. (Glenda Norquay,
for one, has noted some areas in Stevenson's essays where he begins to 'touch on a
surprising number of issues which have concerned practitioners and theorists of the
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novel in recent years 19 While Frye, ostensibly, offers a reliable model of
romance in relation to its status as an immutable generic preserve, Stevenson
demonstrates, to the contrary, that romance is a genre in which narrative makes its
most significant advances. Frye marvels over, and extols, the uniformity of
romances. In this thesis, I wish to take a converse position by suggesting, through
Stevenson, that romance is an area of fiction where narrative undergoes some of its
most innovative and ground-breaking violations of form. It is the overriding aim of
this work, meanwhile, to concentrate on structure and on the conventional elements
of structure, those areas of narrative, according to Frye, that uphold the generic
constancy of romance over time, with the intention of revealing how Stevenson
initiates the collapse of romance as a conventional mechanism. This thesis will show
that, unlike Stevenson, Frye fails to address the possibility of a modern romance
which disengages itself from its traditional bases by detaching itself from the
structural prerequisites that characterise its function.
To put these suggestions in a broader context, I wish to argue that, while
romance demonstrates certain principles and effects we tend to associate with a
formalist or structuralist programme, it as equally demonstrates those principles or
effects that we associate with a post-structuralist programme. Romance has proven
vital to our understanding of formalist and structuralist theory because it so clearly
reveals the operations of structure. It is a generic category, as Boris Eichenbaum
points out in his 'Introduction to the Formal Method', that 'bares its construction'.20
But, by the same token, it also bares those areas wherein we detect its
deconstruction: it demonstrates, more effectively than any other type of fiction, the
conventional functions of structure and, by that very logic, demonstrates more
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effectively the failure of structure, as well as the failure of formalism and
structuralism as valid means of interpretation. In view of this, it is one of the aims of
this thesis to give a structuralist reading of Stevenson's fiction in order to show the
failure of structuralism; for it is the case, with Stevenson, that where texts are liable
to deconstruct themselves they are actively made to do so.
At the same time, post-structuralism itself has generally failed to address the
issue of conventional structures where they are most readily perceived to exist. It is
the tendency among those engaged, for example, in deconstructive practices to focus
on the work of Mallarme or Joyce, authors who demonstrate perfectly the volatility
of linguistic systems, and to neglect those texts where structure appears rigidly intact.
It is one ofmy aims to redress this imbalance and to show that, even where structure
appears intact and regular, it is nevertheless bound to produce instances or, in
Stevenson's case, organised sequences of structural 'entropy'. What is remarkable
about Stevenson's romances, as I intend to show, is that they deliberately set in
motion a system of conventional elements which, while they produce a dynamic
narrative structure, tend also to exceed the sustainable limits of the structures they
adhere to. By no means aimless, these activities represent an attempt by Stevenson to
recreate 'the certain almost sensual and quite illogical tendencies in man'21 which, he
says, occasion the formation of romance, but which are paradoxically incompatible
with the logical conditions of romance as a conventional mechanism. Consequently,
it will be demonstrated in this thesis that, if Frye represents the culmination of
romance as a 'tradition' (or a point at which the structure of romance can be audited
and catalogued as a tradition), Stevenson, acting prior to Frye, represents a point at
which the underlying assumptions of this tradition are preclusively denied. Under
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such terms, as we shall see in the second section, Stevenson has developed a theory
of narrative that has profound implications, as yet unrealised, for what might be
described as a modern (that is to say, a post-traditional) theory of romance.
Such claims, of course, are in direct contrast to what has already been
indicated, that there is an increasing recognition among critics of the importance of
Stevenson in the development of a proto-structuralist approach to fiction. At his most
incisive, certainly, Stevenson pioneers a formalist / structuralist ethos in its
embryonic stages. Some of the essays examined in this thesis - 'On Some Technical
Elements of Style in Literature', 'A Humble Remonstrance', 'Some Gentlemen in
Fiction' - reveal a marked attempt by Stevenson to explore the technicalities of form
in a way, as Norquay relates, which 'foreshadows both formalist and structuralist
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thinking'. It is an area of Stevenson that clearly needs to be addressed more fully
than it otherwise has. Accordingly, this thesis will seek to add to an already
burgeoning interest in Stevenson's role as an early formalist / structuralist; but it will
do so strictly in relation to Northrop Frye. The reason for this - and here we find
another reason as to why Frye is valuable to this thesis - is that Stevenson's critical
approaches to narrative in many ways prefigure those of Frye, more so, in fact, than
they do any other branch of proto-structuralist or structuralist criticism. Alert to this,
Ian Duncan, in referring to nineteenth-century attitudes towards fiction, makes the
telling remark:
...popular entertainment, didactic purpose and aesthetic quality were to
be distinct and contradictory faculties; and "romance" a gross commodity
or an elegant abstraction. The most sophisticated defence, by Robert
Louis Stevenson, anticipates modernist formalisms, and Frye himself.23
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It is partly the aim of this thesis to substantiate Duncan's claim with the necessary
foundation. Additionally, however, I wish to explore, not only those areas where
Stevenson anticipates Frye, but those areas where Stevenson, by undermining the
formalist \ structuralist principles which he himself asserts, begins to outdistance
Frye.
In the meantime, we can hardly continue to use the terms 'formalism' and
'structuralism' without providing a brief definition, nor without offering a context in
which to situate Frye and Stevenson. Formalism we recognise as a movement
emerging from Soviet Russia in the early twentieth-century which proposed a
difference between ordinary or 'practical' language use and the use of language in a
uniquely 'literary' sense. While ordinary language, it was claimed, serves a
referential or communicative function, literary language differs through its assertion
of the 'formal' relations of elements and devices which convey the 'literariness' of a
text. In particular, formalism draws attention to 'foregrounded' elements in literary
works that disrupt the linguistic patterns of ordinary language so as to produce an
effect of strangeness, freshness or 'defamiliarisation'. In relation to prose fiction,
formalism makes a distinction between the 'story' as a chronological series of events
and the 'plot' - plot, in this sense, referring to the particular distribution of story-
elements, coupled with the introduction of various devices, which are deployed as a
means of producing fresh effects. 'Story time', for example, can be interrupted or
distended by 'discourse time', or the revelation of events in a story condensed
through elliptical summaries or delayed in order to create suspense or mystery.
Similarly, formalists sought to explain the recurrent narrative formulae said to persist
through literary works as a whole, and posited literature as a self-contained field of
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operation that has at its disposal a limited range of functions and effects which can
be classified accordingly.
Emerging in France in the 1950s (though largely under the influence of
Russian formalism), structuralism can be seen an expansion of formalism. Its aims,
says M. H. Abrams, were 'to provide an objective account of all social and cultural
phenomena, in a range that includes mythical narratives, literary texts,
advertisements, fashions in clothes, and patterns of social decorum'. The interests of
structuralism, he continues, are 'not in any particular cultural phenomenon except as
it provides access to the structure, features, and rules of the general system that
engenders its significance'.24 In relation to 'literature', structuralism extends the
formalist claim of literary works as self-contained or self-referential structures,
advocating that literary texts cannot be regarded as having any intrinsic mimetic
relationship with reality. At the same time, structuralism introduces a more
intensified technical approach in seeking, as Jonathan Culler suggests, 'to construct a
poetics which stands to literature as linguistics stands to language'.25 Structuralism,
in other words, regards literature as 'text', as being grounded in a system of
conventions and codes which, derived from language as a whole, pre-exist the author
who is not so much a creator as a vehicle for an 'always-already' existing literary
order. Pushing the author aside, structuralism also seeks to show how the reader's
comprehension of a literary text is underlined by an unconscious command of the
conventions and codes with which the text is invested.
Ranging from Vladimir Propp's analysis of narrative construction in The
Morphology of the Folktale to Roland Barthes's exploration of signifying systems in
Mythologies, there are many overlapping strains and variations of formalism \
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structuralism. It is impossible to summarise them here with anything other than
general indications. Nevertheless, on these grounds, Frye's work can be viewed as
proto-structuralist in its attempts to detect an underlying order of conventions and
codes which give the literary work its structure and significance; while it can
certainly be viewed as a branch of formalism in its attempts to catalogue recurrent
narrative formulae. The point of separation, perhaps, is where Frye focuses not so
much on the linguistic system, but on the characters, settings, patterns of events and
images which constitute the narrated world of literature. And while these are often
the objects of formalism, Frye differs in that he characterises these elements as
symbols invested with a metaphorical import that coincides with their structural
function and which is a part of the means through which one given structure can be
shown as identical to another. In this sense (as I will show in the first chapter), Frye
retains a metaphysical framework which is essential to his method and which, in
formalism \ structuralism proper, is implied rather than stated.
Frye's anatomy can be seen as part of a wider project of totalisation which,
refined through structuralism, has antecedents that go further back than Frye. Frye's
own methodology, as I will reveal, has drawn largely from Jung's attempts to
catalogue the recurrent images identified in stories, myths and the dreams and
fantasies of his patients. It has also drawn, says Frye, 'on the work done on the ritual
basis of naive drama in Frazer's Golden Bough' (AC, p. 108). The Golden Bough, in
fact, presents one of the earliest and most successful attempts to totalise social and
cultural phenomena in having 'identified elemental patterns ofmyth and ritual that, it
claimed, recur in legends and ceremonials ofmany diverse and far flung cultures'.26
A structuralist bent is evident in Frazer's attempt to stratify the mental development
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ofmankind into two contrasting phases. One phase he terms 'magic', which refers to
a primitive or superstitious condition of mind, and the other he terms 'religion', the
condition of mind which, in civilised societies, supersedes the primitive one. Upon
these grounds, Frazer locates an underlying principle applicable to mankind more
generally:
But if in the most backward state of human society now known to us we
find magic thus conspicuously present and religion conspicuously absent,
may we not reasonable conjecture that the civilised races of the world
have also at some period of their history passed through a similar
intellectual phase?... When we survey the existing races ofmankind from
Greenland to Tierra del Fuego, or from Scotland to Singapore, we
observe they are distinguished one from the other by a great variety of
religions... Yet when we have penetrated through these differences,
which affect mainly the intelligent and thoughtful part of the community,
we shall find underlying them all a solid stratum of intellectual
agreement among the dull, the weak, the ignorant, and the superstitious,
who constitute, unfortunately, the vast majority of mankind. One of the
great achievements of the nineteenth century was to run shafts down into
this low mental stratum in many parts of the world, and thus to discover
• 97
its substantial identification everywhere.
Moving even closer to Frye, perhaps, is Stevenson's friend and personal champion,
Andrew Lang. In his study ofMyth, Ritual and Religion, Lang expressed the need for
an essentially structuralist programme of interpreting myths, which was in many
ways answered by Frye as well as extended by him throughout the whole of
literature:
Myth is so ancient, so complex, so full of elements, that it is vain labour
to seek a cause for every phenomenon. We are chiefly occupied with the
quest for an historical condition of the human intellect to which the
element in myths, regarded by us as irrational, shall seem rational
enough. If we can prove that such a state of mind widely exists among
men, and has existed, that state of mind may be provisionally considered
as the fount and origin of the myths which have always perplexed men in
a reasonable modern mental condition. Again, if it can be shown that this
mental stage was one through which all civilised races have passed, the
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universality of the mythopoeic mental condition will to some extent
• 28
explain the universal diffusion of the stones.
Taking this further, Lang offers a scientific basis for the study of myth which, again,
resembles that which we will see in Frye:
....a new science has come into existence, the science that studies man in
the sum of all his works and thoughts, as evolved through the whole
process of his development. This science, Comparative Anthropology,
examines the development of law out of custom; the developments of
weapons from the stick or stone to the latest repeating rifle; the
development of society from the horde to the nation ... It is inevitable that
this science should also try its hand on mythology.29
It is possible, then, to recognise a proto-structuralist tendency in the late nineteenth-
century that assuredly prefigures Frye. It is hardly unusual that, from within this
environment, Stevenson should begin to show a proto-structuralist tendency in the
context of his discussions about fiction. What is unusual, however, is the extent to
which Stevenson's proto-structuralism is simultaneous with an apprehension of the
limitations of structuralism. For Stevenson, that is to say, the discovery of a
structuralist method brought about the challenge of discovering what lay beyond it.
Ultimately, then, the suggestion is that Stevenson may prove more useful to us than
Frye in establishing a treatise of romance that, inasmuch as it begins to encroach
upon a post-structuralist idiom, is more in keeping with the modern theory and
practice of fiction.
The suggestion is not an unproblematic one. Stevenson, after all, belongs to
the late nineteenth-century. It is important to state at this early stage, though, that this
thesis is not a retrospective application of post-structuralist principles to the work of
Stevenson or, more widely, to the genre of romance. It is a study of romance through
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Stevenson's essays and fictions which, as one of its effects, coincides with certain
aspects of structuralist and post-structuralist criticism. It is an attempt to modify the
outmoded interpretation of romance provided by Frye's archetypal schema and to
show, through Stevenson, the development of romance as a progressive rather than
conservative idiom. With Stevenson, by this very manoeuvre, we are liable to
encounter theoretical contrasts, not only between Stevenson's ideas and those of a
'protostructuralist'30 like Frye, but between Stevenson's ideas and those arising from
a post-structuralist agenda. Stevenson's essays and fictions, as Glenda Norquay has
intimated,31 can be intensely idiosyncratic. They are, as a consequence, unique to
Stevenson and often at odds with any mainstream theory of narrative. They are by no
means presented to us, like Frye's, as a coherent body of precepts and propositions:
they are not, in other words, delivered as a system or method of interrogation.
Stevenson was fairly inept when it came to planning his work. He was opportunistic
rather than tactful. There is an engaging disorderliness about his activity as a writer.
His career is littered with abortive failures as much as it is with extraordinary
successes. Illness certainly played its part: but it should be said that, with Stevenson,
disorderliness was sometimes a matter of principle, an impulse to be obeyed, or
perhaps an impulse that, when theorised, became a principle to be obeyed. The
unrule of unorthodoxy was often too much for him to resist. But although he
undertook no consistent or organised study of fiction (as he sometimes intended), he
was nevertheless keen to make his mark as a critic and theorist. In this respect,
Stevenson seems something of a mercenary, campaigning, where necessary, against
the representational overkill of literary realism, determined and efficient in
dispatching ideas against the institutionalised creeds (mercantilism, naturalism,
22
empiricism, determinism) that, in his opinion, threatened to infect and, finally,
downgrade the development of fiction. To look at Stevenson's essays and fictions
closely is to find that, when brought together and viewed as a whole, they form a
thematic crux that transcends their otherwise rampant eclecticism and topical
diversity. They possess a conceptual constancy which, while it by no means
constitutes a systematic credo, shows in Stevenson a sustained commitment to the
discovery and implementation of a theory of fiction. In this respect, Stevenson
reveals himself to be a writer on the brink of making significant discoveries about
fiction which exceed the limitations of his immediate critical or creative
environment.
By way of providing a provisional grounds for these claims, it would be
useful to demonstrate, briefly, some of those areas where Stevenson can be seen to
prefigure Frye most effectively, some of which arise as a result of his various
exchanges with his friend and critical sparring partner, Henry James. It is during
these exchanges, which chiefly concern the forms and functions of realism and
romance, that Stevenson assembles some of his most powerful arguments and, in
doing so, invokes a remarkable correspondence, both conceptually and
terminologically, between himself and Frye. In drawing attention to this
correspondence at this early stage, we begin to recognise the need for a further study
of Stevenson in relation to Frye. We begin to recognise too Frye's failure to account
for Stevenson, one of the most prolific romancers of the modern epoch, as an initial
evidence of the need to revise Frye's account of romance in general. And, lastly, we
can begin to establish a platform for Stevenson's proto-structuralist tendency in such
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a way as will enable us, later, to throw into relief those areas where Stevenson
radically departs from the structuralist view he precociously asserts.
In his essay 'The Art of Fiction', Henry James makes some potent assertions
which, in the event of subsequent criticism, have been duly acknowledged as
'XO • •
essential to our understanding of fiction. In stating his own position, James is
adamant. Fiction works best when it attempts to accommodate the realities of life and
represent them accurately: 'The only reason for the existence of a novel is that it
does attempt to represent life ... Catching the very note and trick, the strange
irregular rhythm of life, that is the attempt whose strenuous force keeps Fiction upon
"5 "5
her feet'. These and other remarks were seized upon by Stevenson who, in 'A
Humble Remonstrance', offers some forceful emendations:
No art - to use the daring phrase of Mr James - can successfully
"compete with life"; and the art that seeks to do so is condemned to
perish montibus aviis ... The novel, which is a work of art, exists, not by
its resemblances to life, which are forced and material, as a shoe must
still consist of leather, but by its immeasurable difference from life,
which is designed and significant, and is both the method and the
meaning of the work. (HR, pp. 171-174)
It would be easy to undervalue this exchange on the grounds that it presents merely a
contest between the warring factions of an under-developed Victorian coterie: the
self-appointed high-priest of 'realism' versus the self-styled overlord of 'romance'.
However, there is a definite sense in which James and Stevenson reach a common
ground in their attempts to reconcile the perceived extremes of realism and romance.
Bearing in mind, as Wallace points out, that ' "the novel" and "realism" are often
treated as interchangeable terms',34 James complains:
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There is an old-fashioned distinction between the novel of character and
the novel of incident which must have cost many a smile to the intending
fabulist who was keen about his work. It appears to me as little to the
point as the equally celebrated distinction between the novel and the
romance - to answer as little to any reality. There are bad novels and
good novels, as there are bad pictures and good pictures; but that is the
only distinction in which I see any meaning ... What is character but the
determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration of
character?... The novel and the romance, the novel of incident and that of
character - these clumsy separations appear to me to have been made by
critics and readers for there own convenience, and to help them out of
some of their occasional queer predicaments, but to have little reality or
interest for the producer, from whose point of view it is of course that we
if
are attempting to consider the art of fiction.
In 'A Gossip on Romance', written earlier than 'A Humble Remonstrance',
Stevenson makes a similar point, although it is noticeable, already, that he implicates
realism as the property of romance, as opposed to James who appears to put each on
an equal footing:
True romantic art, again, makes a romance of all things. It reaches into
the highest abstraction of the ideal; it does not refuse even the most
pedestrian realism. Robinson Crusoe is as realistic as it is romantic; both
qualities are pushed to an extreme, and neither suffers.36
It is interesting, and perhaps unexpected, to find that James and Stevenson, biases
permitting, are effectively saying the same thing: that the extremes of realism and
romance are reciprocal tendencies acting within the same sphere of unreality -
fiction. Neither are prepared to accept the reduction of fiction to inaccurate
categories which cannot account for its full range of functions and effects. The
difference, inasmuch as there is one, is one of degree, rather than outright generic
discrepancy. Both, then, propose a view of fiction that many contemporary critics, as
we have seen with Frye, accept as a common critical currency - that the distinction
between realism and romance as separate categories of fiction is essentially bogus.
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For James, we know that accurate representation should be the prevailing aim in a
work of fiction, yet he liberally advocates the value of romance. We could say, then,
that James in some ways pre-empts Frye's admonitions against the tendency to value
realism at the expense of romance. But it is Stevenson's insistence on realism as a
method of technical artifice, rather than a means of re-presentation, that most
astutely presupposes the views expressed by twentieth-century (proto-)structuralists.
Stevenson's fairly ground-breaking assertions on 'the form and function of
the novel'37 were largely achieved through his theoretical sabotage of realism, which
involved an insistence on romance as the defining attribute of fiction and a rejection
of mimesis as a valid operation of narrative. As Norquay is at pains to point out,
however:
...it is worth remembering that his writing also attempts to re-
contextualise 'realism' as a theoretical term, offering a more sharply
theorised analysis of what would now be called the ideological
imperative of realism - that it makes itself appear as all encompassing
whereas in fact, he suggests in a letter to Bob, 'realism is a method, and
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only methodic in its consequences'.
The same argument is developed, more lucidly, in another letter to (Stevenson's
cousin, R. A. M. Stevenson) Bob:
Realism I regard as a mere question of method ... Real art, whether ideal
or realistic, addresses precisely the same feeling, and seeks the same
qualities - significance or charm. And the same - very same - inspiration
is only methodically differentiated according as the artist is an arrant
realist or an arrant idealist. Each, by his own method, seeks to save and
perpetuate the same significance of charm; the one by suppressing, and
the other by forcing detail.39
This is Stevenson in prefigurative mode, where he begins to encroach upon a
twentieth-century idiom. For Stevenson, the nineteenth-century penchant for 'pure'
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mimesis and, especially, for the scientific mimicry of naturalism meant, in practice, a
representational pedantry, a technical gerrymandering of literary form made possible
by an extraneous 'admission of detail'.40 What writers and critics needed to beware
of, Stevenson warned, was 'the tendency of this extremity of detail, when followed
as a principle, to degenerate into mere foux-de-joie of literary tricking' (NR, p. 70).
He is even more to the point in suggesting, like Frye, that the emergence of realism
in the nineteenth-century is 'a merely technical and decorative stage' in the history of
literature, that it is not so much a perfected attribute of fiction as a reflection of the
fashionable taste for a 'scientific thoroughness' in literary production:
All representative art, which can be said to live, is both realistic and
ideal; and the realism about which we quarrel is a matter purely of
externals. It has no special cultus of nature and veracity, but a mere whim
of veering fashion, that has made us turn our backs upon the larger, more
various, and more romantic art of yore....The historical novel is forgotten.
Yet the truth ofman's nature and the conditions ofman's life, the truth of
literary art, is free of the ages. It may be told us in a carpet comedy, in a
novel of adventure, or in a fairy tale. (NR, p. 70)
While James has been duly acknowledged for his substantial contribution to
the development of fiction, Stevenson, typically, has not. David Daiches complains
that 'our serious modern critics hang on every word which James has to utter about
the art of fiction, and nobody has anything to say for Stevenson's remarks on the
subject'.41 Yet it is Stevenson's diagnosis of fiction that appears to coincide more
readily with the latter-day premise of romance as the definitive condition of fiction.42
In the mean time, it is noticeable that something of a reversal has occurred in critical
attitudes towards fiction. The assumption that the novel and realism were somehow
interchangeable terms has been replaced by the acceptance of the novel as essentially
an anti-mimetic medium. This being the case, it is reasonable to suppose that there
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was a point in time where realism and romance began to be seen as ineffectual and
reductive terms belying a conceptual complexity. Frye, conveniently, is forthright in
identifying such a point:
The beginning of a new kind of criticism is marked by Oscar Wilde's
The Decay ofLying, which explains very lucidly that, as life has no shape
and literature has, literature is throwing away its one distinctive quality
when it tries to imitate life. It follows for Wilde that what is called
realism does not create but can only record things on a subcreative level:
M. Zola sits down to give us a picture of the Second Empire. Who cares
for the Second Empire now? It is out of date. Life goes faster than
Realism, but Romanticism is always in front of life.
Wilde was clearly the herald of a new age in literature, which would take
another century or so to penetrate the awareness of critics. He is looking
forward to a culture which would use mythical and romantic formulas in
its literature with great explicitness, making once more the essential
discovery about the human imagination, that it is always a form of
"lying," that is, turning away from the descriptive use of language and
the correspondence form of truth. (SS, p. 46)
Had Frye been more resourceful in his researches, he would have found a far more
suitable ally in Stevenson. It is interesting to note, in fact, that throughout Frye's
entire study of romance, whether in The Secular Scripture or Anatomy of Criticism,
there is no mention of Stevenson, which seems a fair measure of the extent of
Stevenson's exclusion from the canonical repertoire. Already we detect the need to
update Frye's account of romance. For if we are to identify an outstanding point in
time where a 'new age' in literature begins, then it is not with Wilde that we shall
find it, but with James and, especially, with Stevenson. It is with Stevenson that we
encounter the suggestion of narrative structures as self-referential rather than
referential systems of meaning. It is with Stevenson that we encounter the critical
revelation of those elements 'whose appearance', as Duncan emphasised earlier,
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'measures the difference between the novel and reality'. We can see as much in
essays like 'Some Gentlemen in Fiction' where Stevenson recommends, says
Norquay, 'that we should not look too closely for links between characters and their
creators, because characters also belong to a historical, generic and discursive
framework'.43 Characters, says Stevenson, are 'verbal puppets'; they
...are things of a divided parentage: the breath of life may be an
emanation from their maker, but they themselves are only strings of
words and parts of books; they dwell in, they belong to, literature;
convention, technical artifice, technical gusto, the mechanical necessities
of the art, these are the flesh and blood with which they are invested.44
Stevenson is bordering here on an archetypal view of structure which situates
characters among the structural assets of a pre-existing generic order and, in this
way, reveals a marked preoccupation with narrative production that prefigures Frye
considerably. At the same time, as we have stated, Stevenson's theoretical
excursions, which will be examined at length in the second section, were by no
means limited to a proto-structuralist agenda. His preoccupation with the structural
operations of narrative is such that he begins to lay the grounds for a romance of the
modern idiom that exceeds the limitations of proto-structuralist or structuralist
criticism. With this in mind, it is the purpose of this thesis to challenge the notion of
stability as the characteristic condition of romance and to redress, through Stevenson,
the traditional or institutionalised model provided by Frye. It will be argued that, by
his rigorous engagement with conventional formulae, Stevenson exploits and
exemplifies the fact that romance does not impose upon narrative a determinate
measure of structural stability, but that it is 'always already' endowed with a counter-
tendency to disrupt its stable parameters, either by the inevitable failure of its
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structurality, which Stevenson 'constructively' admits, or by an authorial
implementation of unstable alternatives. The exact nature of these counter-tendencies
remains to be seen and will, of course, be revealed in the course of this work.
This said, this thesis will assume the following format. It is divided into three
sections consisting of two chapters each. The first section, 'The Cosmology of
Romance', will begin with a short synopsis or 'textbook' summary of romance in a
general sense before embarking on a summary of romance as we understand it
through Frye. It will continue, in the second chapter, with an assertion of principles,
derived from several critical sources, that are intended to highlight some of the
weaknesses of Frye's scheme while, at the same time, as allowing us to build a
means of structural analysis appropriate to Stevenson. In asserting these principles I
intend to establish a broader theoretical context within which to situate and clarify
Stevenson's own theoretical position. Largely in response to Frye's methodology,
with its wilful insistence on the critical value of generalisations, the first section is
conducted at a fairly abstract level and issues arguments which will be latterly
refined in relation to Stevenson. The second section, 'The Genealogy of Romance',
will focus solely on Stevenson and will undertake, firstly, a 'textbook' summary of
his reputation and location in the canon; secondly, a summary of his position in
relation to Frye; and, thirdly, an extensive evaluation of his theoretical mandate for
romance (with some extensive reference to The Strange Case ofDr Jekyll and Mr
Hyde and The Master ofBallantrae). This latter evaluation will retain and refer to the
principles asserted in the first section and reflects the fact that this thesis, in
recognition of the need for a fuller analysis of Stevenson's role as a theorist, is
concerned as much with Stevenson's theoretical work (his essays) as it is with his
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fictions. The third section, meanwhile, will concentrate specifically on Stevenson's
fiction, with one chapter on Will o' the Mill and another on The Ebb-Tide. This
section will seek to apply the theoretical content of the first and second sections in a
practical sense, and will enable us to see how Stevenson implements, explores and
develops his ideas about romance in a purely fictional circumstance. It is hoped that
by exploring Will o' theMill, one of Stevenson's earliest, most neglected and, I wish
to argue, most important works, and by uncovering some of the strategies at work
within it, we may be afforded a better understanding of the anomalies and
peculiarities associated with some of Stevenson's more renowned and more widely
read compositions (such as The Ebb-Tide). Overall, this thesis is designed so that,
beginning more broadly, it gradually streamlines the issues it deals with and, with
increasing specificity, channels them through Stevenson's critical and creative
milieu.
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Part One
The Cosmology of Romance
Chapter One
The Cosmology of Romance I
Definitions are so varied, and its application so wide, that there is a certain
indeterminacy about 'romance' which may lead us to express rather vaguely, like
Gillian Beer, 'the continuity of its wildly various forms'. As Beer goes on: 'The
word's spectrum of meaning has to be wide to include Troilus and Criseyde, The
Fairie Queene, The Mysteries of Udolpho and Lord Jim, all of which have been
called romances'.1 Clearly, it is a word that requires a rigorous interpretation if it is
to have any explanatory value at all. It is the aim of this chapter, therefore, to
consolidate a preliminary definition of romance before concentrating solely on the
advanced definition developed by Frye who, as suggested previously, has done more
to enhance our understanding of romance than anyone. Beginning, then, with a
chronological overview of its 'wildly various forms', we will continue with a general
summary of its characteristic features, with the intention, overall, of moving
gradually towards Frye.
The etymological origins of the word 'romance' can be traced to the early
Middle Ages where, initially, it referred to the vernacular languages descended from
Latin and, latterly, to literatures conceived in the vernacular tongues, which consisted
mainly of chivalric romances. Eventually, as Gillian Beer points out, 'the meaning of
the word extended to include the qualities of the literature in these tongues,' which
were 'a preoccupation with love and adventure and a peculiar vagrancy of
imagination'. Literatures conceived in the vernacular offspring of Latin, however, do
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not represent the origins of romance as a form. As Beer points out: 'The romance as
a literary kind is often exclusively associated with medieval literature ... But the
romance has antecedents far back beyond twelfth-century Europe'. The fact that
Elizabethans drew 'heavily on Greek romances'2 is a measure of the influence of
classical sources. Likewise, we need only think of Shakespeare's romances to note
their dependency too on those made available through the fables, legends and ballads
of a folklore tradition. As Frye observes: 'There are hardly any comedies of
Shakespeare, and few tales told on the Canterbury pilgrimage, that do not have some
common folktale theme prominently featured in them' (SS, p. 7). Clearly, a
preliterate story-telling tradition, and the latent absorption of oral material into
written texts, has provided an abundance of raw ingredients for the burgeoning
oeuvre of romance.
So far, then, we have several tributaries feeding the one generic mainstream:
folklore, such as the tales collected by archivists like the Brothers Grimm and
Andrew Lang; Greek and Latin romances, such as those of Heliodorus or Apuleius's
The Golden Ass; and medieval or chivalric romances, such as the Arthurian legends
of Chritien de Troyes and the later adaptations of Thomas Malory. From here on, the
progress of romance becomes easier to trace. It is given fresh impetus by the
Elizabethans, who drew upon all of the sources above - and this, perhaps, served to
amalgamate the genre. Spenser's The Faerie Queene and Sidney's Arcadia are the
most prominent contributions at this stage. In the event of the novel, and mainly as a
result of Cervantes' Don Quixote, a 'deviant' strain of romance is introduced, and
one through which its complexion is thoroughly altered. Largely derived from the
'picaresque narratives' of sixteenth-century Spain, the 'parody-romance', with its
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self-reflexive irony and tendency towards farce and disenchantment, is often
regarded as a point of a separation between romance and the novel. Towards the end
of the seventeenth century, romance begins to move in several directions. A chivalric
strain continues in the French, although it begins to wear out and is confined, by
now, to aristocratic circles. It undergoes further transformations at the hands of
religious Puritans, including Bunyan and Milton, who adopted romance as a vehicle
for Christian dogma. Perhaps a more telling example of things to come lay in the
criminal romances, such as Francis Kirkman's The Counterfeit Lady Unveiled, which
engaged in a thrilling exposition of underworld activities. In the aftermath of Don
Quixote, these widely popular criminal romances showed, says Beer, 'one of the
early reconciliations between "novel" and "romance" '.3
During the age of the Enlightenment, romance comes under attack from an
intolerant literati. Samuel Johnson summarised the general mood, expressing
bewilderment at how 'this wild strain of imagination found reception so long in
polite and learned ages'.4 In spite of Jonson's condemnation, romance enjoys further
expansion in prose form, retaining as yet its chivalric connections through the work
of female novelists like Eliza Haywood, Fanny Burney and Clara Reeves. Its most
significant return to popularity, however, comes via James Macpherson's contrived
legends of Ossian (1760). Coupled with this comes the enormous impact of the
Gothic romance, initiated in 1765 with the publication of Horace Walpole's The
Castle of Otranto and galvanised further by Anne Radcliffe's The Mysteries of
Udolpho, published in 1794. The ensuing era of Romanticism further restores
romance to prominence. Again, much is extracted from the rich veins of folklore:
popular superstitions are fictionally revived in 'Tarn O' Shanter' and 'The Rhyme of
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the Ancient Mariner'; folk and fairy tales feature highly in German Romantic
literature; and a new dimension is added as poets, such as Wordsworth and
Coleridge, procure an interest in the oriental folk tales of The Arabian Nights.
Schlegel's Brief iiber den Roman {Letter about the Novel), positing romance as a
more favourable mode of fiction, proves immensely influential. Inspiration is drawn
too from Medieval and Renaissance romances. Keats, for instance, offers a
kaleidoscopic blend of all of the former strains of romance in poems like 'The Eve of
St. Agnes', which is further enhanced by his re-introduction of the Spenserian stanza.
Walter Scott, meanwhile, draws upon former romance materials in metrical
narratives such as The Lay ofthe LastMinstrel andMarmion.
Mostly as a consequence of Scott, the so-called 'prose romance' becomes a
major regenerative force in fiction throughout the nineteenth century. Further
exponents of the prose romance - which has 'as precursors the chivalric romance of
the Middle Ages and the Gothic novel of the later eighteenth century'5 - include
Scott's countryman James Hogg, English authors like Emily Bronte and Charles
Dickens, and French authors like Victor Hugo and Alexandre Dumas. An important
contribution to prose romance also comes from American writers such as Edgar
Allan Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne and Herman Melville. Depending on how we look
at it, the nineteenth century was an extremely fertile or extremely confusing period in
the development of romance. As Beer points out:
...throughout the nineteenth century the idea of "the romance" was
persistently revived and interpreted afresh by artists according to their
individual needs. As a result it begins to appear in a bizarre variety of
forms: day-dream, allegory, history, fairy-tale, horror-tale, psychological
fantasy. All could be claimed as romances.6
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There are certain varieties, however, that fit firmly into the framework. Following on
from prose romance comes the enduringly popular adventure-romances, pioneered
by Captain Marryat, Rudyard Kipling and H. Rider Haggard. Robert Fraser has
summarised the adventure-romance as 'a narrative prose form which retained the
shape and trajectory of epic or myth, while keeping in touch with the modem world
through its physical context, its characterisation, and its dialogue'.7 As the title of his
book suggests - Victorian Quest Romance: Stevenson, Haggard, Kipling and Conan
Doyle - this is the kind of romance with which Stevenson is usually associated. In the
general context of romance, however, Stevenson's fiction might best be described as
encyclopaedic in that it alludes to or incorporates all, or most, of the varieties
described above.
Much of what occurs in twentieth-century romance is a result of nineteenth-
century innovations. What is generally regarded as the genre's most significant
expansion in the twentieth-century arrives via the romance of science, or 'science
fiction'. Poe, Stevenson and Jules Veme all figure highly in the emergence of this
phase. Fantasists, such as Tolkien and Mervyn Peake, in the wake of the nineteenth-
century Scottish author George MacDonald, initiate a comparable trend with The
Lord of the Rings and the Titus Groan trilogy, establishing what is known to us now
as 'fantasy'. There are numerous twentieth-century variations which could also come
under the title of romance: 'westerns', detective or spy 'thrillers', the proverbial
'Mills and Boon' - these and more will at least partly fulfil romance criteria.
Having offered a chronology, the problem arises as to the apparent disunity
within a tradition which, in being catalogued as a tradition, ought to convey some
intrinsic unity or conglomerate range of functions and effects. It is noticeable that the
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word is seldom unaccompanied, that it is usually prefixed, or even superseded, by
some other term. Folklore, fable, chivalric, pastoral, parody, Gothic, prose,
historical, adventure, fantasy, science fiction - all of these, and more, exist as
independent items, yet all of them fall under the generic umbrella of romance. And
this in itself is an accurate indication of the nature of the genre, that it is generically
multifarious and by no means succinct - hence the difficulty in establishing a
compact definition. We can begin to establish a more adequate definition, however,
by exploring those features which are said to inhabit all of the above forms and
which, collectively, have come to represent the serial ingredients of romance.
In the first place, it is part of the effect of romance to intoxicate its readers
with mysteries, with marvellous events and with abnormal possibilities, or to create
what Gillian Beer has referred to as an 'amplitude of proportions'.8 Romance
embroiders worldliness with otherworldliness, the supernatural with the natural, the
bizarre with the ordinary. It is a form that drives an anti-representational wedge
between fiction and reality. 'All fiction', remarks Beer, 'contains two primary
impulses: the impulse to imitate daily life and the impulse to transcend it'.9 In the
case of romance, the overwhelming tendency is towards transcendence:
It oversteps the limits by which life is normally bounded. The world of
romance is ample and inclusive, sustained by its own inherent, often
obsessive laws. It is not an entire world; it intensifies and exaggerates
certain traits in human behaviour and recreates human figures out of this
exaggeration... It absorbs the reader into experience which is otherwise
unattainable. It frees us from our inhibitions and preoccupations by
drawing us entirely into its own world - a world which is never fully
equivalent to our own although it must remind us of it if we are to
understand it at all.10
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It is said of romance, moreover, that it 'likes violent stimulus'(SS, p. 23), that it is
'sensational', that it asserts 'action and plot, particularly of a violent and exciting
sort', and that it seeks to provide its readers, says John Cawelti, with 'a means of
temporary escape from the frustrations of life'. And it is in this sense that romance
has often been regarded as oppositional to realism. In stressing the point, Cawelti
reiterates some of the distinctions disputed by Stevenson and James in the
introduction, whilst drawing attention to an area of romance as yet to be discussed -
its formulaic structure: '... we can say that formulaic works necessarily stress intense
and immediate kinds of excitement and gratification as opposed to the more complex
and ambiguous analyses of character and motivation that characterise mimetic
literature'.11 The emphasis on violence and excitement, meanwhile, can be situated
under the heading of adventure, which is perhaps the most essential feature of
romance; and it is the theme of adventure, says Frye, that gives romance its particular
structure:
The essential element in romance is adventure, which means that
romance is naturally a sequential and processional form ... As soon as
romance achieves a literary form, it tends to limit itself to a sequence of
minor adventures leading up to a major or climacteric adventure, usually
announced at the beginning, the completion of which rounds off the
story. (AC, pp.186 -187)
What Frye, in fact, is describing is 'the element that gives literary form to romance,
the quest' (AC, p. 187), an aspect of romance which will be studied in detail in due
course. Accordingly, we might furnish the quest apparatus with additional elements,
some of which are summarised by Beer. Broadly common to any romance,
regardless of time or place in the canon, are
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...the themes of love and adventure, a certain withdrawal from their own
societies on the part of both reader and romance hero, profuse sensuous
detail, simplified characters (often with a suggestion of allegorical
significance), a serene intermingling of the unexpected and the everyday,
a complex and prolonged succession of incidents... a happy ending,
amplitude of proportions, a strongly enforced code of conduct to which
1 9
all characters must comply.
As Beer suggests, the theme of love plays a prominent role and is the central feature
of some romances, often serving as the object of the quest itself. But while the quest
apparatus remains firmly intact over time, romance presents, over the course of its
development, a variable range of quest-objectives:
....sexual love is one of the great themes of the romance. It is not,
however, quite as universal as is sometimes suggested. In some
romances, adventure which commonly goes alongside love as the great
theme and machinery of the work, may take over entirely. The search for
treasure, whether it be Grail or gold, or dragon's horde, is engrossing
enough in itself, and the object of the quest serves as the love-object.
Pilgrim's Progress, Treasure Island and The Hobbit are three romance-
mutants of this sort.13
Given the variety of quest-objectives, and the variety of examples given by Beer, we
might seem, yet again, to be experiencing a disunity among the forms of romance.
According to Frye, however, the shifting planes of emphasis described above can be
accounted for by the principle of displacement. In the same way that realism is
reckoned to be a displacement of romance, so the various forms of romance, when
related to one another as a whole, can be regulated as a continuous series of
displacements which have undergone, through successive shifts over time, an organic
modification of narrative 'structure to a demand for greater conformity to ordinary
experience' (SS, p. 39). In comparing, for example, the general characteristics of
Medieval romance with the prose variety of the early nineteenth century, we find
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significant adjustments in where and how there occurs an 'amplitude of proportions'.
In describing each in isolation, M. H. Abrams indicates a number of differences. Of
the chivalric form, he relates:
Its standard plot is one of a quest undertaken by a single knight in order
to gain his lady's favour; frequently its central interest is courtly love,
together with tournaments fought and dragons and monsters slain for the
damsel's sake; it stresses the chivalric ideals of courage, loyalty, honour,
mercifulness to an opponent, and exquisite and elaborate manners; and it
delights in wonders and marvels. Supernatural events in the epic had
their causes in the will and actions of the gods; romance shifts the
supernatural to this world, and makes much of the mysterious effect of
magic, spells, and enchantments.14
Of prose romance, on the other hand, Abrams states:
It usually deploys characters who are sharply discriminated as heroes and
villains, masters or victims; its protagonist is often solitary, and relatively
isolated from a social context; it tends to be set in the historical past, and
the atmosphere is such as to suspend the reader's expectations based on
everyday experience. The plot of prose romance emphasizes adventure,
and is frequently cast in the form of the quest for the ideal, or the pursuit
of an enemy; and the nonrealistic and occasionally melodramatic events
are claimed by some critics to project in symbolic form the primal
desires, hopes and terrors in the depths of the human mind, and to be
therefore analogous to the materials of dream, myth, ritual and folklore.15
It is apparent that the supernatural unreality of the former mode has given way to a
more secularised unreality where the 'otherworldliness' of romance is engendered
not so much by its inclusion of the supernatural as by its elaborated or 'spectral' re¬
presentation of the distant historical past. According to the principle of displacement,
however, it is noticeable that, while the supernatural oddities of the chivalric
romances have given way to the less extravagant oddities of the prose romances, the
structural characteristics of each, presented in terms of the quest, remain the same.
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It is the structural regularity among the various strains of romance, says Frye,
that amalgamates them under one heading. In spite of its representational diversity,
romance consistently adheres to the quest structure and, in doing so, abides by a
number of devices which are said to recur throughout its full range of displacements,
meaning that romance can be reduced to a single model, and that its plurality can be
limited to an underlying totality which operates, synchronically, above and beyond
specific historical junctures. In emphasising the point, while at the same time
registering some of the typical components of the romance machinery, Frye
observes:
In the Greek romances we find stories of mysterious birth, oracular
prophecies about the future contortions of plot, foster parents, adventures
which involve capture by pirates, narrow escapes from death, recognition
of the true identity of the hero and his eventual marriage with the
heroine. We open, let us say, Guy Mannering, written fifteen centuries
later, and we find that, although there are slight changes in the setting,
the kind of story being told, a story of mysterious birth, oracular
prophecies, capture by pirates, and the like, is very much the same. In
Greek romance the characters are Levantine, the setting in the
Mediterranean world, and the normal means of transportation is by
shipwreck. In science fiction the characters may be earthlings, the setting
the intergalactic spaces, and what gets wrecked in hostile territory a
spaceship, but the tactics of the storyteller generally conform to much the
same outlines. (SS, pp. 4-5)
Having suggested the basic principle that romance, as a genre, is consolidated by the
recurrence of plot through time, it becomes possible to determine the structure of
romance systematically and to make a systematic analysis of its typical, or
archetypal, functions. This, at least, has been a principal object of Northrop Frye,
whose theory of archetypes will be summarised in miniature in the following sub¬
sections of this chapter. In providing such a summary, it becomes necessary to
incorporate some of Frye's theories in a broader sense, inasmuch as they refer to
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literature as a whole, after which we can begin to limit the discussion to romance
alone.
The Theory ofArchetypes
Seen as a whole, romance forms what Northrop Frye describes as a 'stable genre'.
The secret of its stability, he says, resides in the enduring strength of its conventions:
'... the conventions of prose romance show little change over the course of centuries,
and conservatism of this kind is the mark of a stable genre' (SS, p. 4). As part of the
need to locate definitions, it might be useful to ask ourselves exactly what is meant
by the term 'conventions' and, likewise, to ascertain the difference, if there is one,
between conventions and archetypes.
As regards conventions, the answer seems fairly straightforward. As M. H.
Abrams explains, conventions are 'conspicuous features of subject matter, form, or
technique which occur repeatedly in works of literature', 'recurrent types of
character, turns of plot, forms of versification, or kinds of diction and style'. If this is
too general, then we can develop it further by isolating what Abrams alludes to as the
'most inclusive' definition of conventions, which takes us closer to Frye's
archetypes, where, 'common in structuralist criticism, all literary works, no matter
how seemingly realistic, are held to be entirely constituted by literary conventions, or
"codes" - of genre, plot, character, language, and so on...'.16
The notion of conventions as 'codes', rather than, simply, repeated or
recurrent images, is more illuminating in terms of their operational significance. To
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think of codes is to think of 'a system of letters or symbols, and rules for their
association by means of which information can be represented or communicated for
reasons of secrecy, brevity, etc.' (CED). Conventions as codes, it follows, must
harbour a communicable message, or a certain kind of information which can only be
expressed through a system of symbols held together by special rules of association.
(The etymological origins of word 'code' are interesting, coming from the French
codex, meaning book, which returns us directly to a literary context). In a related
sense, we might also think of the implications of conventions as an innate
distribution of organic design-forces, something akin to the genetic 'codes' that
structure animal or plant species or similar phenomena in the natural sciences (and
these are analogies, as we shall see, which are often relied upon by Frye). A code of
conventions, then, can mean any one of two things: firstly, that the recurrence of
conventions is determined by an underlying 'natural' order; and, secondly, that
conventions form an interior framework of symbols capable of semantic expansion
so that, in Frye's terms, 'the meaning or pattern' of a literary work can be thought of
as 'a structure of imagery with conceptual implications' (AC, p. 136).
When it comes to assigning the significance of conventions, Frye reduces the
rather loose concept of conventions to the rigidity of archetypes in a way that
galvanises the principles stated above. The initial difference between conventions
and archetypes appears to be one of degree. Abrams' definition of archetypes, for
example, coincides, more or less, with his definition of conventions, albeit there are
some slight modifications: '... the term archetype denotes recurrent narrative designs,
patterns of action, character types, or images which are said to be identifiable in a
wide variety of works of literature...'.17 Archetypes are conventions, he implies, that
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occur throughout a wide variety of texts as single items invested with a trans-textual
capability. In turning to Frye's own definition, meanwhile, we can begin to see some
telling distinctions: 'The symbol ... is the communicable unit, to which I give the
name archetype: that is, a typical or recurring image' (AC, p. 99). We notice here that
archetypes are 'units of communication' (AC, p. 104) arranged, continues Frye, in
'associative clusters' (AC, p. 102), rather like a code. And it is as a code of
'conventional associations' - 'most easily studied in highly conventionalized
literature: that is, for the most part, naive, primitive, and popular literature', but
nevertheless discernible throughout 'the rest of literature' (AC, p. 104) - that we can
finally draw a distinction between conventions and archetypes. The difference is
such that archetypes are conventions which assume their role throughout literature in
its entirety. As Frye points out:
I mean by an archetype a symbol which connects one poem with another
and thereby helps to unify and integrate our literary experience. And as
the archetype is the communicable symbol, archetypal criticism is
primarily concerned with literature as a social fact and as a mode of
communication. By the study of conventions and genres, it attempts to fit
poems [Frye's word for literary works in general] into the body of poetry
[or literature] as a whole. (AC, p. 99)18
According to Frye, it becomes possible to detect in literature, a la language, 'a
grammar of literary archetypes' (AC, p. 135), and to read in them a particular set of
meanings which, because they are expressed repeatedly through time, lead Frye to
conclude that 'the narrative aspect of literature is a recurrent act of symbolic
communication: in other words a ritual...' (AC, p. 105).
The archetype, then, is a structural item both in a purely functional sense and
in the sense that it is endowed with a particular meaning or communicative value
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which is not local to any given narrative, but universal. In the following sub-section,
I wish to consider the ways in which Frye, in spite of the immense diversity of
individual narratives, is able to apply a collateral theory of structure, before
considering the same in relation to the communicative value of structure. Before
doing so, however, it is necessary to say something of Carl Gustav Jung, who is in
many ways the Godfather of archetypal criticism. In looking briefly at Jung, we can
begin to draw attention to another important aspect of Frye's anatomy - namely that
concerning the role of the author.
Frye's concept of archetypes is ultimately derived from the concept of
archetypes developed by Carl Gustav Jung in the early twentieth century. In Jungian
psychology, archetypes are 'primordial images' issuing 'from a "collective
unconscious" ' which 'is detached from anything personal and common to all men'.19
Underlying the 'individuated' self, these 'primordial images' constitute 'the inherited
possibilities of human imagination as it was from time immemorial' and are said to
belong 'not to the domain of the personal memory but to the secrets of the mental
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history of mankind'. Paving the way for critics like Frye, the concept of archetypes
was applied by Jung, not only to the dreams and disorders of his patients, but to the
constructive principles of storytelling: 'The fact of this inheritance explains the truly
amazing phenomenon that certain motifs from myths and legends repeat themselves
the world over in identical forms... I have called these images or motifs "archetypes"
, 21
It follows from this that the production of narrative no longer pertains to the
individual subject but to what Jung refers to as 'the autonomous complex', described
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by Elizabeth Wright 'as a central force in the mind, manifesting itself through the
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archetypes of the collective unconscious'. Introducing the idea, Jung asserts:
The unborn work in the psyche of the artist is a force of nature that
achieves its end either with tyrannical might or with the subtle cunning of
nature herself quite regardless of the personal fate of the man who is its
vehicle. The creative urge lives and grows in him like a tree in the earth
from which it draws nourishment. We would do well, therefore, to think
of the creative process as a living thing implanted in the human psyche.
In the language of analytical psychology this living thing is an
autonomous complex. It is a split-off portion of the psyche, which leads a
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life of its own outside the hierarchy of consciousness.
'For Jung,' says Wright, 'the collective unconscious is the pure source of art,
muddied somewhat by the "tributaries" from the personal unconscious'.24 The same
principle is maintained by Frye in his adaptation of the archetypal theory and is
applied by him as an alternative view to notions concerning the role of the author as
the arbiter ofhis work. As Wright explains:
Frye is with Jung in so far as Jung's emphasis on the communal aspect of
the creative process and on the work of art undermines the favoured view
of the artist as an original genius and instead makes him a medium for
the transmission of archetypal myths and images.25
In his own terms, Frye defines the individual literary work as the manifestation of an
order of symbols that pre-exists the individual author:
Just as a new scientific discovery manifests something that was already
latent in the order of nature, and at the same time is logically related to
the total structure of the existing science, so the new poem manifests
something that was already latent in the order ofwords. (AC, p. 97)
Where Jung has remarked that it 'is not Goethe that creates Faust, but Faust that
creates Goethe',26 so we find with Frye that 'Literature shapes itself, and is not
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shaped externally' (AC, p. 97). Where Jung has described the creative process as a
natural force, so we find with Frye that the author 'is not the father of his poem; he is
at best the midwife, or, more accurately, the womb of Mother nature herself...' (AC,
p. 98). And it is with a similar regard for Jung that Frye expands the theory of
archetypes to account for the structure and meaning of literature as a whole, the
structural aspect of which will be summarised now and the meaning of which
immediately after.
Archetypal Structure
To summarise Frye's envisaged totality is to flirt with generalisations. Nevertheless,
the fault, if it is a fault, is entirely his own, and one which he is prepared to argue for
without seeking some kind of critical immunisation. On the contrary, Frye insists that
to generalise is not a crime, but a reflex necessary to the collective critical mind: 'We
have to adopt the hypothesis... that just as there is an order of nature behind the
natural sciences, so literature is not a pile aggregate of "works", but an order of
words', 'a central hypothesis which, like the theory of evolution in biology, will see
the phenomenon it deals with as parts of a whole' (AC, pp. 16 - 17).
Frye's hypothesis is intended to account for the development of literature as
having undergone a sequence of phases through time, beginning with myth and,
according to Frye, descending through a successive series of displacements, ranging
from the various forms of romance to the various forms of realism. Different modes
of narrative, in the simplest sense, can be graded according to whether or not their
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'hero's power of action' conforms to, or exceeds, 'the ordinary laws of nature' (AC,
p. 33) as we generally perceive them. Myths, for example, such as Greek or Biblical
myths, are stories about divine super-beings whose actions exceed the actions that
we, as ordinary human beings, are capable of performing. Romances are stories, not
about gods, but about human heroes whose actions, while they resemble our own,
tend nevertheless to exceed them. Realistic fictions, meanwhile, tend to represent
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characters in a world which, with reasonable accuracy, resembles our own. The
same applies, of course, when we are talking about the other characters or content of
any given story within any given mode of fiction. In myths, the supernatural and
extraordinary are its definitive attributes and occur quite readily; in realism, so-
called, the attempt is to adhere to the natural and ordinary as faithfully as possible. In
myths, the structural features openly inhabit 'an abstract or purely literary world of
fictional design'. Realistic fiction, on the other hand, expresses 'a plausible
adaptation to familiar experience' (AC, p. 136) which lessens our awareness of its
intrinsic fictionality. The crux of the matter for Frye is that, regardless of whether a
story's characters are gods or heroes or 'ordinary' humans, they will continue to
perform the same functions as recurrent symbols within a story's narrative structure.
By the same token, all other contingent structural features will do the same.
In a more complex sense, part of the process of displacement, as explained in
the introduction, involves a proliferation of descriptive and discursive detail which
further subordinates the abstract quality of narrative structure to a greater demand for
representational accuracy. To take an easy example: in a myth such as The Voyage of
the Argos, the structure of the story, which is a quest, is clearly visible, while in the
increased realism of a 'displaced' novel like Conrad's Heart of Darkness, the
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structure of the story, though a quest, is largely obscured by Marlow's descriptive
and discursive rhetoric. In the case of the former, the hero's (Jason's) power of
action regularly exceeds that of our own while, in the case of the latter, the hero's
(Marlow's) power of action is more or less coincident with our own. The critical
dictum stands, according to Frye, that in 'myth we see the structural principles of
literature isolated; in realism we see the same structural principles (not similar ones)
fitting into a context of plausibility' (AC, p. 136). In contextualising this principle in
relation to romance, meanwhile, Frye states:
Myth, then, is one extreme of literary design; naturalism is the other, and
in between lies the whole area of romance, using that term to mean ... the
tendency ... to displace myth in a human direction and yet, in contrast to
"realism," to conventionalize content in an idealized direction. (AC, pp.
136 - 137)
In effect, then, Frye is applying the same principle given earlier (that romance is
consolidated by the recurrence of plot through time) to the whole of western
literature, pointing out only that 'the more undisplaced a story, the more sharply the
design stands out' (SS, p. 38). In spite of the diachronic development of narrative as a
series of displacements through time, it maintains, synchronically, a structural unity;
it is bound by associative clusters of archetypes and able, therefore, to fulfil its
function as a recurrent act of symbolic communication, what Frye has described as a
ritual.
Within this scheme, the genre of romance, as Frye has repeatedly stated,
occupies a special place of narrative neutrality, affording, as we have seen, 'an
unobstructed view of archetypes' and exhibiting the primary functions of narrative in
their most concentrated aspect. Consequently, it is through romance that the idea of a
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literary totality can be demonstrated most effectively and most effectively engaged.
Frye, in fact, distinguishes between two phases of romance, one which represents its
earliest or most primitive stages ('naive romance'), and one which represents its
ascendancy through literature ('sentimental romance'). Naive romance, says Frye, 'is
the kind of story that is found in collections of folk-tales and marcherf, while
sentimental romance (which begins, for Frye, in the late Classical period) is 'a more
extended and literary development of the formulas of naive romance' (SS, p. 1). In
Frye's way of thinking, folk-tales represent the structural origins of romance. They
are rigidly formulaic and present the archetypal structure in its most abstract form.
From these evolve the more sophisticated narratives which eventually find
expression in writing, some of the earliest of which are identified by Frye as the
Greek pastoral romances of the second and third centuries. Following its transition to
literary status, the various streams and permutations of romance may seem endless,
but they will always refer back to an archetypal model which, in the case of romance,
is best exampled in folktales.
We recognise the shift from naive to sentimental romance as being among the
broader operations of Frye's theory of displacement, where the naive extremity of
folktales eventually gives way to the increased degrees of sophistication made
possible by writing. Romance, accordingly, will eventually give way to more
plausible varieties of fiction in the ways already described in this and the previous
chapter. We could say, overall, that if realism is a militant extension of form,
archetypal criticism is a militant reduction of form to basic models. Upon this
principle, Frye is able to conclude:
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Total literary history gives us a glimpse of the possibility of seeing
literature as a complication of a relatively restricted simple group of
formulas that can be studied in primitive culture. We next realise that the
relation of later literature to these primitive formulas is by no means
purely one of complication, as we find the primitive formulas
reappearing in the greatest classics - in fact there seems to be a general
tendency on the part of the great classics to revert to them. (AC, p. 17)
The most recognisable formula that Frye attributes to fiction is the scenario of the
quest, which we have already identified as the characteristic structure of romance. In
his application of the archetypal credo, however, Frye offers a much more detailed
description of how the constituent phases of the quest are liable to occur:
The complete form of the romance is clearly the successful quest, and
such a completed form has three main stages: that stage of the perilous
journey and the preliminary minor adventure; the crucial struggle,
usually some kind of battle in which the hero or his foe, or both, must
die; and the exaltation of the hero. We may call these three stages
respectively, using Greek terms, the agon or conflict, the pathos or death-
struggle, and the anagnorisis or discovery, the recognition of the hero,
who has clearly proved himself to be a hero even if he does not survive
the conflict. (AC, pp. 186-187)
Thereafter, we are able to establish the relevant associations between the characters
who participate in the quest scenario. As Frye explains:
The characterization of romance follows its general dialectic structure,
which means that subtlety and complexity are not much favoured.
Characters tend to be either for or against the quest. If they assist it they
are idealized as simply gallant or pure; if they obstruct it they are
caricatured as simply villainous or cowardly. Hence every typical
character in romance tends to have his moral opposite confronting him,
like black and white pieces in a chess game. (AC, p. 195)
Most conspicuous in 'primitive' formulae, Frye's model of romance can be applied
to fiction in general, though, by various degrees of displacement, it assumes more
complex forms than we see, for example, in Grimms' Fairy Tales. It becomes
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possible, in this respect, to identify a structural uniformity between Jason's pursuit of
the golden fleece in The Voyage of the Argos and Elizabeth Bennet's pursuit of a
suitor in Pride and Prejudice; between Ahab's vengeful pursuit of the white whale in
Moby Dick and Rebus's pursuit of his daughter's abductor in Knots and Crosses', or
between Dante's pursuit of the truth in The Divine Commedy and Joseph K's pursuit
of the truth in The Trial. To detect an archetypal uniformity of structure is one thing.
But the question remains as to how the same principle can be applied in relation to
communicative value or, in other words, meaning.
ArchetypalMeaning
If archetypes are conventions which have attained the status of 'units of
communication', it follows that they must have something to communicate. The fact
that they communicate something betrays an intrinsic relationship between structure
(the cumulative arrangement of conventional associations) and meaning (the
cumulative arrangement of conventional associations as communicable units).
Structure in this sense is a species of code or semiology where the interactive
symbols and images (or archetypes) are capable of achieving a literary totality in a
semantic as well as structural sense.
Broadly speaking, Frye begins to interpret the archetypal meaning of
literature as follows: 'The archetypal view of literature shows us literature as a total
form and literary experience as a part of the continuum of life, in which one of the
poet's functions is to visualize the goals of human work' (AC, p. 115). The so-called
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goals of human work are defined by Frye as the human desire for civilisation.
'Civilisation', he says, is 'the process of making a total human form out of nature,
and it is impelled by the force [of] desire' (AC, p. 105). It is within the domain of art,
especially, that the desire for civilisation can be most effectively organised and
expressed:
In its archetypal aspect, art is a part of civilisation, and civilisation we
defined as the process of making a human form out of nature. The shape
of this human form is revealed by civilisation itself as it develops: its
major components are the city, the garden, the farm, the sheep-fold, and
the like, as well as human society itself. An archetypal symbol is usually
a natural object with a human meaning, and it forms part of the critical
view of art as a civilized product, a vision of the goals of human work.
(AC, p. 113)
Literature, in other words, enables the transformation of the chaos of nature and
reality which contains us into a desirable order and social stability, of a kind which is
analogous to the general pursuit of extending a human control over nature and of
issuing an imaginative transformation of reality through the practices of art.
However, says Frye, literature 'not only tries to illustrate the fulfdment of desire, but
to define the obstacles to it' (AC, p. 106). Ultimately, then, the total meaning of
literature, in its archetypal phase, can be summarised as 'a presentation of the
conflict of desire and actuality' (AC, p. Ill) where the conflict is between the desire
for the accomplishment of civilisation over the fear and threat of 'the world that
desire totally rejects: the world of nightmare ... the world as it is before human
imagination begins to work on it... the world also of perverted or wasted work, ruins
and catacombs, instruments of torture and monuments of folly' (AC, p. 147).
Literature is therefore characterised by a 'moral dialectic in desire', between 'wish-
fulfilment dream and the anxiety or nightmare dream of repugnance'; or, by 'a
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dialectic of desire and repugnance: desire for fertility or victory, repugnance to
drought or enemies' (AC, p. 106).
These expansive claims can be substantiated somewhat if we relate them to
romance and, specifically, to the structure of the quest. According to Frye, 'the quest-
romance is the search of the libido or desiring self for a fulfilment that will deliver it
from reality but will still contain that reality' and is often exampled, archetypally, by
'the victory of fertility over the waste land' (AC, p. 193). St. George's legendary
killing of the dragon and King Arthur's attainment of the Holy Grail, where, in each
of these cases, the land is restored to its former social and agricultural vitality, are
two such examples. The same theme can be said to persist throughout a variety of
displacements. In the film Jaws, for instance, Chief Brodie engages in a similar quest
to St. George in seeking to rid the prosperous resort of Amity Island of the monster-
shark that threatens to collapse the island's economic infrastructure by driving away
its influx of tourists. The fertility of the land, as such, is not at stake, but the social
implications - the prospect of chaos and disintegration among the community, of
economic ruin and the intrusion of savage forces upon the human transformation of
nature - are the same. The quest for the Grail, meanwhile, finds numerous
equivalents in the quest-for-treasure motif (of which Stevenson's Treasure Island is,
probably, the best example), and exhibits the archetypal theme of the recovery of the
quest object as a means of restoring the degraded social order to a desirable status.
Relating this to the function of characters, heroes, as archetypal components of the
quest, become embodiments of the desire for that which is desirable, while villains,
who act as obstacles to the quest, become embodiments of that which is undesirable
and detested. As archetypes, heroes and villains are analogues presented in stories
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which are themselves analogues of the conflict between desire and actuality. Each
acquires a significance and moral value that exceeds the limitations of their
immediate fictional circumstance (that which is desirable is 'good', which means that
the hero is good, while that which is undesirable is 'evil', which means that the
villain is evil). As such, romance, collectively, consists of ritual re-enactments of the
attempt to visualise the goals of human work and communicates the triumph of
civilisation over the undesirable alternatives that threaten to prevent it. The
accomplishment of the quest, meanwhile, becomes part of the metaphorical fabric of
romance as a whole, where individual narratives can be conceived as the dispersed
representations of an absolute model.
Given the possibility of an archetypal or absolute model, and given the
position of this model as an imaginative transformation of the world that contains us,
it is necessary, says Frye, to consider 'the conception of literature existing in its own
universe' (AC, p. 122). Or, to put it another way: 'The study of archetypes is the
study of literary symbols as parts of a whole. If there are such things as archetypes at
all, then, we have to take yet another step, and conceive the possibility of a self-
contained literary universe' (AC, p. 118). In accepting the possibility of a self-
contained literary universe, it is necessary to recognise, as part of its organising
principle, what Frye describes as 'the still center of the order of words'. 'Without
such a centre,' Frye opines, 'there is nothing to prevent the analogies supplied by
convention and genre from being an endless series of free associations, perhaps
suggestive, perhaps even tantalizing, but never creating a real structure' (AC, pp. 117
- 118). On a purely archetypal level, a structural centre can be identified in the
recurrence of those symbols which embody 'images of things common to all men'.
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One such symbol, the quest, we have already referred to, albeit there are others: 'If
archetypes are communicable symbols, and there is a center of archetypes, we should
expect to find, at that center, a group of universal symbols... Such symbols include
those... of the quest or journey, of light and darkness, and of sexual fulfilment, which
would usually take the form of marriage' (AC, p. 118). But, in order to fully justify
and explain his proposition of 'literature existing in its own universe', Frye attempts
to elevate his archetypal credo onto a further level ofmeaning.
Anagogic Meaning
In Frye's terms, it is not through the archetypal phase alone that literature acquires its
maximum totality. 'The archetypal view of literature shows us literature as a total
form and literary experience as a part of the continuum of life', he inclines, but 'the
archetypal phase' is not 'the ultimate one' (AC, p. 115). According to Frye, the
ultimate view of literature involves its expansion into anagogic, or mythical, planes
of significance, where (what Ian Duncan calls) the 'collective dreamwork' of 'an
immanence of archetypes' is said to contain and convey the ideological postulates
of a Western metaphysical tradition. 'The form[s] of literature most deeply
influenced by anagogy', explains Frye, are the 'definitive myths, or organizations of
archetypes' like those of 'the scripture or apocalyptic revelation'. But anagogy is not
confined to 'the mythical or theogenic mode' (AC, p. 120) alone. There is, says Frye,
an anagogic potential residing among the archetypal unit or combination which
forms a trans-textual cosmology, best represented in myth, but extending 'vertically'
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throughout the whole range of narratives, most actively through the medial 'horizon'
of romance.
It is in realising this anagogic potential that literature achieves its cosmic
amplitude, striking a radical parity between its own (metaphysical) functions and the
(physical) functions of the natural world:
We see the relation to anagogy also in the vast encyclopaedic structure of
poetry that seems to be a whole world in itself, that stands to culture as
an inexhaustible storehouse of imaginative suggestion, and seems, like
theories of gravitation or relativity in the physical universe, to be
applicable to, or have analogous connections with, every part of the
literary universe. (AC, pp. 120 - 121)
So it is that Frye's literary universe, based on 'the assumption of total coherence'
(AC, p. 16), is said to consist of the immemorial totality of Western literary
experience which, in being expressed via an elaborate 'cosmology' of archetypes,
performs an analogous and interpretative function when assessed in relation to
exterior contingencies. For Frye, says M. H. Abrams, 'literary works constitute a
"self-contained literary universe" which has been created over the ages by the human
imagination'. 'Viewed archetypally', Abrams goes on, 'literature turns out to play an
essential role in refashioning the material universe into an alternative verbal universe
that is humanly intelligible and viable, because it is adapted to essential human needs
and concerns'.29
On a purely archetypal level, we remember, the object of art is to make a total
human form out of nature as part of the continuum of human work. On an anagogical
level, however, the position of nature as the container and man as the contained is
reversed. Here, literature evolves into an alternative verbal universe which, through
phases of imaginative transformation, has been made 'humanly intelligible and
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viable' and adapted 'to essential human needs and concerns' so as to reflect, in the
end, a vision of the universe as Man ultimately, beyond the scope of his material
existence, desires it:
When we pass into anagogy, nature becomes, not the container, but the
thing contained, and the archetypal universal symbols, the city, the
garden, the quest, the marriage, are no longer the desirable forms that
man constructs inside nature, but are themselves the forms of nature.
Nature is now inside the mind of an infinite man who builds his cities out
of the Milky Way. This is not reality, but it is the conceivable or
imaginative limit of desire, which is infinite, eternal, and hence
apocalyptic. By an apocalypse I mean primarily the imaginative
conception of the whole of nature as the content of an infinite and eternal
living body which, if not human, is closer to being human than to being
inanimate. (AC, p. 119)
On entering Frye's alternative literary universe, we are enabled a visionary accession
to anagogic planes ofmeaning, whereby the realisation of the goals of human work is
not restricted to the secular accomplishment of civilisation. Rather, civilisation - the
process of making a human form out of nature - becomes merely a stage in the
process of entering a metaphysical 'center of imaginative experience' (AC, p. 117).
Just as there exists a group of universal symbols at the centre of archetypes, so there
exists an anagogic centre where the archetypal functions of narrative structure can be
reduced, as it were, to the 'Archetype Proper' - in other words, the Logos - the point
from which the literary universe assumes its infinite distribution of conventional
associations:
The sense of the infinitely varied unity of poetry may come, not only
explicitly from an apocalyptic epic, but implicitly from any poem ... Thus
the center of the literary universe is whatever poem we happen to be
reading. One step further, and the poem appears as a microcosm of all
literature, an individual manifestation of the total order of words.
Anagogically, then, the symbol is a monad, all symbols being united in a
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single infinite and eternal verbal symbol which is, as dianoia [meaning],
the Logos... (AC, p. 121)
The status of the monad as eternal verbal symbol is translated, in narrative terms,
through what Frye describes as 'analogies of revelation' (AC, p. 121), narratives
where 'the incarnate Word' (AC, p. 122) undergoes a metaphorical transfiguration
from preliterate sublimity to verbal signification. Those works which come closest to
the apocalyptic disclosure of the Logos are, Frye has suggested, the 'definitive
myths, or complete organizations of archetypes', such as those in the Classical or
Biblical mythologies, or 'the epics of Dante and Milton and their counterparts in
other modes' (AC, p. 121). We have moved, then, from the human goal of
civilisation to the apocalyptic disclosure of the linguistic avatar, the Logos, the
meaning of which is translated, narratorially, through the archetypal analogues (or
metaphors) of character and setting:
Here the dianoia [the meaning] of art is no longer a mimesis logou, but
the Logos, the shaping word which is both reason and, as Goethe's Faust
speculates, praxis or creative act. The ethos [the character and setting] of
art is no longer a group of characters within a natural setting, but a
universal man who is also a divine being, or a divine being conceived in
anthropomorphic terms. (AC, p. 120)
The Logos, effectively, becomes the Telos, conceived, in anthropomorphic terms, as
the archetypal figure of the mythical Christ or Godhead. In this we discover the site
of an omnific totality, the origin and eventuality of total meaning, the 'still centre' of
Frye's literary universe made visible in narrative through conventional symbols and
images: 'The god, whether traditional deity, glorified hero, or apotheosized poet, is
the central image that poetry uses in trying to convey the sense of unlimited power in
human form' (AC, p. 120). As Frye points out, 'the independence of the anagogic
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perspective' is such that it need not be religious: 'Joyce's non-theological use of the
theological term epiphany' or 'Dylan Thomas's exultant hymns to a universal human
body' (AC, p. 122) show a comparable, if not identical, trend.
As we have said, the myths of the Biblical and Classical traditions are the
narratives in which the structural ordination of Frye's literary universe finds its most
powerful expression. Considering that romance is a displacement of myth, we may
conclude that the structure of romance is organised in the same way and that it
performs a similar function, remembering, of course, that, in being a displacement of
myth, any apocalyptic disclosures in romance will occur implicitly. Looking at this
in detail, and by limiting our discussion of Frye to romance alone, it becomes
possible to determine the structure of romance as belonging to, as he describes it, the
mythopoeic formula.
The Mythopoeic Formula
The relationship between myth and romance is given special attention by Frye who,
we have seen, regards these modes as part of the 'general category of mythopoeic
literature' (AC, p. 188). Among the differences, he suggests, 'between the mythical
and the fabulous is a difference in authority and social function, not in structure' (SS,
p. 8). Myths, in other words, tend 'to stick together to form a mythology, a large
interconnected body of narrative' which has a particular significance, Frye contends,
in explaining a 'society's religion, laws, social structure, environment, history, or
cosmology'. Romance, meanwhile, consists of a heterogeneous mix of stories that
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'lead a nomadic existence' and that, apparently, 'do not expand into larger structures'
(SS, p. 9). These stories, which include everything from folktales to science fiction,
'seem to be of less importance' and are primarily designed to 'amuse or entertain'
(SS, p. 6). The value of romance, then, in relation to myths, appears to be negligible.
As Frye has stated, however:
If we were concerned only with structural features we should hardly be
able to distinguish between them at all. Most of the stories about the
accepted divine beings are myths rather than folktales, but structurally
this distinction is more one of content than of actual shape. (SS, p. 8)
Thus the structural role of the biblical Christ, if we cast aside the theological
implications, begins to resemble the role of redeemer figures like, for example,
Edmund Dantes from The Count ofMonte Cristo. The only difference, structurally,
between the mythical hero and the hero of romance, says Frye, is that 'in the myth
proper he is divine, in the romance proper he is human. This distinction is much
sharper theologically than it is poetically...' (AC, p. 188).
Given the structural identification between myth and romance, Frye is
inclined to asked: 'Is it possible, then, to look at secular stories as a whole, and as
forming a single integrated vision of the world, parallel to the Christian and biblical
vision?' It is with this in mind that Frye labels romance a secular scripture and seeks
to establish its unity
... as a total verbal order, with the outlines of an imaginative universe
also in it. The Bible is the epic of the creator, with God as its hero.
Romance is the structural core of all fiction: being directly descended
from folktale, it brings us closer than any other aspect of literature to the
sense of fiction, considered as a whole, as the epic of the creature, man's
vision of his own life as a quest. (SS, p. 15)
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Frye, then, is proposing that a displacement has occurred whereby the divine
illustrations of myth are paralleled by a secular variety in the stories of romance.
Taking this a stage further, it is by asserting the anagogic value of archetypal
functions that Frye is able to establish a correlation between the structures of
romance and the structures of myth, both of which begin to reveal contiguous
patterns ofmeaning in an anagogic, as well as archetypal, sense.
To demonstrate this we have to consider what Frye eventually comes round
to calling the 'central principle of displacement', where the difference between
romance and myth can be measured according to a deflation, in romance, of the
metaphorical potential that is indigenous to myth. As Frye suggests:
... what can be metaphorically identified in myth can only be linked in
romance by some form of simile: analogy, significant association,
incidental accompanying imagery, and the like. In a myth we can have a
sun-god or a tree-god; in a romance we may have a person who is
significantly associated with the sun or trees. (AC, p. 137)
A more specific example is offered by Frye:
In the dragon-killing legend of the St. George and Perseus family ... a
country under an old feeble king is terrorized by a dragon who eventually
demands the king's daughter, but is slain by the hero. This seems to be a
romantic analogy (perhaps also, in this case, a descendant) of a myth of a
waste land restored to life by a fertility god. (AC, p. 137)
In this case, a metaphorical identification exists, in the myth, between the god and
fertility so that we have, in the end, the complete or 'literal' metaphor of a fertility
god. In the story of St. George, George can only be likened to a fertility god
inasmuch as he enables, through the killing of the dragon, the waste land to be
restored to its former vigour. In the myth, the hero is a god; in the romance, the hero
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is like a god. To see it this way, we can begin to recognise that romance, as in myth,
has a metaphorical potential, and that it can be distinguished from myth only insofar
as it involves a reduction of myth to secular levels. Through stages of displacement
romance becomes 'less rigorously metaphorical', says Frye, so that 'its imagery
presents a human counterpart of the apocalyptic world...' (AC, p. 151). But, as Frye
is keen to point out, this is only a lessening of the metaphorical potential ofmyth, not
an erasure of it. It therefore becomes possible to reveal in romance an inherently
mythical foundation, albeit 'it is only after a comparative study of the story type has
been made that the metaphorical structure within it begins to emerge' (AC, p. 137).
To see romance as a displacement of myth means that we can trace all
romance narratives, through stages of metaphorical reduction, to an initial phase of
anagogic significance and to a structural and semantic totality of a kind expressed
explicitly in apocalyptic narratives. In romance, as in myth, it becomes possible to
trace 'the anagogic aspect of meaning' which enables us to view stories as part of a
universe 'of total metaphor, in which everything is potentially identical with
everything else, as though it were all inside a single infinite body' (AC, p. 136). In
romance, as in myth, it becomes possible to experience the apocalyptic disclosure of
'the universal creative word which is all words', or the Logos, and to detect in the
heroes of romance displaced equivalents of 'the mind ofman who is all men' (AC, p.
125), such as we find in the mythical characterisations of gods and christs. In
expressing the point, Frye importantly draws attention to the anagogic expansion of
the moral dialectic between desire and repugnance, which we saw occurring at an
archetypal level. In the same way that archetypes are invested with the moral
dialectic of desire and repugnance, so anagogy expands the opposition into
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metaphorically enlarged, mythical equivalents. In Frye's terms, these are the
'apocalyptic' (desirable) and the 'demonic' (undesirable) tendencies which give to
romance its characteristic values:
First, there is the undisplaced myth, generally concerned with gods or
demons, and which takes the form of two contrasting worlds of total
metaphorical identification, one desirable and the other undesirable.
These worlds are often identified with the existential heavens and hells of
religions contemporary with such literature. These two forms of
metaphorical organization we call the demonic and the apocalyptic
respectively. Second, we have the general tendency we have called
romantic, the tendency to suggest implicit mythical patterns in a world
more closely associated with human experience. (AC, pp. 139 - 140)
Similarly, we can see in the struggle between heroes and villains that informs the
quest-romance a mythical dialectic beginning to form. Anagogically, the human hero
of romance becomes metaphorically identical with the apocalyptic hero of myth,
while the villain of romance becomes associated with demonic threats and
impediments:
The central form of the romance is dialectical: everything is focused on a
conflict between the hero and his enemy, and all the reader's values are
bound up with the hero. Hence the hero of romance is analogous to the
mythical Messiah or deliverer who comes from an upper world, and his
enemy is analogous to the demonic powers of a lower world. The conflict
however takes place in, or at any rate primarily concerns, our world,
which is in the middle, and which is characterized by the cyclical
movement of nature. Hence the opposite poles of the cycles of nature are
assimilated to the opposition of the hero and his enemy. The enemy is
associated with winter, darkness, confusion, sterility, moribund life, and
old age, and the hero with spring, dawn, order, fertility, vigour, and
youth. (AC, pp. 187 - 188)
Importantly, the metaphorical reduction of romance to secular levels means that it
does not occupy the mythical dimensions of an apocalyptic heaven or demonic hell,
but that it is poised, between the two, within the cyclical order of nature. In the
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overall context of archetypal and anagogic criticism, a representative model of
romance begins to emerge which, according to Frye, is most explicitly revealed in
the work ofMilton and Dante:
The conception of a heaven above, a hell beneath, and a cyclical cosmos
or order of nature in between forms the ground plan, mutatis mutandis, of
both Dante and Milton. The same plan is in paintings of the Last
Judgement, where there is a rotary movement of the saved rising on the
right and the damned falling on the left. We may apply this construct to
our principle that there are two fundamental movements of narrative: a
cyclical movement with the order of nature, and a dialectical movement
from that order into the apocalyptic world above. (The movement to the
demonic world below is very rare, because a constant rotation within the
order of nature is demonic in itself.) (AC, pp. 161 - 162)
The movement from the cyclical order of nature into an apocalyptic world above
constitutes, for Frye, the fundamental structure of romance. Or as he puts it more
descriptively: '...the quest romance takes on a spiral form, an open circle where the
end is the beginning transformed and renewed by the heroic quest' (SS, p. 174). The
spiral model is both cyclically and teleologically inclined. For Frye, it contains the
semantic and structural totality and thrust of romance and is exemplified, again, by
Dante:
Dante's Inferno is a descending spiral, taking us into narrowing and
unchangeable closed circles; the Purgatorio spiral gives us the opposite
creative movement. When Dante reaches the presence of God at the end
of the Paradiso, the universe turns inside out, becoming God-centered
instead of earth-centered, an end that reverses the beginning of all things.
Dante is within the orbit of the sacred scripture, where God is the creator,
but the same principle of reversed movement can be associated with
human creativity. (SS, p. 174)
Frye, in fact, appears to situate The Divine Comedy at a point where the world of
man (romance) and the apocalyptic world (myth) come into contact, whereas most of
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what we call romance tends to occur, with implicit allusions to its mythical bases, in
the world of man and nature. But it is precisely, Frye suggests, through its allusive
attempts to recreate the transition from an earth-centred to a God-centred universe
that romance becomes 'man's vision of his own life as a quest'. It becomes, in other
words, a metaphorical illustration of man's desire to transcend the order of nature
and re-establish contact with the apocalyptic world from which he has fallen. In The
Secular Scripture, Frye explains the principle further:
Romance, the kernal of fable, begins an upward journey toward man's
recovery of what he projects as sacred myth.... The end of fable, as the
total body of verbal imagination that man constructs, brings us back to
the beginning of myth, the model world associated with divine creation
in Genesis. (SS, pp. 183 - 184)
In traditional romance... the upward journey is the journey of a creature
returning to its creator. In most modern writers, from Blake on, it is the
creative power in man that is returning to its original awareness. The
secular scripture tells us that we are the creators; other scriptures tell us
that we are actors in a drama of divine creation and redemption... Identity
and self-recognition begin when we realize that this is not an either-or
question, when the great twins of divine creation and human recreation
have merged into one, and we can see that the same shape is upon both.
(SS, p. 157)
According to Frye, then, the apocalyptic inclination inhabits all romance which,
through its ritual repetition of the quest, aspires to the same, if metaphorically
reduced, aims and values which are accomplished, with apocalyptic clarity, in myth.
Through its ordinance of archetypes, romance represents the verbal re-enactment of
man's recovery of the omnific totality from which he has become separated. It is the
linguistic passage of imaginative agency seeking to re-enter its source through the
visionary utility of narrative. For it is the visionary utility of narrative, enabled
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through the transcendental imperatives of metaphor, that comes, in the end, to define
the cosmology of romance as we receive it through Frye.
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Chapter Two
The Cosmology of Romance II
The more we have explored Frye's literary cosmology, the more we have exposed
the fact that it incorporates principles which, according to current theoretical trends,
have become largely discredited. In the first place, it is blatantly patriarchal in
retaining the rigid discriminations of the religious models it refers to (romance is the
expression of 'man's vision of his own life as a quest': woman, presumably, trails in
his wake). It is essentially structuralist in its design, albeit it outreaches the outmoded
assumptions of structuralism with an even more outmoded insistence on narrative
structure as a metaphysical mechanism. Its trans-historical totalisations and
insistence on 'literature' as an independent category of writing are, in the aftermath
of Foucault's concept of discourse, highly questionable, as are its tendencies to
situate narrative outwith any immediate social, political, cultural or historical
context. Ian Duncan, for one, questions Frye on these grounds, rejecting the concept
of fiction as 'a shared cultural order distinct from material and historical
contingency',1 suggesting instead that, as opposed to expressing any outright critical
currency, Frye reflects the characteristic mood of the age he belongs to: 'Frye's
secular scripture, the totality of fictions, contains history as one of its effects: the
view from a belated and ironic modernism that thinks it has nowhere to look but
back, unless upward to an apocalyptic horizon'.2 Elizabeth Wright has raised a
similar objection, noting with doubt the tendency of Frye's theories towards
'transcending history': 'Where, for instance, does Frye consider the relation of the
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epic hero of the quest to the feudal \ tribal warrior? Neither Jung nor he questions the
expectations of social role which produce this kind of hero'.3
At the same time, we recognise the assiduity with which Frye, seemingly,
appropriates literature to serve the ideological purposes of a Christian tradition, an
alignment which, for a Marxist critic like Terry Eagleton, is too much to bear. 'The
beauty of the approach is that it deftly combines an extreme aestheticism with an
efficiently classifying "scientificity",' Eagleton concedes, but it 'maintains literature
as an imaginary alternative to modern society while rendering criticism respectable
in that society's terms'. Frye's literary cosmology 'is the work of a committed
Christian humanist (Frye is a clergyman), for whom the dynamic which drives
literature and civilisation - desire - will finally be fulfilled in the kingdom of God'. In
other words, says Eagleton, 'Frye offers literature as a displaced version of religion.
Literature becomes an essential palliative for the failure of religious ideology, and
supplies us with various myths which are of relevance to social life'.4
That Frye's cosmology corresponds to and reflects a religious ideology is
certain. Eagleton's complaints, however, are arguably misplaced, given the fact that
most of European literature has been written under the conditions or conditioning of
a society and culture formed according to a Christian ideology. Eagleton's remarks
are tantamount to saying that Frye has superimposed a Christian belief system upon
the whole of literature, whereas a good deal of that literature was written, precisely,
with that belief system in mind, often to the point of deliberately promoting or
upholding it. Eagleton is loathe to accept that when most of Western literature was
conceived Christianity was far from being a failure: it was, until the nineteenth-
century at least, the ideological mainstay of Western society. It is perhaps more
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accurate to suggest that Frye is responding to that which in literature is self-evident,
the expression of social and cultural values which coincide with and express (either
unconsciously or consciously) a Christian point of view. Frye exposes the ideological
framework at work; he does not enforce it. He embraces the teleological world-view;
he did not create or imagine it.
Besides this, it is a mistake to delimit Frye's teleological world-view to a
purely Christian ethos. What many critics have overlooked in the Anatomy are Frye's
protestations against associating archetypal criticism with any one doctrine. Perhaps
Frye's most rigorous denial of a Christian bias in his reasoning occurs in pages 125 -
128 of the Anatomy. The following extract is taken from these pages and is a good
example of the argument waged:
If Christianity wishes to identify the infinite Word and Man of the
literary universe with the Word of God, the person of Christ, the
historical Jesus, the Bible or church dogma, these identifications may be
accepted by any poet or critic without injury to his work ... But they can
never be accepted by poetry as a whole, or by criticism as such. The
literary critic, like the historian, is compelled to treat every religion in the
same way that religions treat each other, as though it were a human
hypothesis, whatever else he may in other contexts believe it to be ...
Coleridge was right in thinking that the "Logos" was the goal of his work
as a critic, but not right in thinking that his poetic Logos would so
inevitably be absorbed into Christ as to make literary criticism a kind of
natural theology. (AC, pp. 125 - 126)
The figure of Christ, says Frye, must take its place among a plethora of redeemer-
figures belonging, with equal efficacy, to the mythopoeic formulae of other cultures
and other epochs. In The Secular Scripture he concentrates his theory on the
Christian tradition, but not exclusively; even then, he tends to refer to archetypal
variants or antitypes from, for example, the Greek and Icelandic traditions.5 As Ian
Balfour points out, meanwhile, in Frye's work the Bible 'is "anatomized" because of
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its structure and influence as a text, not valued as a repository of doctrine'.
Consequently, says Balfour, the 'charge... that Frye's theory of literature is a thinly
veiled displacement of a theological or religious program turns out to be spurious...'.6
Italo Calvino gives us greater scope in this respect when he speaks
...of a "cyclic" Frye (though it would be more exact to call him a
describer of the cyclic concept of the world that literature has expressed)
or of a "teleological" Frye (and we must not forget that this historian and
geographer of human desire was a Protestant minister).7
Although Calvino voices similar reservations to Eagleton's as regards Frye's
religious credentials, it is worth considering whether a 'teleological' Frye, as with a
'cyclic' Frye, cannot also be called a describer of the world that (Western) literature
has expressed. This holds true, it appears, when we are dealing, specifically, with
romance. With its characteristic quest structure and narratorial tendency towards
revelational, redemptive or regenerative goals, romance, by definition, is
teleological. If we take any example of romance and fit it into Frye's scheme, the
effectiveness, even accuracy of the fit is impressive. We have seen this with
examples as diverse as Dante's The Divine Comedy, Conrad's Heart ofDarkness and
Steven Spielberg's Jaws. Frye's scheme retains its application in relation, at least, to
mythopoeic formulae, in spite of the objections raised against it. Elizabeth Wright
has raised a similar point in her discussion ofFrye:
...Frye has made use of symbolic structures as they exist within western
culture... His system provides a ready analytical tool by which a critic
can make an approach to fantasy in literature. Even though his
classification lacks the underpinning of a more fundamental theory, this
does not mean that the fantasies do not have the image-structures he
detects, only that they cannot be given the status of some numinous
derivation from 'forces ofnature'.8
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Acting in his defence, then, we could say that Frye has provided a structural model
of narrative based on the teleological concept of the world that has been expressed by
literature. It is this, regardless of whatever religious connotations we attach to it, that
stands as the absolute sanction of Frye's critical programme. In this sense, Frye is
providing us with an institutionalised model of romance based on evidence
accumulated from a structural reading: this reading shows in romance an adherence
to western metaphysics which, itself, is part of the ideological framework ofwestern
civilisation.
Jacques Derrida has exploited the contradictions and paradoxes within such
systems, and it will become necessary to refer to Derrida more fully as we go on. To
undertake a retrospective application of post-structuralist principles that enable us to
demonstrate the failure of logocentricism is one thing; but this does not alter the fact
that a large proportion of narratives, in the event of their conception, presupposed,
and continue to exhibit, a logocentric tendency (which means that Frye's theories, as
a summary or description of what was intended, retain a valid aspect). What I wish to
argue in this thesis, though, is that, if such a failure has become apparent, there ought
to be points in the development of narrative where this failure has been admitted
'consciously'; that is, as the effect of an authorial awakening, where the author,
emerging from his or her unconscious absorption of archetypal formulae, apprehends
and exposes the failure of logocentricism prior to the interventions of latter-day
theorists. Accordingly, I wish to suggest that it is possible to see such anomalies
forming in the context of nineteenth-century romance, remembering that, if romance
is the genre in which archetypes are most visibly expressed, it is also the medium in
which the absence of an archetypal centre - the Logos - is most likely to reveal itself.
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It is the medium in which the failure of the archetypal schema / logocentricity makes
itself available to our descriptive faculties. Rather than simply devalue Frye's
theories according to the means that supersede him, then, I wish to show that it is
possible to look at examples of romance occurring prior to Frye which devalue his
scheme prior to its conception. Frye, to some extent, may have described the world
that literature has expressed and shown how this description is encrypted in the
appropriate narrative models. What he does not describe are those areas where the
'appropriate' narrative models begin to articulate, deliberately (and paradoxically),
the invalidity of the strategies that inform them. Consequently, it may become
possible to say that the failure of logocentricism announces itself through Frye's
failure to describe it. Above all, I hope to demonstrate how such issues are addressed
and how they occur in Stevenson's essays and fictions. For it would be fair to say
that, of all the authors in the nineteenth-century, Stevenson remains the principal
exponent of romance theory and fiction. If romance is the genre in which the absence
of an archetypal centre is most likely to reveal itself, then it is with Stevenson's
romances, as romances par excellence, that we are likely to encounter this absence
more readily.
There are various ways in which we could expose the inefficacy of Frye's
anatomy. Any summary of the typical aims and strategies of poststructuralism, as I
have said, would allow us to do that. However, in the remainder of this chapter, I
wish to forge a variety of positions and principles which, as well as counter-acting
Frye directly, allow us to establish a provisional grounds for a fuller analysis of
Stevenson (given in the following section). These positions and principles are
derived from several, seemingly disparate sources - from Edgar Allan Poe, from
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Derrida (where appropriate), from contemporary critic Ian Duncan, and from
Stevenson himself. Disparities notwithstanding, these sources, derived from before
and after Frye's lifetime, are intended to go some way to bridging the idiomatic gaps
that exist between the nineteenth and twentieth / twenty-first centuries, and to
demonstrate the ways in which, as I have claimed, the deficiencies of logocentricism
were recognised prior to Frye, as they are recognised now. It is my intention to
provide a theoretical framework within which to situate Stevenson and, from there,
to explore Stevenson's own accentuation of the positions and principles stated here.
Cosmological Inconstants: Edgar Allan Poe
One of the more puzzling ramifications of Frye's cosmology is that it sometimes
relies as much on science as it does on anagogy to give it conceptual stability, to the
point that science appears to offer a reliable structural model against which narrative
(as anagogy) can be validated. We have already seen Frye's tendency to incorporate
scientific principles as a means of reinforcing the teleological integrity of his
scheme, so much so that in narrative structure we are presented with something like a
metaphysical extension of the space-time continuum. From all this we can assume
(remembering Abrams) that the 'interpretative' function of texts, as educed by Frye,
ultimately involves the metaphysical transformation of external contingencies,
whereby science itself, secured through analogies and metaphors, becomes contained
and explained through the archetypal and anagogic process. With Frye we are
effectively presented with literature as a scientifically viable mythical quest,
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strengthened by its imaginative combination of the objects of mythology with the
principles of science. Frye's 'scientificity', then, gives us good grounds for
appropriating some of Edgar Allan Poe's ideas, as expressed in his scientific treatise
Eureka, concerning the nature 'of the Physical, Metaphysical and Mathematical - of
the Material and Spiritual Universe; - of its Essence, its Origin, its Creation, its
Present Condition and its Destiny'?
Poe's discussion provides insights which, in foreshadowing certain principles
later expanded by Derrida, are, for our purposes, more immediately relevant than
Derrida. They represent, that is to say, a nineteenth-century idiom and vocabulary
which, not only takes us closer, as we shall see, to Stevenson, but also goes some
way to proving the point that Frye's scheme was problematised prior to its
conception. Using Poe in his capacities as a theorist, we find a set of ideas about
origin and structure that raise a good many questions about the teleological world-
view. In this sense, Poe's Eureka offers an elaborate prelude to Stevenson, who was
influenced considerably by Poe and stands, perhaps, as Poe's worthiest successor.
Poe, indeed, provides a highly relevant contemporary backdrop against which to
situate Stevenson. He allows us to show that the issues we are dealing with were not
confined to Stevenson alone, but to romance more generally, though it is through
Stevenson's romances that we receive their greatest impact.
Given that Poe's Eureka has been acknowledged for its remarkably accurate
hypotheses concerning the structure and ordination of the material universe, as we
understand it from a twentieth-century perspective,10 it is hardly surprising that, at
the same time, it makes significant gestures towards a twentieth-century critical
idiom. In this instance, Poe calls into question the conceptual identification between
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the signifier and, what we would nowadays call, the 'transcendental signified' which,
according to 'the language of metaphysics',11 presupposes an immediate
correspondence between word and thing as a basis for intelligibility and conceptual
validation. Poe exposes the fact that traditional assumptions regarding the origin and
structure of the universe, which rely, precisely, on transcendental significations, are
inherently flawed. Such assumptions, he argues, are necessarily retracted from any
solid foundation because of the inadequacy of language as a means of accessing the
inaccessible 'presences' these assumptions refer to. It is the tendency of 'Man',
however, because of the deficiencies of analytical method, to substitute the
unaccountable with blank metaphors - words without directly interpretable meanings
- or with signs, as Derrida describes it, which are 'secondary and provisional'12
inasmuch as they are substitutes for the significations they (cannot) refer to. It is
noticeable that some of the words and concepts Poe is calling into question have
been acted upon by Frye as theoretical givens:
Let us begin, then, at once, with that merest of words, 'Infinity'. This,
like 'God', 'spirit', and some other expressions of which the equivalents
exist in nearly all languages, is by no means the expression of an idea -
but an effort at one. It stands for the possible attempt at an impossible
conception. Man needed a term by which to point out the direction of this
effort - a cloud behind which lay, forever invisible, the object of this
attempt. A word, in fine, was demanded, by means of which one human
being might put himself in relation at once with another human being and
with a certain tendency of the human intellect. Out of this demand arose
the word, 'Infinity'; which is thus the representative but of the thought of
a thought.13
The substitution of the possible attempt of the sign for an impossible conception is a
principle that inundates Frye's literary universe to the point that it is entirely
grounded, not in the expression of an idea of the Logos, but in an effort towards one;
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in other words, not in the thought of the Logos - which is beyond conception - but in
the thought of a thought of the Logos (or 'infinity', 'God', 'spirit', or any of the
words that Frye employs in validating his scheme). To prove the point - if we ask
ourselves what Frye means by 'Logos', the answers are vague: it is 'the incarnate
Word' (the word of 'God'?) or 'a single infinite and eternal symbol' (of what
exactly?). It is 'the universal creative word which is all words' (but what does it
mean?) or 'the shaping word which is both reason' and 'creative act' (emanating
from who or what or where? What is its source?). The Logos, he implies, conveys
'an infinite and eternal living body which, if not human, is closer to being human
than to being inanimate': but if it is not human, then what is it? It is clear that, in the
context of Frye's theories, the word 'Logos' is a verbal substitution for a
transcendental signification which cannot be located or Titeralised' through the
linguistic means at our disposal. In attempting to define the Logos, Frye is forced to
elicit further substitutions which can only defer rather than clarify its meaning. In
this sense, Frye's version of structure refers to a point of origin and orientation from
which it is necessarily removed through the limitations of the episteme: within his
scheme, the Logos can only 'appear' as a blank metaphor, as a secondary or
provisional sign for something it is not, as a signification for something it cannot
signify.14 'Man needed a term by which to point out the direction of this effort', says
Poe, and Frye has supplied a new one; but, like the other terms identified by Poe, it
can only convey 'a cloud behind which lay, forever invisible, the object of this
attempt.'
The status of the Logos as an effort towards an idea, rather than an idea in
itself, is demonstrated by the fact that, within the context of narrative, it can only be
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represented, not as an idea or a concrete thought, but as an endless series of
archetypal analogues, or as metaphors which - like the word 'Logos' - are verbal
substitutions for something they cannot signify. In the context of narrative, we recall,
the Logos is expressed in 'anthropomorphic terms', as 'a universal man who is also a
divine being' or a 'glorified hero'. But the glorified hero is an archetypal symbol, a
metaphor, no less, for the Logos which is not the expression of an idea but an effort
at one. We could say, then, that if the word 'Logos' represents the thought of a
thought, the archetypal hero (as a metaphor for the Logos) represents the thought of a
thought of a thought of the Logos. To see it this way, the archetype of the glorified
hero takes us further away from that which it is meant to convey. The same is true of
the mythopoeic formula as a whole. Through the archetype of the quest we are
enabled a metaphorical accession to an omnific totality which, in being metaphorical
rather than literal, is necessarily removed from the actuality of what it illustrates. In
the structure of romance, and in the apocalyptic 'revelation' received through the
attainment of the quest object, what we get is not a sense of cosmic revival, but a
metaphorical gesture that implies, but cannot actualise, the material aspect of the
unimaginable idea it refers to. In this sense, romance does not contain but cancels the
event of revelation, while the individual examples of which romance consists, as an
endless series of metaphorical abstractions, move us further away from, rather than
towards, any 'origin or end, arche or telos\ 5 Ultimately, then, the Logos cannot be
conceived through the archetype: the archetype enables, not the perception of the
Logos, but the staggered perceptions of (never) perceiving it. As it does so, it takes
us further away from the prospect of a centre and further away from the prospect of
totality as a viable notion. In the end, the archetype itself cannot be seen as anything
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other than an inherently unstable item, like a unit of language subject to 'play',
where, in Derrida's terms, the 'absence of the transcendental signified extends the
domain and the play of signification infinitely'.16
In place of the conceptualisation of the transcendental signified ('infinity',
'God', 'spirit') Poe locates an untranslatable space (or 'cloud') in which the frontiers
of intelligibility are dissolved and the implied object of signification remains outside
the range of significative possibility: it remains, as Derrida might put it, 'beyond the
reach of play'.17 This in itself is enough to destabilise Frye's analogous interpretation
of a literary universe, reminding us of the contradiction in structuralist criticism (well
noted by post-structuralists) that, in order to authenticate its structurality, structure
depends on a centre which it cannot locate within itself.18 Given that 'the notion of a
structure lacking any centre represents the unthinkable in itself, Poe is able to show
us what Derrida shows us a century or so later: that Frye is falling into the trap of
attempting to ground the infinite play of 'structure' within 'a fixed origin',19 that he
is seeking to identify a necessary cause in the 'event' of structurality which regulates
the 'infinite literary universe' by imposing on it an intelligible limit. Poe, in
reference to the material universe, detects the absurdity of this way of thinking,
recognising, as Derrida did, that the 'concept of a centred structure - although it
represents coherence in itself, the condition of the episteme as philosophy or science
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- is contradictorily coherent':
'The mind is impelled,' say the theologians and others, 'to admit a First
Cause, by the superior difficulty it experiences in conceiving cause
beyond cause without end.' ... And what is a First Cause? An ultimate
termination of causes. And what is an ultimate termination of causes?
Finity - the Finite. Thus the one quibble, in two processes, by God knows
how many philosophers, is made to support now Finity and now
Infinity.... 1
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Frye's appeal to scientific method would appear to be 'always already' infected with
a self-effacing paradox. He cannot conceive of an infinite distribution of narrative
functions without limiting them to a finite cause or centre which they cannot
accommodate.
The contradictory coherence of Frye's literary cosmology is such, then, that it
is structured around its opposite quality, namely the absence of a structural centre
and, so, the absence of any unified structurality. By the same token, seeing as the
Logos cannot be revealed as an idea but only as an effort at one, romance can no
longer be viable as the re-enactment of the loss and recovery of the ultimate
ideological totem. At best, it can only postpone the exposure of its lack of
structurality by sustaining its position as the metaphorical thought of a thought. The
Logos can only be 'recovered' in symbols but cannot be conceived or actualised
through the apocalyptic mediation of narrative, which ceases, then, to be apocalyptic.
This way, a symbol (or archetype) - as a constitutive unit of anagogy - is increasingly
condemned to itself. It cannot fulfil its metaphorical aim to become what it
illustrates, nor can it occupy a space of apocalyptic disclosure in that it cannot
achieve the literal status of the Logos in itself.
Altogether, Poe has given us the grounds for taking the converse position to
Frye, which he himself alludes to, that without 'the still center of the order ofwords'
then 'there is nothing to prevent the analogies supplied by convention and genre
from being an endless series of free associations, perhaps suggestive, perhaps even
tantalizing, but never creating a real structure'(,4C, pp. 117 - 118). Going further than
this, I wish to suggest that conventions are 'free' to the point of dissolving any trace
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of association altogether, that they are an endless series of disassociations which
eliminate the possibility of a literary totality and, with it, the analogous operations of
conventional formulae. For without the means of association provided by the
common denominator of the Archetype Proper, the 'archetype' cannot belong to
anything other than the specific formation of a specific text. It no longer receives an
associative value from the organic transmissions of a structural centre, to the point
that the idea of the archetype becomes, essentially, a fallacy - that is, something
which appears to but does not exist.
Later, we will see how these kinds of anomalies are revealed in Stevenson's
writing. It is necessary to point out, though, that, thus far, we have continued to
speak of structure as a trans-historical or trans-authorial region of activity. Until we
step outside of any such context, we to some extent remain within the constraints of
Frye's methodology. So far, in fact, we have simply inverted Frye's scheme to show
how its principles of unity are founded on principles of disunity. To consider,
however, the alternative position of narrative as a product of artificial, rather than
organic, processes is to step outside of Frye's scheme altogether. And this is a
possibility which presents itself when we turn to Ian Duncan who, once again, allows
us to assemble principles that, in association with those of Poe, can be latterly
applied to Stevenson. Through Duncan, moreover, we can begin to see how the
discovery of the failure of conventional formulae, and of the ideological solutions
which inform them, is a conscious one and one which becomes, through a writer like
Stevenson, a 'structural' feature of the modern romance.
84
The Archetypal Fallacy: Ian Duncan
Frye's account of the relation of the author to the process of narrative production is
an area that comes under the scrutiny of romance critic Ian Duncan. In looking at
this, Duncan opens up certain positions which we can refer to Stevenson in the
chapters that follow.
In Frye's case, literary structure occurs organically, naturally adjusting to
conditions through time by means of displacement, maintaining an impervious order
of conventions throughout the course of human history, regardless of authorial or
cultural interactions. Structure, for Frye, is a self-contained and self-perpetuating
network of archetypal associations that pre-exist and supersede the author and his
work: the author's work is merely a microcosmic enhancement of the macrocosm of
form or, as Frye has stated, 'an individual manifestation of the total order ofwords'
(AC, p. 121). Frye's concept of displacement depends on a development of fiction
where the role of the author is subordinated to the compositional and creative
imperatives which inhabit literary form as a whole. In this sense, his theory of
totality, as Terry Eagleton has noted, 'is scornfully "anti-humanist", decentring the
individual human subject and centring all on the collective literary system itself.22
The author is merely a vehicle, Frye claims, for the eternal passage of archetypal
form, a passive player in the emanation of conventions that, spread over and above
time, provide a narrative framework prior to, and after, the author's involvement. 'In
the context of process,' he suggests, 'the form becomes something more like the
shaping spirit, the power of ordering which seems so mysterious to the poet himself,
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because it often acts as though it were a separate identity from him' (,SS, p. 35). The
author of fiction, meanwhile,
...may seem to be making up his stories out of his own head, but this
never happens in literature, even if the illusion of its happening is a
necessary illusion for some writers. His material comes from traditions
behind him which may have no recognized or understood social status,
and may not be consciously known to the writer or to his public. (SS, p.
10)
Crucially, Ian Duncan has differentiated between the passive role assigned to the
author by Frye and the role of the author, from within his or her cultural location, as
a principal agent in the production of narrative. A difference emerges between the
transcendental organicity of form and the self-conscious interventions of the author;
or, in our case, between romance as 'an immanence of archetypes structuring those
vast occult processes outside conscious agency'23 and romance as a series of
conscious innovations pertaining to a specific moment of cultural operation. In
stressing the latter, Duncan is able to reconsider the effectiveness of Frye's
interpretation of romance. Far from being an organic proliferation of originary
symbols, romance is a cultural formation, a contrived generic category solidified,
Duncan claims, in 'the formal version of romance established by Scott in his
practice', described by Duncan 'as modern culture's construction of a symbolic form
prior to itself.24 In the event of the novel, Duncan argues, romance is classified and
asserted as an originary species of fiction, latently conceived as a historical
'tradition' through its absorption into the modem prose medium. It remains,
however, an 'anterior' model of romance that has been constructed, rather than
passively inherited, by Scott.
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In exemplifying this, Duncan has taken Frye's idea of realism as a
displacement of romance a stage further, and in such a way that leads him to negate
the principle of displacement altogether. What Frye fails to acknowledge, say
Duncan, is the degree of deliberation involved in the attempt to fashion a context for
fiction: 'Realism is not a revelation of nature but a rhetoric and ideology: as Martin
Price has written, "a deliberate - even militant - extension of form rather than the
effort at literal representation or record" ',25 In some ways, this corresponds to what
Frye would say of realism, that it is simply a technical readjustment of form to an
ideological preference for plausibility. But to emphasise 'conscious artifice and
programme', says Duncan, 'is to correct dialectically Northrop Frye's theory of
"displacement", which would make romance the revelation of nature - the eternal
lineaments of the human - and "realism" one of its local precipitations'.26 To
acknowledge the role in fiction of authorial self-consciousness is to offer an
alternative view to that of realism as the residual offspring of romance and romance,
in turn, as the residual offspring of folklore and myth. Romance, argues Duncan, is
'local in the sense that it speaks to and from particular positions' so that, for us,
'romance must always be romance revival, meaning, not a synchronicity of
archetypes across history but an active cultural work of the discovery and invention
of ancestral forms, in other words the creation of the archetype as a rhetorical
figure'.27 Duncan attaches an artificial quality to the archetype that delimits its
function as an archetype. It is no longer an imperative literary function, but a
manufactured item. It is not so much an encoded point of reference that enables the
'proper' ordination of narrative structures as the product of a particular locality,
subject to the quirks and innovations of authorial agency, as well as the historical and
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cultural particularities of an author's place in time. Accordingly, the 'archetypal'
structure is the invention rather than the trans-historical materialisation of 'a
symbolic order prior to itself. As Duncan concludes, with further reference to
Martin Price:
The novelist needs to 'recreate the myth if he is to make full use of if, in
a process that is allusive rather than vatic, not so much visionary as
revisionary. The relationship of an individual work to a genre 'is not one
of passive membership but of active modulation'.29
Hence, the tendency towards romance in fictions of the nineteenth-century, says
Duncan, 'is not... some kind of pupal shell the creature has failed to outgrow, but its
living tissue of ethical, spiritual and ideological contention: the distinctive garment
of its modernity'.30
Identifying the author and his or her location as central to the development of
literary form is a principle that we can associate, emphatically, with Stevenson, who,
as we shall see in the next section, emerges as an author of the active rather than
passive variety (albeit, there are some intriguing alternatives offered by Stevenson as
regards the local relations between the author and his / her use of language). The role
of the author as self-conscious arbiter of fiction means, of course, that narrative
structure is subject to a hitherto unconsidered and potentially disruptive influence
which, in the end, forces us to reconsider the nature of structure as we have described
it so far. Presently, though, Duncan's reference to the archetype as a rhetorical
construction, rather than a residual symbol, needs to be more fully examined, both in
terms of how it will relate to Stevenson's ideas and how it relates to those we have
derived from Poe and Derrida.
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In a review of Tom Hubbard's Seeking Mr. Hyde: Studies in Robert Louis
Stevenson, Symbolism, Myth and the Pre-Modern (1995), Duncan launches an attack
on, what he sees as, Hubbard's anachronistic application of the archetypal theorem.
In the event, Duncan makes some points about the efficacy of the archetype as a
recurrent narrative figure which, for our purposes, have some telling repercussions:
The appearance of Jung [in Hubbard's text] formalises the problem, as it
justifies the method of analogic association with the appeal to
"archetypes". The archetype is rather like Marx's commodity fetish: it
bestows a factitious agency on the rhetorical figure or image, and diverts
critical attention away from the multiple, specific determinations that
invest the act of cultural production. The Jungian scheme relies on an
archaic (Platonic) model of signification, whereby meanings are
produced by a radiance of essential forms transmitted through local signs
or figures - not by the differential relations of those figures to one
another, and to other semantic and grammatical elements, within a local,
circumstantial utterance. Hubbard's title, SeekingMr. Hyde, admits to the
Jungian critic's interest in "the Hyde-figure" above the particular,
material text, Dr Jekyll andMr Hyde, he may happen to inhabit; and the
Hyde-figure turns out to be a shadow of something else, which can only
be glimpsed by assembling a sort of fuzzy generic composite of all the
Jekyll-and-Hyde-figures, Faust-figures, etc. the critic may lay his hands
on.
Duncan's summary of Hubbard's Jungian approach applies, of course, to Frye's
adaptation of the archetype, which refers to Jungian psychology as one of its
theoretical informants. Similarly, with Frye, the archetype can be viewed as
essentially bogus, that is, as a false accession to analogical unity whereas, beyond the
'factitious agency' attached to the 'archetype', there is only particularity and
difference. The principle is one that can be demonstrated quite easily. To take a
former example, if we remove the 'messiah' value from Edmund Dantes (The Count
ofMonte Cristo) we are left, not with an analogue of the hero-figure as the mythical
Christ, but a merchant sailor of Marseilles caught up in the political intrigues of
89
Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic Europe. Wrongfully convicted as a Bonapartist
conspirator, Dantes exacts his revenge by learning to manipulate the modern
capitalist economy, by infiltrating the Parisian aristocracy and by instigating the
financial ruin of those responsible for his wrongful imprisonment and subsequent
traumas. A story of capitalist decadence is played out against a background of
colonial arrogance and corruption, with its characters evolving from the cultural,
political and ideological matrix of the historical moment they belong to - or, rather,
that Dumas belongs to. They emerge from and represent a circumstantial expediency,
forming the structural and semantic crux of a narrative that issues its discrepancy
against other narratives that, when brought together and viewed as a whole,
emphasise the irregular juxtapositioning of disparate contexts, rather than a compact
generic category.
Duncan draws attention to the problem, suggested by Poe, where the
metaphysical value of the archetype is, as a consequence of the failure of the 'archaic
(Platonic) model of signification', revealed as inadequate. Ultimately, the model of
signification adapted by the archetypal critic is disabled by its inability to trace the
source of 'a radiance of essential forms' that invests 'local signs and figures' with
archetypal meaning. By the same principle as before, the idea of such a source (as an
Archetype Proper or a series of archetypes at the centre of our literary experience) is
problematised by its absence within the structure which it supposedly inhabits as an
organising centre. It follows that, without a centre, conventions can only consist of
endless variations which have no original template against which to validate their
status as recurrent symbols - for it is recurrence that makes conventions conventional
and there is nothing recurring here, except the divergent thoughts of an unthinkable
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thought. Without an omnific bond between them, every 'archetype' must be seen as
an imperfect duplicate of another so that no one narrative can be said to contain a
series of archetypes in their pure or absolute condition, to the point that, properly
speaking, there can be no such thing as an 'archetype'.
The archetype as an artificial item, therefore, becomes disassociated from its
position as one among a series of conventional associations, estranged by its failure
to meet an absolute model which exceeds conceivable limits. Likewise, narratives as
a whole are recognisable for their combinations of local elements which, as an
endless series of ^^associations, are characterised not by uniformity but by
multiplicity, not by metaphorical likeness or similarity but by specificity and
difference. The concept of the archetype, as Duncan suggests, is purely a fallacy: it
represents the necessary simplification of an insurmountable difficulty; or, as Poe
might describe it, it betrays the critic's submission to the 'superior difficulty' of
conceiving of infinity without a First Cause. In this respect, the idea of a
'conventional' formula as the basis for all romances becomes, itself, a kind of
metaphorical fallacy, a figurative reduction of the immense diversity of literary
forms to an abstract similarity. The archetypal critic presupposes a Model Proper
which, like the Archetype Proper, is presumed to exist without appearing in itself, so
that the conventions of romance, so called, converge upon nothing but the thought of
a thought of what is conventional; while the archetypal structure, as a grammar of
conventions, can only exist as a series of differential efforts towards an idea, not as
an idea in itself.
The matter is compounded when we consider the exact delineation of the
'factitious agency' that Frye ascribes to archetypal functions, the meanings, that is,
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with which they are invested as a whole; and these, we recall, adhere to the binary
opposition of what is desirable / undesirable, apocalyptic / demonic, for / against the
quest, and so on. This is as much to say, as Frye has inferred, that archetypes are
metaphorical extensions of the moral postulates of good and evil (themselves
recognisable as transcendental significations) so that, ultimately, Frye's scheme
comes to rest in an ideological power-base which exists prior to and after the
narratives that, supposedly, emerge from it. Narrative, in this sense, is dependent on
external 'presences', moral absolutes that determine its structure prior to its event
and which fashion narratives according to the formula of good triumphing over evil,
leading to the apocalyptic disclosure of the Logos and the imagined accomplishment
of an omnific totality. But we have seen that romances, as metaphorical abstractions
of an absolute model, are illustrations of the absence of the Logos and that they are
detached from any absolute foundation or centre. Romance, then, shows us that the
moral designations it 'contains' are (without the validation of the Logos) lacking in
foundation. These moral postulates, which are structured according to the concept of
a centre, are effectively unhinged and, in themselves, are revealed as values without
the efficacy of 'presence', no longer possible as an ordered series of positive
significations that co-ordinate narratives substantively. Under such circumstances,
romance 'contains' the absence of the moral determinations that are meant to
determine its structure (or sustains them as illusions) and leaves itself open to
alternative modes of determination.
To see the archetype as something resembling Marx's commodity fetish,
meanwhile, is to view it as a kind of structural currency that imposes an illusory
value over 'the multiple, specific determinations' that invest the text. Frye applies a
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single value - 'good' or 'evil' - to endless variables without considering the
contiguous functions of the text in isolation and, this way, reduces all narratives, past
and present, to an analogous totality. This may lead us to conclude, in view of
Duncan's remarks, that it is not the symbol in itself that is recurrent but the positive
or negative value with which it is metaphorically associated. Remove the moral
postulate from the symbol (as we have with Edmund Dantes) and it no longer
becomes connected with other symbols, but becomes an isolated component within a
particular narrative formation. When we rid ourselves of the oppositional dialectic of
external 'presences', we find that symbols deemed similar or identical lose their
common agency of likeness or identification, and are distinguishable for their
specificity, locality and difference. To eliminate the oppositional value with which
the archetype is factitiously endowed is to eliminate its stabilising property and, so,
dissolve its 'conventional' association with those archetypes which 'share' its value.
If the antithetical moral framework is the means by which the archetypal
framework sustains itself, then to eliminate these antithetical properties is to begin to
dismantle the institutionalised model described by Frye. In romance, the suggestion
that narrative is able to break out of its archetypal framework implies a
dysteleological aberration of the integrity of the quest structure, which, as we shall
see, is precisely what occurs in Stevenson's romances. Stevenson, in fact, draws
attention to the referential incapacity of narrative to focus on teleological absolutes
which are no longer ideologically viable. One of the ways in which he does this is to
obliterate the moral designations which make such narratives possible as efforts
towards an idea of the Logos. It is through such operations that an author like
Stevenson is able to detach himself from the rigours of the tradition of romance -
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albeit, these operations are not confined to his fictions alone. In the context of his
essays, and even those, like the ones below, that do not deal directly with fiction, it is
clear that Stevenson was formulating ideas which, as part of their effect, precluded
the validity of the archetypal schema.
Analogies ofAbsence: Robert Louis Stevenson
This is not to deny that Stevenson, as we shall see in the chapter after this one, in
many ways prefigures formalism and structuralism, approaches to fiction that invoke
the conceptual anchorage of the Logos. In this sense, many of Stevenson's ideas,
whilst they are remarkably innovative for their time, have, like Frye's, been
superseded. At the same time, however, Stevenson undertakes significant twists in
his essays which call into question both the logocentric tendency and the efficacy of
conventional structures. In this sub-section, and by way of offering a preparatory
grounds for the next chapter, I wish to demonstrate the strength of Stevenson's
arguments against the totalisation of cultural phenomena, arguments which,
beginning more generally (in referring to all aspects of human knowledge), are
latterly refined in relation, specifically, to fiction. Remaining within the broader
context of Poe, Derrida and Duncan, it is my present aim to elicit certain principles
from the extracts provided below and to indicate the ways in which they might be
referred to fiction, even while they do not relate directly to fiction here.
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One of Stevenson's better known statements, from 'Crabbed Age and Youth',
concerns the futility of the pursuit of absolute knowledge or significance, contending
that
...[sjince we have explored the maze so long without result, it follows,
for poor human reason, that we cannot have to explore much longer;
close by must be the centre, with a champagne luncheon and a piece of
ornamental water. How if there were no centre at all, but just one alley
• • • -39
after another, and the whole world a labyrinth without end or issue?
The denial of an epistemological centre and the refusal to admit the possibility of a
centre as an attainable object is a principle that inundates Stevenson's essays, to the
point that it is applied to almost any area of human activity, as in the essay 'El
Dorado':
Happily we all shoot at the moon with ineffectual arrows; our hopes are
set on inaccessible El Dorado; we come to an end of nothing here below.
'Ofmaking books there is no end,' complained the Preacher; and did not
perceive how highly he was praising letters as an occupation. There is no
end, indeed, to making books or experiments, or to travel, or gathering
wealth. Problem gives rise to problem. We may study for ever, and we
are never as learned as we would. We have never made a statue worthy
of our dreams. And where we have discovered a continent, or crossed a
chain ofmountains, it is only to find another ocean or another plain upon
the farther side. In the infinite universe there is room for our swiftest
diligence and to spare.
It is true that we shall never reach the goal; it is even more than probable
that there is no such place; and if we lived for centuries and were
endowed with the powers of a god, we should find ourselves not much
nearer what we wanted at the end.
I wish to suggest that, in applying the same principle to fiction, Stevenson suffuses
the teleological imperatives of romance, which he has inherited, with dysteleological
imperatives, based on the absence of a centre, so as to construct romances which
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generate a simultaneous impulse - a teleological / dysteleological 'impasse' which
forms the structural and semantic crux of many of his most significant works.
Romance aims towards goals that Stevenson, in many of his fictions, locates within
an 'inaccessible El Dorado' or, in a comparative way, within an 'inaccessible
silence'.34 The object of the quest-romance, in being anagogically modified so as to
'appear' as the Logos, is 'revealed' by Stevenson as being confined to an
untransalatable space that cannot be recovered through the 'visionary' utility of
narrative or, indeed, through language as a whole. In Derridean terms, and in terms
of that which we have extrapolated from Poe, we might say of the statements above
that Stevenson is already preparing the grounds for eliminating the possibility of the
transcendental signified as a metaphorically transferable object of narrative.
In expanding the theme, Stevenson challenges post-Enlightenment notions
about the assimilation and classification of epistemological data, an effect of which
is to undermine the proto-structuralist agenda of contemporaneous thinkers like
Andrew Lang and J. G. Frazer. More broadly, Stevenson's critique of the effort
towards a totalisation of (any branch of) knowledge constitutes something similar to
Foucault's theory of 'discourse formations', where the assertion of knowledge / truth
/ meaning is not linear, established or universal, but localised, fleeting and
eradicable:
As we go catching and catching at this or that corner of knowledge, now
getting a foresight of generous possibilities, now chilled with a glimpse
of prudence, we may compare the headlong course of our years to a swift
torrent in which a man is carried away; now he is dashed against a
boulder, now he grapples for a moment to a trailing spray; at the end, he
is hurled out and overwhelmed in a dark and bottomless ocean. We have
no more than glimpses and touches; we are torn away from our theories;
we are spun round and round and shown this or the other view of life,
until only fools or knaves can hold to their opinions. We take a sight at a
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condition in life, and say we have studied it; our most elaborate view is
nothing more than an impression.
It is in vain to seek for consistency or expect clear and stable views in a
medium so perturbed and fleeting. This is no cabinet science, in which
things are tested to a scruple; we theorise with a pistol to our head; we
are confronted with a new set of conditions on which we have not only to
pass a judgement, but to take action, before the hour is at an end. And we
cannot even regard ourselves as constant; in this flux of things, our
identity itself seems in a perpetual variation; and not infrequently we find
our own disguise the strangest masquerade.35
The term 'perpetual variation', above all, may act as a suitable description for 'the
identity' of Stevenson's fictions. His narratives express fluctuation, multifariousness,
randomness and uncertainty, the inability of narrative to ground itself in any fixed
foundation or decidable network of values. In rejecting any quasi-structuralist
approach to knowledge, history, philosophy, or whatever, Stevenson introduces a
principle of discontinuity and difference, rather than continuity and similarity, which
inhabits his romances with equal force.
In view of all that has been said, then, I wish to argue that it is the active
discovery of the detachment of structure from any external foundation, origin or goal
that, in the first instance, characterises romance of the modern idiom. It is an activity,
if not initiated, then certainly epitomised by Stevenson, who marks the emergence of
romance as 'modern' in the sense that it undergoes a detachment from its traditional
or institutionalised bases. It is my aim to demonstrate Stevenson's construction of the
archetype as an item deprived of its metaphorical potential or, more accurately, as an
item constructed under the failure and erasure of its conventional values. Stevenson,
that is to say, liberates the symbol or image from its moral prerequisites and shatters
its association with anything outside of its immediate context. He offers a 'model' of
romance which has become estranged from its mythopoeic site of origins and which
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has ceased to retain the conventional criteria that have enabled its generic formation.
Romance becomes, rather, a site of confrontation between the teleological
imperatives that determine its structure and the emergence of dysteleological
imperatives that initiate the collapse and re-orientation of the model of structure
described by Frye.
The exact nature of these dysteleological imperatives will be revealed over
the course of the following sections. For a final remark, however, it is worth
suggesting that the development of a modern form of romance has its basis in factors
attributable to fluctuations in the ideological milieu of nineteenth-century Europe.
Frye has loosely associated his idea of displacement with 'changes in social context,
rather than literary form'. What he appears to have overlooked is the extent to which
there were changes in the nineteenth-century social context significant enough to
cause, not so much a displacement within literature, as the 'rupture' or detachment of
literary form from its mythopoeic origins. Such is the forcefulness of these
adjustments in social context - impacting, largely, through Darwin in Stevenson's
case - that it is possible to identify them as potential causes of a weakening or
negation of the ideological criteria which inform the mythopoeic structure. This we
can extend to include Eagleton's claim about the failure of religious ideology
inasmuch as such a failure may have contributed to the dislocation of metaphysics
more generally. Perhaps, then, we can begin to glean an understanding of the root
causes of the unstable operations of conventions: namely, the inefficacious and
invalid behaviour of the ideological referents which conventions refer to and 're¬
present' narratorially. Derrida, we notice, cautiously elects 'several "names", as
indications only' of 'the moment when, in the absence of a centre or origin,
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everything became discourse ... that is to say, a system in which the central signified,
the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system
of differences'; and lists as 'authors in whose discourse this occurrence has kept
most closely to its radical formulation', 'the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics',
'the Freudian critique of self-presence', and 'the Heideggarean destruction of
metaphysics'.36 If philosophy and psychoanalysis undertook such radical
formulations, it is reasonable to assume that 'literature' did the likewise, that it
undertook its own radical formulations within the context of narrative and that it did
so, perhaps, in terms that lay ahead of philosophy and psychoanalysis. And this is a
prospect, as we shall see later in this thesis, tantalisingly expressed by Stevenson, for
whom the 'tradition' of romance becomes a suitable vehicle for driving a wedge
against the ideological imperatives that characterise its form and function.
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Part Two
The Genealogy of Romance
Chapter Three
The Genealogy of Romance I
As a description, Frye's theory of romance appears a valid one, even ifwe can, as in
the previous chapter, theorise against it with equally valid, more powerful or more
fashionable arguments. It is only when we attempt to put it into practice against an
author like Stevenson, himself one of the most enthusiastic practitioners of romance
in recent centuries, that we begin to find an immediate, as opposed to a strategic,
disqualification of the narrative model Frye has described. That is to say that, where
Foucault and Derrida, as revisionary scholars, theorists and philosophers,
strategically counter-describe Frye's descriptions, an author like Stevenson, as a
producer of the literature Frye is describing, is already problematising Frye's
totalities prior to their conception and prior to their moment of being described.
Stevenson is active from the outset and 'interior' of (his) fiction, engaged in its
production rather than its delayed absorption through critical means. As an author, he
inhabits a creative moment: he looks, not from the retrospective critical periphery,
but from the instantaneous crux of a textual operation. He is engaged in a process,
not of describing literature, like Frye, but of inscribing (a part of) literature. As he
does so, I wish to demonstrate in the next section, in relation to Will o' the Mill and
The Ebb-Tide, he purposively inscribes the failure of Frye's literary totality by
enabling the dislocation of the archetypal analogues that Frye has asserted as central
to it. But Stevenson is also, in his own right, a critic and theorist, like Frye or Derrida
and Foucault; and this is an aspect of his work, as Glenda Norquay has pointed out,
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which has 'tended to become "background" to his own novels'.1 Stevenson's critical
essays, in fact, have been drastically overlooked and are in need of much further
scrutiny if we are to fully comprehend his fictions. This section, then, will
concentrate mainly on Stevenson's role as a critic and theorist in order to illustrate
the ways in which his creative activity is simultaneous with a theoretical activity
which invests his fictions with a strategic implementation and denial of formulaic
modes. We have already seen how Stevenson, in relation to a wide variety of
subjects, has theorised his rejection of traditional, classical or conventional notions of
understanding and analysis. Bearing this in mind, we can begin to see how these
ideas are applied within the context of those essays that deal directly with fiction.
Firstly, though, it is necessary to offer a context for Stevenson in terms of
how he has been canonically located and received, an issue which, in Stevenson's
case, is absurdly problematic. The variety of responses which Stevenson provokes
among both his auditors and detractors is evidence of a certain ambiguity about his
writing which implies, in turn, a form of writing that eludes description. And this
perhaps is the earliest evidence of what is being suggested above, that Stevenson's
canonical and critical obscurity belies a mode of romance that disrupts the generic
model made available through established critical media. Having said this, this
section will show where Stevenson's theories on romance coincide with, as well as
differ from, those of Frye. Admitting already, then, a certain ambivalence towards
Stevenson's work, we encounter one of the major stumbling blocks critics are faced
with in dealing with Stevenson: the question, in other words, of whether he
exemplifies a mainstream tradition or whether he is responsible for introducing a
'deviant' strain of narrative activity. As we shall see, it is not unproblematic to
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suggest that Stevenson represents neither of these, or both; for it is a characteristic
feature of his writing that it incorporates a number of incompatible phenomena with
simultaneous precision. Beginning with a summary of Stevenson's position in the
canon, it is possible to see how this principle of simultaneity takes root as a
characteristic condition of romance as a modern idiom.
A Canonical 'DeviantRobert Louis Stevenson
Given his tendency to drift, piratically as it were, from one genre to another, it is
difficult to know where to begin with a writer like Stevenson. In our belated, if still
uncertain, recognition of his significance, it is tempting, like Alan Sandison, to
squeeze him alongside his 'elect' contemporaries and successors as a forerunner or
instigator of an early-Modernist ethos and to insist upon the precedent 'that Robert
Louis Stevenson's work has, in Gertrude Stein's phrase, "a future feeling" highly
compatible with Modernist sentiments'.2 Sandison certainly has a point here.3 There
is no question of the influence on Modernism of Henry James, Stevenson's most
notable critical sparring partner; nor of Stephane Mallarme, whose reference to
Stevenson as 'un maitre'' speaks for itself. Yet Stevenson's value as a writer remains
vaguely diminished in comparison to these, his admirers, whose inclusion among
'the first generation of truly modern writers' is unquestioned (Malcolm Bradbury and
James McFarlane cite James and Mallarme as being among these)4 And here we
encounter one of the first among many incongruities in attempting to fashion a
context for Stevenson: that he has eluded the bracket of Modernism within which
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writers like these, notwithstanding their diversity, have been bracketed, writers with
whom he can be easily, even personally, associated.
Mostly, Stevenson has been cast away as a writer of 'perilous adventures'
who wrote, said George Moore in 1897, 'with the brain of a boy and the imagination
and perceptions of the meticulous eighteenth century';5 and this is a matter which
Sandison, among others, is keen to redress. The inappropriate description of
Stevenson as a writer of adventure stories is not, of course, entirely inappropriate.
Treasure Island as yet remains the definitive 'boy's-own' adventure yarn, so much
so that even Stevenson's auditors, Robert Kiely among them, are apt to make
remarks on how 'Stevenson, it was true, was capable of taking the adventure story in
its conventional, almost sub-literary, sense as a mode in which change for its own
sake was uppermost; motion counted more than direction, physical action
overshadowed interior motivation'.6
That Stevenson often drew upon conventions is not to be denied, and is of
crucial importance to this thesis. But Kiely's apologetic gesture towards conventions
and the conciliatory notion of Stevenson's 'sub-literary' capabilities constitute a
typical prejudice often raised against Stevenson - that he cannot be taken seriously
because he was a writer 'merely' of adventure stories. This is a serious
misconception on Kiely's behalf and does nothing to enhance our understanding of
the author to whom he extends his critical sympathies. It occludes, in the first
instance, what is more accurately the case: Stevenson's ability to maximise the
appeal of his fictions through an expert manipulation of 'sub-literary' materials. In
the second instance, it indirectly condemns to irrelevance those fictions which aspire
to be romances and which, in transcending their representational obligations, seek an
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uninhibited accession, says Stevenson, 'to certain almost sensual and quite illogical
tendencies in man'(HR, p. 174).
Kiely confines himself to a hollow schematics wherein this or that narrative
tendency is automatically endowed with this or that positive / negative value. Read
from an Aristotelian perspective of mimetic probability, there are obvious excesses
in a text like Treasure Island. No one, certainly not Stevenson, would dispute its
emphasis on action rather than, what he would call, 'the passionate slips and
hesitations of the conscience'(GR, p. 153). But to undermine Stevenson's status
along these lines is to extort from his merits a further, and unnecessary, incongruity.
As much is expressed by Alistair Fowler, in his essay 'Parables of Adventure: The
Debatable Novels ofRobert Louis Stevenson', when he contends that
...those who find high quality in Hawthorne or Melville should
experience no difficulty in recognising the genius of Stevenson's
romantic, un-novelistic stories... In speaking of romances and tales,
questions of character, or of authorial omniscience, will often be crassly
impertinent. Who would be so generically idiotic as to question the
probability of Poe's MS Found in a Bottle? Yet to be less idiotic about
stories that are not novels may call for critical methods of a new sort. We
need a new way, in short, of talking critically about effects of pure
narrative.7
It is one of the aims of this thesis to evoke such alternatives, to apply, that is, a more
satisfactory method of criticism in assessing Stevenson's preoccupation with 'pure
narrative'. For it is a preoccupation that pervades the full range of his work, to the
point that it becomes his vocation as a writer.
To claim as much is to forge revisionary associations between Stevenson and
literary theorists and practitioners of our own epoch. It is possible, for example, to
o
think of Stevenson's ideas as a prelude to those of Roland Barthes, albeit
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Stevenson's scope is limited to a nineteenth-century idiom and vocabulary. But what
is said of Barthes by Susan Sontag, that his 'writing, with its prodigious variety of
subjects, has finally one great subject: writing itself,9 could, perhaps, be said of
Stevenson. Glenda Norquay's collection, R. L. Stevenson on Fiction, goes some way
to proving the point, revealing the extent to which Stevenson's essays 'explore
fiction-making: what makes for a good or bad book; the ways in which writers,
including himself, work; the nature of literary realism; the influence of childhood
reading on the adult mind; and the importance of the imagination for both writers and
readers'.10
It is our general failure to acknowledge Stevenson's theoretical capacities
which has resulted in his being relegated to some peripheral back burner of critical
opinion. Stevenson flashes through our minds in the image of some populist
puppetmaster, shamelessly pulling the strings of our infantile zeal for gratuitous
adventures, only occasionally materialising as something more definite (most
recently through the efforts of Sandison, Norquay, Vennessa Smith and Penny
Fielding). Such a remark as Kiely's panders to this image, and is likely to blur our
already blurred appreciation of Stevenson's work, the bulk of which prodigiously
outweighs the more 'conservative' adventures. Stevenson can certainly be associated
with a nineteenth-century adventure tradition which, in being perpetuated and
generically abridged by Marryat, Haggard and Kipling, provided a highly popular
mainstream. But in this respect he differs little from Joseph Conrad. In many ways,
in fact, Conrad can be seen as adhering to the adventure trend, for, as David
Thorbum points out, 'exotic settings,' 'abductions,' 'bizarre characters,' 'duels, hand
to hand combat, natural catastrophe, extreme physical suffering, violent death - all
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the blood and thunder of the traditional narrative of outside adventure - are the very
substance of Conrad's novels'.11 It is for this reason that Thorburn is keen to express:
'The critics of our time have tended to ignore or at best minimise what Conrad's
reviewers understood to be crucial: that the author of Lord Jim had a great deal in
12
common with Robert Louis Stevenson'.
To anyone familiar enough with Stevenson, Thorburn's revelations are hardly
surprising, albeit they are in need of being reversed. Thorburn is suggesting that
Conrad has much in common with an adventure tradition epitomised by Stevenson.
That may be true. What is more to the point, though, is where Conrad shares a
common strain with Stevenson in transcending the adventure scenario. Indeed, in
contextualising Stevenson comparisons with Conrad are inevitable. And this brings
us back to the question concerning the orientation of Stevenson's fictions as a
modern phenomenon, in that they may or may not correspond to Conrad's highly
n
defined ModernAt agenda. There are, in fact, fundamental differences between
Conrad and Stevenson which, while they appear to substantiate Conrad's Modernist
credentials, put Stevenson, canonically, at an unstable variance. These differences -
or anomalies peculiar to Stevenson - consist of a tendency, in him, to resist any linear
fictional programme, to reject any regular application of theme or credo, and to
exhibit a rampant eclecticism which, says Ian Campbell, produced 'a great variety of
kinds, some of which he invented or mixed creatively'.14 This presents a sharp
contrast to the serial ingredients of Conrad's tales, which amount, in effect, to a
critical index of Modernist themes (futility, suicide, nihilism, nothingness, madness,
isolation, and so on). Conrad's index of themes, moreover, is indicative of a long-
term programme which forms a compact body of fiction out of individual works, so
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that the matter of accounting for Conrad, canonically, is simplified by his generic and
thematic consistency.15
Categorising and cataloguing Stevenson's work, however, is a much more
tenuous business. To implicate his similarities with Conrad, or rather Conrad's
similarities with Stevenson, should be enough to vanquish any doubts about his
Modernist qualifications. The moral and ethical dystopia of The Ebb-Tide bears all
the hallmarks of the Conradian (mis)adventure; while such instances as Darnaway's
demented outcry in The Merry Men - 'the horror - the horror o' the sea!' (The Merry
Men and Other Tales, p. 16) - have obvious textual resonances. And if these
comparisons seem somewhat superficial we might refer to Penny Fielding's incisive
chapter on The Master of Ballantrae which shows how closely the 'journey away
from Scotland prefigures that of Marlow in Conrad's Heart of Darkness' .16 From
beginning to end, their work can be seen to progressively and, in Conrad's case,
regressively overlap. It is interesting to think of how Stevenson's career, beginning
with Treasure Island, culminates in a work like The Beach of Felasa, which he
tellingly describes as
...the first realistic South Sea story; I mean with real South Sea characters
and details of life. Everybody else who has tried, that I have seen, got
carried away by the romance, and ended in a kind of sugar candy sham
epic, and the whole effect was lost - there was no etching, no human grin,
• • 17
consequently no conviction.
Had Stevenson lived long enough to see the ways in which Conrad developed the
South Seas theme, he would surely have approved.18 And Conrad did continue the
theme, until his untimely 'relapse' into the realms of 'sugar candy sham epic' which
mars some of his later writing. Stevenson's remark on a misguided literature of the
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South Seas might easily refer to Conrad's later attempts to write romances, for the
most part stunning failures, like The Arrow ofGold (1919), The Rover (1923) and the
flawed collaboration with Ford Madox Ford, the injudiciously titled Romance
(1903). For it would be true to say that, in producing such tales, Conrad regressed
into a literature more in keeping with an outmoded nineteenth-century adventure
tradition, of a kind perfected and only occasionally championed by Stevenson. It is
worth noting 'the fact that in working on Romance Conrad had the author of
Treasure Island firmly in mind'.19 It is testimony to the talents of Stevenson that he
should succeed where Conrad and Ford, writers of considerable ability, should fail
outright. It is all the more bewildering to note that Conrad's reputation remains
largely unaffected by the failure of his later romances (his reputation as a Modernist
having been settled by the insight and originality of his earlier material); while
Stevenson's has been blighted by the success of his earlier romances which, to some
extent, have obscured the significance of his later works (the insight and originality
of which has been largely overlooked). Conrad can in many ways be seen as
Stevenson's natural successor, even if, as Richard Curie remarks, Conrad (rather
jealously perhaps) 'always spoke, apart from his book on the South Seas, with
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aversion to Stevenson, whom he regarded as an artist of small account'. It is a
further irony that 'Flaubert, Mallarme and Henry James are the greatest influences on
21 ...
Conrad...', while Stevenson, himself an influence on Mallarme and James, is
stoutly rebuked.
This, though, goes some way to explaining the ambiguity of Stevenson's
position in the canon. For there has been a tendency to ignore the implications of
Stevenson's work apart from Treasure Island, and to overlook what was apparent to
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his immediate auditors, that in a book like The Master of Ballantrae, as Andrew
Lang defined it, it is 'a very modern gloom that broods over the roof-tree of
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Durrisdeer'. The problem for Stevenson, and the reason, probably, why he has
never maintained a 'serious' status, lies in what followed after his death: that is, the
expulsion of Stevenson from a Modernist aesthetic at the hands of those, like George
Moore and Conrad, who contributed to its development. It is well known, and need
hardly be reiterated here, that Stevenson suffered posthumously at the hands of an
elite Modernist literati, and that the declamation he received, in being labelled a
writer of gratuitous adventures, is something from which he has never fully
recovered. Thus when we come to hazily define the notion ofModernism as 'a Great
9-3
Divide between past and present, art before and art now', we find that Mallarme,
James and Conrad fall on this side of its radical mainstream, while Stevenson, in
spite of his historical proximity, is confined to its 'prehistoric' past. It is therefore
understandable that Sandison should seek to confer upon Stevenson, through the
mists of ignorance surrounding his work, some lasting measure of credibility, and to
secure for him some kind of 'serious' status among the higher tiers of the Modernist
forum.
This, however, is as if to say that without the title of Modernist, Stevenson is
destined to remain a canonical non-entity. To label Stevenson with outright finality,
in fact, as Sandison does, might arouse our suspicions. For we cannot lose sight of
the fact of Stevenson's annulment from any institutionalised (i. e. textbook) summary
of Modernism. Nor can we ignore the facts as expressed, somewhat crudely, by
Kiely, that Stevenson was capable of appropriating the most conventional means of
story-telling. In short, Sandison overplays the Modernist card. He is so keen to
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establish Stevenson's Modernist credentials that he omits or suppresses what is a
vital aspect of Stevenson's work - namely, his staunch advocacy of romance, both as
a genre and a principle, and his insistence on the conventions of romance as reliable
structural criteria. It is with this in mind that we draw attention to a contradiction in
Sandison's argument:
So Stevenson, stressing in his own work the importance of the abstract,
of artifice and the repudiation of old conventions, illustrates well what
Bradbury and MacFarlane contend to be part of any working definition of
Modernism, namely 'a quality of abstraction and highly conscious
artifice, taking us behind familiar reality, breaking away from familiar
functions of language and form'.24
Sandison may be right in attributing some of the defining characteristics of
Modernism to Stevenson, but in his eagerness he loses sight of some of the defining
characteristics of Stevenson himself - most crucially his expressed reliance on
conventions as an effective material for writing:
But again, we are rather more tempted to admit those particulars which
we know we can describe; and hence those most of all which, having
been described very often, have grown to be conventionally treated in the
practice of our art. These we choose, as the mason chooses the acanthus
to adorn his capital, because they come naturally to the accustomed hand.
The old stock incidents and accessories, tricks of workmanship and
schemes of composition (all being admirably good, or they would long
have been forgotten) haunt and tempt our fancy, offer us ready-made but
not perfectly appropriate solutions for any problem that arises, and wean
us from the study of nature and the uncompromising practice of art. (NR,
p. 73)
Sandison's comment, moreover, is given in response to a sequence of analogies
made in 'A Humble Remonstrance' where Stevenson, in crossing swords with Henry
James over the representational capacities of fiction, contends:
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The arts, like arithmetic and geometry, turn away their eyes from the
gross, coloured and mobile nature at our feet and regard instead a certain
figmentary abstraction... Our art is occupied, and bound to be occupied,
not so much in making stories true as making them typical ... A
proposition of geometry does not compete with life; and a proposition of
geometry is a fair and luminous parallel for a work of art. Both are
reasonable, both untrue to the crude fact; both inhere in nature, neither
represents it. (HR, pp. 172 - 174)
For Sandison, this amounts to evidence of Stevenson's repudiation of old
conventions. More accurately, it expresses Stevenson's distrust of 'new' ones, those,
he senses, which are ushering fiction towards the 'photographic exactitude' of
'realism', those, in short, which have 'made us turn our back upon the larger, more
various, and more romantic art of yore' (NR, p. 70). An author is hardly going to
adhere to a premise of making stories 'typical' by repudiating old conventions, nor
by abandoning the familiar functions of language and form. The opposite stands that
in writing, for example, Treasure Island Stevenson sought to produce an 'elementary
novel of adventure' (HR, p. 176), admitting, without apology - and in retribution of a
growing tendency to 'write the novel of society instead of the romance of man' (HR,
p. 182) - that
...while it is true that neither Mr. James nor the author of the work in
question [Stevenson himself] has ever, in the fleshy sense, gone questing
after gold, it is probable that both have ardently desired and fondly
imagined the details of such a life in youthful day-dreams; and the
author, counting upon that, and well aware (cunning and low-minded
man!) that this class of interest, having been frequently treated, finds a
readily accessible and beaten road to the sympathies of the reader,
addressed himself throughout to the building up and circumstantiation of
this boyish dream. (HR, p. 176)
Clearly, Stevenson is expressing his intention to re-familiarise his readership with
the established functions of language and form.
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It is not altogether fair to invalidate Sandison on these grounds. Some of what
he infers from Stevenson certainly hits the mark, especially where he emphasises
Stevenson's acutely self-conscious approach to narrative production. (Indeed,
Stevenson's unabashed acknowledgement of his use of conventions, given in such
self-deprecating tones, is accompanied by intimations of the failure of conventions to
produce 'perfectly appropriate solutions for any problem that arises'. His self-
consciousness is such that there is a certain playfulness about his writing25 and with
it, we suspect, an ulterior motive - to introduce conventional formulae if only to
expose their limitations and exploit them accordingly). Nevertheless, it will be
argued here that Sandison, like Kiely, has failed to strike a balance in contextualising
Stevenson's fiction. The fact that Stevenson was capable both of taking 'the
adventure story in its conventional, almost sub-literary, sense' (Kiely) and of
repudiating 'the old conventions' of 'language and form' (Sandison) presents an
obvious contradiction. To correlate the assessments ofKiely and Sandison, then, is to
forge an unusual discrepancy, a kind of conceptual crack, which, in itself, can
probably do more to improve our understanding of Stevenson than anything else.
To examine this contentious middle space is to put Stevenson at an awkward
variance with Modernism. On the one hand we are dealing with an author of
immense originality and, on the other, with an author who allies himself to the
requirements of 'the tradition'. The situation presents itself that Stevenson had an
odd capacity for combining innovation with conservatism, and this might prompt us
to think ofVictor Shklovsky's adage - that 'every work of art comes into existence as
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a parallel and a contrast to some sort of model' - as a reasonable motto for
Stevenson. One of the outstanding conclusions we can draw from this (in mentioning
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Shklovsky) is that Stevenson possessed a precursory tendency towards formalist and
structuralist methodologies. This is intimated by Sandison when he emphasises the
degree of self-consciousness shown by Stevenson as regards his art. This, as
Sandison suggests, often leads Stevenson to expose the artificiality of fiction. But
exposing the artificiality of fiction is not the same as a repudiation of conventions
(which is how Sandison seems to see it). It demonstrates, rather, the kind of
awareness shown by twentieth-century exponents of formalism and structuralism
who, far from repudiating 'the old conventions', sought a direct involvement with the
functional 'interior' of narrative; or, to put it another way, it demonstrates the kind of
awareness shown by a proto-structuralist like Frye. It is by the same token that,
contrary to Kiely's assumptions, Stevenson's expressed adaptation of conventions
was far from being a naive administration of tried and tested strategies: it was a
deliberate activity, pursuing the deliberate aim of entering, intimately, into an
advanced understanding of fiction.
In the following sub-sections of this chapter, I wish to gauge the extent of
Stevenson's proto-structuralist tendency in comparison to Frye's. However, in order
to gain a preliminary understanding of Stevenson's structuralist bent - in
contradistinction to Frye's - we can turn to Stevenson's reliable contemporary, Henry
James. In the following summary, James applies something resembling Shklovsky's
dictum to Stevenson in the same way that we have applied it. In doing so, he
unwittingly draws attention to a fundamental difference between Stevenson and
Frye: '[Stevenson] makes us say, Let the tradition live, by all means, since it was
delightful; but at the same time he is the cause of our perceiving afresh that a
• • • • 27 • •tradition is kept alive only by something being added to it'. This observation is at a
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crucial variance with Frye's interpretation of 'the tradition'. James implies that,
while Stevenson is an upholder of the tradition, he is also an expert manipulator of
the tradition: he is a causal impetus in the manufacture of form who, ultimately,
enables it to perform its function, but only after a creative interim where he has
subjected 'the tradition' to authorial (or local) modifications. This is a phenomenon,
as we have seen, which is disqualified by Frye, within whose scheme the author is
subject to the overriding determinations of the archetypal order. But Stevenson, as
will be revealed in this chapter, goes further than James's panegyric offering
suggests. He allows the tradition to live, but only inasmuch as it can be revealed as
inherently unsustainable, as something which does not 'live' as such, but which is
subject to the determinations of its localised production. With his awareness of
conventions, Stevenson clearly has something in common with Frye, but we must
come to a point where Stevenson transcends Frye's way of thinking by
demonstrating his place, as Ian Duncan might put it, in a process of 'active
modulation'. It is something of a paradox that, having revealed the extent to which
Stevenson operates within conventional modes, we begin to acknowledge his
attempts, not to repudiate but, on the one hand, to trace them to their very origins
and, on the other, to carry them beyond their recurrent or regular functions. I wish to
argue, precisely, that it was by entering into and manipulating conventions, not by
repudiating them, that Stevenson was able to create a romance of the modern idiom,
a form of romance which detaches itself from its conventional or traditional bases by
exposing the invalidity of the bases it relies on. As a consequence, we shall see that it
is inappropriate, after all, to label Stevenson a proto-structuralist with any finality, in
that he as often acts beyond the rigours of the structuralist method.
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In describing his position, I wish to invoke, first of all, some remarks made
about Stevenson by one of his most distinguished admirers, Italo Calvino. Adapting
Calvino's terms, given at the start of the following sub-section, we can begin to think
of two opposing zones of narrative operation - one referring to Frye's idea of an
envisaged order of conventions (which I will call, after the manner of Calvino, 'the
invisible text') and the other referring to narrative as we actually receive it (which I
will call 'the visible text'). Of these, the invisible text relates to the archetypal order
which is presumed to exist but which, to re-apply Poe's terms, never materialises as
an idea in itself (but only as an effort at one). The visible text, meanwhile, refers to
narrative as a linguistic construct which, as a condition of itself, is subject to the
limitations of the linguistic system and which imposes, therefore, a material limit on
the production and function of narrative structure. This distinction, summarised now,
will become more important as we go on and, in particular, when we come to focus
primarily on Stevenson.
The Invisible Text
Italo Calvino, paying homage to Stevenson in the preface of Our Ancestors, offers a
useful key to unravelling Stevenson's fiction. The extent to which Calvino was
influenced by Stevenson is summarised in the following sketch:
Among the writers I have always read and, willy-nilly, have taken as a
model is R. L. Stevenson. This is because Stevenson himself wrote the
books he would have liked to read, because he, who was so delicate an
artist, imitated old adventure stories and then relived them himself. To
him, writing meant translating an invisible text containing the
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quintessential fascination of all adventures, all mysteries, all conflicts of
will and passion scattered throughout the books of hundreds ofwriters; it
meant translating them into his own precise and almost impalpable prose,
into his own rhythm which was like that of dance-steps at once
impetuous and controlled.28
Stevenson's expertise in the effective use of conventions is such that Calvino situates
him centrally within something like an archetypal order. Importantly, though,
Calvino is adamant that Stevenson's translation of the invisible text is superseded, in
its transition from invisible to 'visible' status, by stylistic nuances which are peculiar
to Stevenson alone. Calvino sees in Stevenson a form ofwriting which inheres in the
romance tradition while at the same time as remaining outside of it. Through its
phase of enunciation, the text begins to function independently of the conventions it
translates: there is a point of separation between the (invisible) thought of the story
as part of a literary totality and the (visible) actualisation of the story as the concrete
thought of the thought it represents. Calvino assigns a role to the author whereby the
translation of the quintessential fascination of all adventures undergoes an idiolectic
transformation. He allows for a material phase of narration where the conventional is
subsumed by the specific, where the universal totality of fiction gives way to the
idiolectic specificity and creative management of the author.
This passage is enough to indicate the fundamental similarity and difference
between Stevenson and Frye. On the one hand, Calvino recognises Stevenson's - like
Frye's - apprehension of an order of conventions that informs the whole of fiction.
But, on the other, he recognises the significance of style and, in this way, reflects
Stevenson's own preoccupation with and insistence on style as the final determinant
of narrative form and function. With Stevenson, that is to say, the question of style is
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not solely limited to 'the manner of linguistic expression'. As we shall see,
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Stevenson's theorisation of style includes an exploration of the material processes of
narrative production and the problems pertaining to the actualisation of the invisible
text or idea of structure through the visible utility of language. These deliberations
eventually lead Stevenson to establishing a theory of narrative grounded in the
operations of idiolect where the author is working through a genealogical, as opposed
to a cosmological, frontier of narrative development. And this is a matter which we
will begin to explain and explore more fully after the following comparison between
Stevenson and Frye.
We have already seen how Stevenson has prefigured Frye in matters relating
to realism and romance and in identifying the conventions of romance as reliable
structural criteria. It is worth expanding on some of these prefigurations in order to
show the full extent to which Stevenson anticipates Frye. Frye's arguments
concerning the representational condition of fiction, for example, emphasise the need
for critics to get to grips with the technicalities of fiction-making -
There is still a strong tendency to avoid problems of technique and
design and structure in fiction, and to concentrate on what the book talks
about rather than on what it actually presents. It is still not generally
understood either that "reality" in literature cannot be presented at all
except within the conventions of literary structure, and that those
conventions must be understood first. (SS, p. 43)
- and, in this way, he takes a similar position to Stevenson: 'Art is not like theology;
nothing is forced. You have not to represent the world. You have to represent only
what you can represent with pleasure and effect, and the only way to find out what
that is is by technical exercise'.30 Similarly, in 'Some Gentlemen in Fiction',
Stevenson draws attention to the function of characters as technical components of a
story's structure, suggesting that they are derived from an 'invisible' resource of
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literary conventions, although his emphasis on the 'visible' aspect of conventions (as
purelymaterial elements of text) is already discernible:
These verbal puppets ... are things of a divided parentage: the breath of
life may be an emanation from their maker, but they themselves are only
strings of words and parts of books; they dwell in, they belong to,
literature; convention, technical artifice, technical gusto, the mechanical
necessities of the art, these are the flesh and blood with which they are
invested.31
In 'A Humble Remonstrance', meanwhile, Stevenson goes into far more detail in
defining the technicalities of form and the condition of fiction, and, in doing so,
issues the same analogies and analytical principles later issued, as we shall see, by
Frye. The condition of fiction as a representational medium, in taking its place
among the other art forms, can be compared, says Stevenson, to geometry:
What, then, is the object, what the method, of an art, and what the source
of its power? The whole secret is that no art does "compete with life."
Man's one method, whether he reasons or creates, is to half-shut his eyes
against the dazzle and confusion of reality. The arts, like arithmetic and
geometry, turn away their eyes from the gross, coloured and mobile
nature at our feet, and regard instead a certain figmentary abstraction.
Geometrywill tell us of a circle, a thing never seen in nature; asked about
a green circle or an iron circle, it lays its hand upon its mouth. So with
the arts ... A proposition of geometry does not compete with life; and a
proposition of geometry is a fair and luminous parallel for a work of art.
Both are reasonable, both untrue to the crude fact; both inhere in nature,
neither represents it. (HR, pp. 172 - 174)
Frye, advancing similar claims, relates the principle of fiction as an abstraction to the
principle of displacement among generic forms. Romance, he asserts, is more distant
from reality than realistic modes only inasmuch as it represents a further abstraction
from reality than realistic modes. Romance is no less 'true' to nature than realism,
nor more vulnerable to 'any child-and-adult value judgement about beliefs'. It
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merely reflects, says Frye, 'the fact that undisplaced versions present the narrative
structure more abstractly, just as a cubist or primitive painting would represent the
geometrical forms of its images more directly than straight representation would do'
(SS, p. 41). As regards myths, says Frye:
It follows that the mythical mode, the stories about gods, in which
characters have the greatest power of action, is the most abstract and
conventionalized of all literary modes, just as the corresponding modes in
other arts - religious Byzantine painting, for example - show the highest
degree of stylization in their structure. Hence the structural principles of
literature are as closely related to mythology and comparative religion as
those ofpainting are to geometry. (AC, pp. 134 - 35)
It is noticeable that Frye has extended the analogy between fiction and geometry to
include painting. In describing the abstract quality of fiction further, Frye invokes yet
another analogy, this time relating to music:
In this book we are attempting to outline a few of the grammatical
rudiments of literary expression, and the elements of it that correspond to
such musical elements as tonality, simple and compound rhythm,
canonical imitation, and the like... We are suggesting that the resources
of verbal expression are limited, if that is the word, by the literary
equivalents of rhythm and key.... (AC, p. 132)
Overall, Frye contends, '[pjroblems of design, of composition and balance and
contrast, are obviously as central in the verbal arts as they are in music or painting'
(SS, p. 37). Returning to 'A Humble Remonstrance', we find Stevenson conveying
an identical series of analogies in describing, like Frye, the estrangement of literature
from any external foundation:
Music is but an arbitrary trifling with a few of life's majestic chords;
painting is but a shadow of its pageantry of light and colour; literature
does but dryly indicate that wealth of incident, of moral obligation, of
virtue, vice, action, rapture and agony, with which it teems. To "compete
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with life," whose sun we cannot look upon, whose passions and diseases
waste and slay us - to compete with the flavour ofwine, the beauty of the
dawn, the scorching of fire, the bitterness of death and separation - here
are, indeed, labours for a Hercules in a dress coat, armed with a pen and a
dictionary to depict the passions, armed with a tube of superior flake-
white to paint the portrait of the insufferable sun. (HR, p. 172)
Developing these analogies further, Stevenson shows a remarkable correspondence
to Frye, as well as to formalism and structuralism more generally, in defining the
condition of literature as a self-contained and self-referential region of activity:
Painting, ruefully comparing sunshine and white-flake, gives up truth of
colour, as it had already given up relief and movement; and instead of
vying with nature, arranges a scheme of harmonious tints. Literature,
above all in its most typical mood, the mood of narrative, similarly flees
the direct challenge and pursues instead an independent and creative aim.
(HR,p. 173)
Life is monstrous, infinite, illogical, abrupt and poignant; a work of art,
in comparison, is neat, finite, self-contained, rational, flowing and
emasculate. Life imposes by brute energy, like inarticulate thunder; art
catches the ear, among the far louder noises of experience, like an air
artificially made by a musician. (HR, p. 174)
And again, in 'A Humble Remonstrance', Stevenson significantly pre-empts the
arrival of critical approaches that would characterise fiction as a mode of writing
which follows its own internal logic. In doing so, he verges, terminologically as well
as theoretically, on something like an archetypal theory (Stevenson's word is
'typical' rather than archetypal). We could even say that he anticipates, implicitly,
the possibility of an alternative literary universe as we have received it through Frye;
albeit, the emphasis on the artificiality of narrative is highly noticeable:
Our art is occupied, and bound to be occupied, not so much in making
stories true as making them typical; not so much in capturing the
lineaments of each fact, as in marshalling them towards a common end.
For the welter of impressions, all forcible but all discreet, which life
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presents, it substitutes a certain artificial series of impressions, all indeed
most feebly represented, but all aiming at the same effect, all eloquent of
the same idea, all chiming together like consonant notes in music or like
the graduated tints in a good picture. (HR, p. 173)
It is impressive enough that Stevenson should recognise the detachment of
narrative from any representational foundation, and that he should pre-empt Frye's
idea of narrative as an 'autonomous verbal structure' (AC, p. 74) or 'a hypothetical
verbal structure which exists for its own sake' (AC, p. 245). At his most intuitive,
though, Stevenson pre-empts the latter-day recognition of the trans-generic
operations of narrative as being among the broader operations of a field of textuality.
On the one hand, says Glenda Norquay, this expands the 'blurring of categories
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between the serious and the popular' and the negation of value-judgements as
reliable critical criteria. On the other, and in a move which clearly 'anticipates the
thinking of later theorists', it evokes an elimination of special categories of writing
through an 'applicability of "narrative" as a term to poetry, to drama, to biography
and even to history, in which, [Stevenson] suggests, we can find many of the same
textual features and literary strategies that are apparent in fiction'.33 In this sense,
Stevenson begins to radically outdistance Frye, who as yet retains a separation
between literature and what he calls descriptive or assertive modes of writing, those
forms ofwriting (historical, scientific, philosophical or theological) that presuppose a
referential correspondence between the text and a reality- or truth-foundation.34 For
Frye, 'verbal structures may be classified according to whether the final direction of
meaning is outward or inward'. Thus:
In descriptive or assertive writing the final direction is outward. Here the
verbal structure is intended to represent things external to it, and it is
valued in terms of the accuracy with which it does represent them ... In
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all literary verbal structures the final direction of meaning is inward ... In
literature, questions of fact are subordinated to the primary aim of
producing a structure of words for its own sake, and the sign-values of
the symbols are subordinated to their importance as a structure of
interconnected motifs. Wherever we have an autonomous verbal structure
of this kind, we have literature. Wherever this autonomous structure is
lacking, we have language, words used instrumentally to help human
consciousness do or understand something else. Literature is a
specialised form of language, as language is of communication. (AC, p.
74)
As regards history, Frye is far too off-the-cuff, asserting that 'the historian selects his
facts, but to suggest that he had manipulated them would be grounds for libel' (AC,
p. 75). Stevenson, on the other hand, by his expansion of the concept of narrative,
denies these separate faculties of linguistic function. 'The art of narrative,' he says in
'A Humble Remonstrance', 'is the same, whether it is applied to the selection and
illustration of a real series of events or of an imaginary series' (HR, p. 170). Contrary
to Frye, Stevenson puts the onus, precisely, on the historian's necessary conversion
of 'facts' into narrative raw materials which, when pieced together, produce, not
descriptive accuracy or truth, but an effect akin to fiction. Like authors of fiction,
historians are engaged in a process of constructing narratives which, in being
dependent on method, become indirect modifications of the realities they claim to
represent:
No art is true in this sense: none can "compete with life": not even
history, built indeed of indisputable facts, but these facts robbed of their
vivacity and sting; so that when we read of the sack of a city or the fall of
an empire, we are surprised, and justly commend the author's talent, if
our pulse be quickened. And mark, for a last differentia, that this
quickening of the pulse is, in almost every case, purely agreeable; that
these phantom reproductions of experience, even at their most acute,
convey decided pleasure; while experience itself, in the cockpit of life,
can torture and slay. (HR, pp. 172 - 173)
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In a similar move, Stevenson goes further than Frye, not only in proclaiming the
representational incapacities of descriptive or assertive writing, but of language in its
entirety. 'Language', he tells us, 'is but a poor bull's-eye lantern wherewith to show
off the vast cathedral of the world'.35 Or, more sceptically still: '...written words
remain fixed, become idols even to the writer, found wooden dogmatisms, and
preserve flies of obvious error in the amber of the truth'.36 The implications of these
remarks appear to suggest of language a labyrinth of discourses segregated from any
referential basis in truth, being, essence or whatever, whilst emphasising the
materiality of language to a point that it consists of signs devoid of the presences
they refer to.
As we shall see in more detail in a moment, it is chiefly Stevenson's
emphasis on the arbitrary nature and materiality of the text, and on the inability of
narrative to effect a metaphysical means of signification, that most clearly separates
him from Frye. In Frye's case, literature is anti-representational, but it is nevertheless
capable of establishing a truth-foundation in the idea of the Logos. Through the
transcendental operations of metaphor, any individual narrative remains for Frye a
visible manifestation of the invisible text which, with the Logos at its centre, the
author has accessed through the visionary means at his disposal. In exploring
Stevenson's concept of structure, however, we find that the invisible text inhabits an
untranslatable space which exists, if at all, beyond the scope of the visible medium,
while the visible medium itself is not anchored in anything outside of the immediate
conditions of its localised production. In considering the intricacies of Stevenson's
theoretical programme it becomes clear that, for Stevenson, narrative is ultimately
the property of style, of idiolect - not of the author's visionary propensity; while, as
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will be revealed in the second chapter of this section, the desire which perpetuates
narrative is not, as with Frye, the effect of some overriding cosmic thrust. As a
preliterate cause of the effect of fiction, desire is grounded firmly in the genealogical
impetus of 'certain almost sensual and quite illogical tendencies in man'. There are
some intriguing propositions arising from this which drive a decisive wedge between
Stevenson and Frye, not least through Stevenson's discovery of a dislocation
between the concrete materials of narrative and the impulse of desire which initiates
the formation of narrative. And it is here that Stevenson begins to address the issue
concerning the translation of the text from its 'invisible' to 'visible' status. Looking
at this now, it is necessary to begin with Stevenson's more general assertations
concerning the production of narrative, before focusing, in the following chapter, on
the special function he assigns to romance in view of the limitations stated here.
The Visible Text
I will argue in this sub-section, among other things, that, for Stevenson, the
structurality of narrative is only possible through the more immediate dynamics of
language and through the author's handling of the local difficulties of language, a
feature of structural production that Frye fails to address. Frye denies any creative
autonomy on the grounds that a grammar of archetypes pre-exists authorial agency.
If narrative ultimately resides in and refers to an archetypal plenum, then the role of
the author is at once diminished; authorial 'presence' is the property of the archetype
and issues, ultimately, from the linguistic avatar of the Logos. For Derrida, on the
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other hand, authorial 'presence' or 'consciousness' is irretrievably disseminated
through the signifying chain, so that agency, in the end, is an illusory component of
speech revealed in writing, the true condition of language.
With Stevenson, however, the emphasis is placed squarely on the role of the
author as the arbiter of narrative structure, and he is quick to deride, for example, the
author-as-realist who, in his attempts 'to immolate his readers under facts', embarks
on false accessions to objectivity which lead him, Stevenson protests, 'to discard all
design, to abjure all choice'. Choice, autonomy, creative function, are held by
Stevenson as pivotal forces in literary production, to the point that 'in every case the
artist must decide for himself, and decide afresh and yet afresh for each succeeding
work and new creation' (NR, p. 74). The process of narrative, then, is a decision¬
making process and, in this sense, the author manufactures form rather than gains
access to form through an apocalyptic medium.
But Stevenson's insistence on the author by no means reflects some kind of
post-Romantic cult of subjectivity. To state in advance what will be shown in this
sub-section, Stevenson often diminishes the stature of the author and perversely
celebrates the impossibilities ofwriting. Over the course of his work, he assembles a
theory of composition which involves a repudiation of traditional notions of
creativity and a reversal of assumptions concerning the organicity of literary form.
For Stevenson, the author, in spite of his ability to administer choice over his
materials, is incapacitated by the restrictions of intellectual method and by the local
difficulties of the linguistic system which, Stevenson suggests, has no natural or
instantaneous contact with the author's initial power to conceive. In his attempt to
administer form through language, the author is 'naturally' disadvantaged: the
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narrative he produces is dependent on his personal struggle with an available range
of artificial materials which continually elude his creative scope. It is part of the
author's task that he applies the strictest measure of self-conscious endeavour in
arranging these materials effectively, but this, as we shall see, is always an
insurmountable difficulty which, if it is to have any effect at all, requires the
demotion of the author from the position of artist to 'artisan'.
Some of Stevenson's most enigmatic references to the nature of textuality are
made in the essay 'On Some Technical Elements of Style in Literature'. His
enthusiasm for the necessity of conventions, seen earlier, is now underpinned by an
insistence on the position of the author as being constrained to work with a linguistic
apparatus which acts, not as an aid to composition, but as an obligatory hindrance, a
handicap, a 'singular limitation':
...literature alone is condemned to work in mosaic with finite and quite
rigid words. You have seen these blocks dear to the nursery: this one a
pillar, that a pediment, a third a window or a vase. It is with blocks ofjust
such arbitrary size and figure that the literary architect is condemned to
design the palace of his art. Nor is this all ... but every word, phrase,
sentence, and paragraph must move in a logical progression, and convey
a definite conventional import.37
His choice of terminology - his analogies between text and architecture or material
construction - convey a healthy engagement with the structural principles of fiction.
But the tone is less frivolous than before as regards the operations of language and
form. In this instance, the author is 'condemned' to struggle with the unavoidable
requirements of his linguistic resources. He is required to work with arbitrary
materials and, from within a limited textual economy, to produce a sense of order
which does not inhere in the materials themselves. It is the author's task to fashion a
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conventional order out of a chaos that precedes his intervention, in a process that
denies the possibility of structure as the offspring of some absolute model. Structure,
rather, is the cumulative effect of the stylistic management of unmanageable
materials.
It is at moments like these that Stevenson appears poised on a verge - mindful
of the formalist / structuralist plateau he has thoughtfully erected, yet sensible too of
the void which surrounds and undermines it. The emphasis on language as an
inorganic material betrays a feeling that there is no pre-existing network of values
from which the emergent narrative receives its formal impetus. Instead, Stevenson is
given to characterise narrative as a form without substance outside of itself, which,
while it gives the appearance of being rooted in some pre-established order of
significations, is structurally and semantically vacuous:
There is nothing more disenchanting to man than to be shown the springs
and mechanism of any art. All our arts and occupations lie wholly on the
surface; it is on the surface that we perceive their beauty, fitness, and
significance; and to pry below is to be appalled by their emptiness and
shocked by the coarseness of the strings and pulleys. In a similar way,
psychology itself, when pushed to any nicety, discovers an abhorrent
baldness, but rather from the fault of our analysis than from any poverty
native to the mind. And perhaps in aesthetics the reason is the same:
those disclosures which seem fatal to the dignity of art seem so perhaps
only in the proportion of our ignorance; and those conscious and
unconscious artifices which it seems unworthy of the serious artist to
employ were yet, if we had the power to trace them to their springs,
indications of a delicacy of the sense finer than we can conceive, and
hints of ancient harmonies in nature. This ignorance at least is largely
irremediable. We shall never leam the affinities of beauty, for they lie too
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deep in nature and too far back in the mysterious history ofman.
Stevenson, like Frye, is seeking to penetrate the 'visible' exterior of fiction and reach
its 'invisible' interior so as to reveal its originary foundations, its causal operations
and preliterate incentives. Given that the archetypal schema is based, precisely, on
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the theorem that the structural tendencies of narrative, those 'conscious and
unconscious artifices', can be directly related to 'ancient harmonies in nature',
Stevenson, again, is running very close to Frye. But there are several areas where
Stevenson resists the implications of an archetypal reading. In the first place, he
indicates a deficiency in our modes of analysis - as well as in 'psychology itself -
which prevents our gaining an exhaustive understanding of the processes of literary
production. We are not equipped, intellectually or epistemologically, to resolve the
mysteries of composition; and, while Stevenson expresses the possibility of a pre-
textual site of origins, unlike Frye, he will not admit its actualisation (in the form of
the Logos) through textual means. He seems to sense a metaphysical foundation, and
yet, in attempting to reveal it, sees only the inorganic hardware, tricks of the trade
and inanimate matter of composition. In this sense, he indicates a rupture between
the (invisible) origin and (visible) articulation of written texts, between 'a delicacy of
sense finer than we can conceive' and 'the coarseness of the strings and pulleys' that
constitute the completed article. As a visible conception, the text is unstable, a
structure without a central emanation - in effect, a structure devoid of any inherent
structurality. It is detached from any external 'presences' that may have enabled its
genesis and formation, organically, through the material realms of the text and,
moreover, lacks any transcendental impetus that may have precluded the local
difficulties ofwriting or improved the author's disadvantaged status.
More striking, perhaps, are Stevenson's references to the absence (the
'emptiness', the 'abhorrent baldness') of any solid basis ofmeaning in 'our arts and
occupations' and in 'psychology itself. Such a consideration, related to fiction, not
only emphasises the artificiality, as opposed to organicity, of narrative: it threatens
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the semantic validity of narrative and excludes the idea of structure as a series of
conventional associations which converge upon the author in the event of writing.
Structure, for Stevenson, is synthetic. Significance, meanwhile, is purely an effect of
the text, and narrative a set of semantic transactions which have no conceptual
foundation or target beyond the limitations of their own (synthetic) effect. The
significance of a work of art, Stevenson implies, occurs on the 'surface', artificially;
it is a product only of the material assets of the text which have no intrinsic value or
significance in themselves. 'Here are stories which powerfully affect the reader,'
Stevenson remarks of the Arabian Nights and The Count ofMonte Cristo, 'which can
be reperused at any age, and where the characters are no more than puppets. The
bony fist of the showman visibly propels them; their springs are an open secret; their
faces are ofwood, their bellies filled with bran; and yet we thrillingly partake of their
adventures' (GR, pp. 160 - 161). Or again, says Stevenson, with an explicit emphasis
on the materiality of narrative:
Dumas approaches perhaps nearest of any modern to these Arabian
authors in the purely material charm of a some his romances. The early
part of Monte Cristo, down to the finding of the treasure, is a piece of
perfect story-telling; the man never breathed who shared these moving
incidents without a tremor; and yet Faria is a thing of packthread and
Dantes little more than a name. (GR, p. 160)
Contrary to Frye, then, Stevenson invalidates conventions as items endowed with this
or that semantic value, defining them, instead, as signs without the efficacy of the
presences they refer to. The semantic value of narrative is seen as a factitious effect,
and the failure to recognise the effect, as it were, as an unintentional fallacy. To
expose this fallacy, says Stevenson, is 'a most distasteful business: taking down the
picture from the wall and looking on the back; and like the inquiring child, pulling
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the musical cart to pieces'. To be pulling the musical cart to pieces is an activity
which can be said to permeate Stevenson's essays and fictions alike, and this in view
of his expressed reliance on conventions. The suggestion presents itself, more clearly
than ever, that Stevenson uses conventions if only to disrupt the sanctity of narrative
forms, reaffirming their effectiveness whilst showing them to be incapable of
sustaining a metaphorical bond between one text and another.
To recap, then, Stevenson, in revealing an 'emptiness' or lack of foundation,
no longer posits narrative as a natural sequence of intelligible items. Intelligibility
depends on the artificial manipulation of the linguistic stockpile. Conventions, as
collective clusters of words that situate structure, become uprooted from any solid
basis ofmeaning. As narrative elements, they have no basis in any universal model:
they are random and only cease to be random under the local supervisions of the
disadvantaged author. It is a measure of his commitment as a theorist that Stevenson
explores these matters further in other essays, this time relating the principles given
above to narrative structure in the broadest possible sense:
A work of art is first cloudily conceived in the mind; during the period of
gestation it stands more clearly forward from these swaddling mists, puts
on expressive lineaments, and becomes at length that most faultless, but
also, alas! that incommunicable product of the human mind, a perfected
design. On the approach to execution all is changed. The artist must now
step down, don his working clothes, and become the artisan. He now
resolutely commits his airy conception, his delicate Ariel, to the touch of
matter; he must decide, almost in a breath, the scale, the style, the spirit,
and the particularity of execution of his whole design. (NR, p. 71).
While Frye's analysis of structure led him to conceive of literature as a structural and
semantic totality, Stevenson recognises the individual role of the author and proposes
a version of structure which is only possible through stylistic management or, as
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Calvino has implied, through the idiolectic conversion of ideas into textual materials.
Narrative, for Frye, is a metaphysical organicity, an unbreakable bond of archetypal
functions that enter into consciousness and inform the imaginative impulses of
authorial agency. For Frye, narrative is a perfected design prior to and after its
authorial assimilation and disclosure. A perfected design in Stevenson's view,
however, is impossible because the design must undergo the transitional rupture of
its stylistic delivery, style being the intermediate stage between the mystery of
personality, wherein the idea of a work of art is 'cloudily conceived', and its verbal
actualisation. In definite contrast to Frye, then, Stevenson posits a disjunction
between the initial conception of an 'invisible' design-formation and its articulation
through a 'visible' medium. Stevenson situates the origins of creativity within the
subjective space of authorial agency where it becomes subject to the local
expediencies of language. As such, the idea of the story will not appear in itself, but
only as an effort at one, bearing in mind that to make 'the idea' manageable through
words is impossible because language consists of unmanageable materials. The
author must confront the impossibilities of writing and commit his ideas to texts
which will not reveal them in their visible aspect. Hence, the idiolectic conversion of
ideas into textual materials necessitates a dislocation between the idea and its
material thought, between the originary design-formation and 'the particularity' of
the design as a finished product.
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A Summary
The implications of this, in contradistinction to Frye, are broad and need to be
summarised accordingly. The creative origins of literary form and function, as we
have seen, have been consigned by Stevenson to an untraceable space of 'ancient
harmonies in nature' or unaccountable regions in 'the mysterious history of man',
unavailable to the intellect because of the inherent limitations of intellectual method.
Emerging from the 'swaddling mists', these untraceable factors remain outside the
field of linguistic determination - which is why they are untraceable - so that the text
emerges from an author who is detached from any intelligible contact with an
originary presence. Structure is achieved, not as a result of Frye's 'shaping spirit'
(SS, p. 35), or of any other contact with the / a transcendental signified, but through
the active participation of the artist as artisan, rather than visionary. In this respect,
narrative emerges, not from the central emanation of the Logos, but from the
disadvantaged author who, in the act of writing, invokes a detachment between the
originary conception and the item conceived. For Stevenson, no such transcendental
signifieds exist or, at least, are not permitted to exist as identifiable concepts within
the context of narrative. They are 'cloudily conceived' within 'an inaccessible
silence',40 conceived as ideas, whereas the finished product can only be an effort
towards an idea rather than an idea in itself. That which is presented, that which we
receive, is the materialisation of the thought ofa thought, 'the possible attempt at an
impossible conception'. In this sense, the 'purely material charm' of narrative is
absolute: narrative is structurally unfixed and semantically devalued by the absence
of the vital element, the unadulterated 'essence' of the original design-formation, 'the
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airy conception' of the idea in itself, the element of narrative which narrative
requires but which it always already lacks.
The implications of this can, of course, be related to post-structuralist
accounts of linguistic procedure. In defining certain aspects of deconstruction, for
example, Christopher Norris informs us that 'Derrida's logic is simple but
devastating. Language can fulfil the condition of self-present meaning only if it
offers a total and immediate access to the thoughts that occasioned its utterance. But
this is an impossible requirement'.41 Stevenson's logic would appear to be as equally
devastating. To paraphrase Norris in relation to Stevenson, narrative can fulfil the
condition of self-present meaning only if it offers a total and immediate access to the
thought that occasioned its utterance. But this, Stevenson tells us, is an impossible
requirement. In the end, narrative remains the thought of a thought that occasioned
its utterance, a structure without self-present meaning, a structure detached from any
organising principle other than, in Stevenson's terms, an immediate 'particularity of
execution'.
Overall, then, according to Stevenson's view, the author's attempt to produce
a perfected design depends on his handling of the linguistic and literary machinery
before him. Literary structure has no independent function that overrides the author's
interaction or transcends him altogether. There is no visionary accession to some
incorruptible organicity of 'total form' (AC, p. 121). In the event of its idiolectic
transformation, structure can only exist, from author to author and work to work, as a
series of finely-wrought imperfections. No formula exists which the author meets
with repeated exactness. No story exists as 'an individual manifestation of the total
order of words' (AC, p. 121). Under Stevenson's terms, narrative becomes an
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idiolectic supplement of language, a linguistic formation comparable only to itself -
in short, a structure which has established its 'own independent and creative aim' and
which has separated itself from any prospect of totality. By the same token, the
conventions pertaining to literary structure are not a manifestation of archetypes, but
a series of veritable absences - inaccurate translations of conceptions, or ideas, that
cannot be met or replicated in words. The linguistic determination of the idea of a
design results in its being deferred through material stages so that a story, in effect,
becomes a detached metaphor for an idea which it cannot represent. The archetype,
similarly, ceases to exist because it cannot be attached to any associative relation
outside of the structure it belongs to. As a narrative component, the archetype
becomes a product of the idiolect; and the idiolect, in this case, is the material aspect
of the unimaginable.
It is typical of Stevenson that, while his theories impart a decisive limitation
on the form and function of narrative in general, he is able to exploit this limitation in
relation, specifically, to the form and function of romance. And this is a matter which
will be dealt with in the second chapter of this section, with a particular emphasis on
that which has so far been ignored - namely, the author's power to conceive in the
first place. The author's failure to translate his ideas into an identical textuality
notwithstanding, Stevenson advocates the author's initial power to conceive, even
while the initial conception of a work of art is placed at an inaccessible distance from
the linguistic means at its disposal. Nevertheless, Stevenson explores the mysteries of
creative origin which he ascribes, like Frye, though with significant differences, to
desire. In suggesting a dislocation between the originary conception of a story and
the story conceived, then, Stevenson is suggesting a dislocation between the concrete
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materials of narrative and the impulse of desire which initiates the formation of
narrative. Under very different conditions from those described by Frye, Stevenson
assigns a special function to romance - namely, of accommodating the creative
impetus of desire which occasioned its formation but which, under the material
conditions of language, it cannot accommodate within the 'visible' context of
narrative. It is mainly through his discovery of this aporia, as well as through his
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Chapter Four
The Genealogy of Romance II
The 'ProbablyArboreal'
Following on from the last chapter, there is some ambiguity in Stevenson's
arguments about the distinction between the event of execution and the originary
source of the design-formation which he attributes, sceptically and vaguely, to an
unthinkable space - to 'swaddling mists', 'ancient harmonies in nature', 'the
mysterious history of man', and so on. In other essays, Stevenson offers more
definite resolutions as to the nature of creative origin and impulse which, again,
resemble Frye's ideas while at the same time as departing from them. In the
following passage, Stevenson evokes a more rigid discrimination between the
operations of style (of execution or idiolect) and the preliterate stages of conception
which precede it:
Style is the invariable mark of any master; and for the student who does
not aspire so high as to be numbered with the giants, it is still the one
quality in which he may improve himself at will. Passion, wisdom,
creative force, the power ofmystery or colour, are allotted in the hour of
birth, and can be neither learned nor simulated. (NR, p. 69)
Style, the author's struggle with language, is, as far as Stevenson is concerned, the
only means by which he can actively or consciously pursue the production of the
visible text, so that, at this level, there is no creative mystery occurring. Because of
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its engagement with artificial materials, style can be improved, just as the deftness of
a sculptor's touch can be improved through repeated exercise and practice. Those
more mystifying aspects of creativity, which Stevenson has previously associated
with the vagaries of swaddling mists and ancient harmonies, are more positively
identified as being received, not through any visionary contact with the ultimate
source (as it is with Frye), but through the author's biological or genealogical
inheritance. As the author maintains a fragile command over the course of his work
by inadequate acts of choice, he is impelled, says Stevenson, by creative forces that
are genetically 'allotted at the hour of birth'. This presents an intriguing contrast to,
as well as denial of, the archetypal schema. The event of writing is genetic rather
than generic, Stevenson suggests, full of idiosyncrasies, quirks and deviations, rather
than the sustained application of a universal structure. Similarly, Stevenson
eradicates the metaphysical extensions of Frye's anatomy, replacing it with a radical
pragmatism which involves, by varying degrees, a colourful adaptation of Darwinian
principles, which Stevenson applies (as we shall see shortly) to matters of
composition and which he uses, most emphatically, as a means of theorising
romance.
Elsewhere, however, Stevenson, to some extent resembling Frye, introduces a
psycho-dynamic element to the mysteries of conception and creative force, as
summarised here, by Penny Fielding, who points out that romances, 'in Stevenson's
opinion, are the expression of their readers' natural desires'.1 In relating the issue,
Stevenson is prone to sounding, on one level, like the staunch advocate of wish-
fulfilment literature he often is: '...the great creative writer shows us the realisation
and the apotheosis of the day-dreams of common men. His stories may be nourished
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with the realities of life, but their true mark is to satisfy the nameless longings of the
reader, and to obey the ideal laws of the day-dream'(GR, p. 156). But it is by
releasing his own, as it were, 'desire'-formations that the author is able to conceive
the design-formations which will become, in time, the material realisations of the
visible text: '...it will be found true, I believe, in a majority of cases, that the artist
writes with more gusto and effect of those things which he has wished to do, than of
those which he has done. Desire is a wonderful telescope, and Pisgah the best
observatory' (HR, pp. 175 - 176).
In terms of its being a generative impulse in the emergence of narrative,
desire is not confined to the elaborate self-indulgences ofwish-fulfilment dream. The
biological origins of creative force and the inducement of desire as creative energy
are consolidated by Stevenson in his Darwinian prodigy, the 'Probably Arboreal'. In
the figure of the Probably Arboreal, which appears (by name) in two of his essays,
Stevenson traces the creative impulse beyond the author's 'hour of birth', evoking
from the depths of his genealogical bloodline an existential dynamism which can
eventually be traced to the pre-historic apeman. The Probably Arboreal is initially
introduced by Stevenson in his essay 'The Manse', in which he attempts to
summarise himself and his 'minister-grandfather' in relation to their entire ancestral
heritage. What begins as an autobiographical reminiscence on the character of his
near relative becomes a mini-treatise on the character and locality of the human
individual as a product of successive aeons of genetic interaction. (There are
interesting possibilities here, which will be re-invoked later, in that 'the subject' is
designated, by Stevenson, not as unique but, so to speak, as the product of a
signifying chain of ancestors: the subject, in other words, is not a liberated agency,
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but the conglomerate effect of countless othernesses). Identified in 'The Manse' as
the originary source of Stevenson's genetic inheritance, the Probably Arboreal is
latterly evoked, in the essay 'Pastoral', as the originary source of the passage of
desire through narrative structure. Already in 'The Manse', however, we recognise
Stevenson's tendency to saturate the biographical or factual data he provides with a
discursive gloss which is more in keeping with his theories of romance than anything
else. A telling reference to Bailie Nicol Jarvie, from Scott's Rob Roy, would seem to
emphasise the point, as fact and fiction become audaciously intermixed. The
quotation here is long but should be repeated in full for what it reveals of
Stevenson's adaptation ofnineteenth-century theories of'heredity':
But our ancestral adventures are beyond even the arithmetic of fancy; and
it is the chief recommendation of long pedigrees, that we can follow
backward the careers of our homunculus and be reminded of our
antenatal lives. Our conscious years are but a moment in the history of
the elements that build us. Are you a bank-clerk, and do you live at
Peckam? It was not always so. And though to-day I am only a man of
letters, either tradition errs or I was present when there landed at St.
Andrews a French barber-surgeon, to tend the health and the beard of the
great Cardinal Beaton; I have shaken a spear in the Debatable Land and
shouted the slogan of the Elliots; I was present when a skipper, plying
from Dundee, smuggled Jacobites to France after the '15; I was in a West
India merchant's office, perhaps next door to Bailie Nicol Jarvie's; and
managed the business of a plantation in St. Kitts; I was with my
engineer-grandfather (the son-in-law of the lamp and oil man) when he
sailed north about Scotland on the famous cruise that gave us the Pirate
and the Lord of the Isles', I was with him, too, on the Bell Rock, in the
fog, when the Smeaton had drifted from her moorings, and the Aberdeen
men, pick in hand, had seized upon the only boats, and he must stoop and
lap sea-water before his tongue could utter audible words; and once more
with him when the Bell Rock beacon took a "thrawe," and his workmen
fled into the tower, then nearly finished, and he sat unmoved reading in
his Bible - or affecting to read - till one after another slunk back with
confusion of countenance to their engineer. Yes, parts of me have seen
life, and met adventures, and sometimes met them well. And away in the
still cloudier past, the threads that make me up can be traced by fancy
into the bosoms of thousands and millions of ascendants: Picts who
rallied round MacBeth and the old (and highly preferable) system of
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descent by females, fleers from before the legions of Agricola, marchers
in Pannonian morasses, star-gazers on Chaldaean plateaus; and, furthest
of all, what face is this that fancy can see peering through the disparted
branches? What sleeper in green tree-tops, what muncher of nuts,
concludes my pedigree? Probably arboreal in his habits....
And I know not which is the more strange, that I should carry about
with me some fibres ofmy minister grandfather; or that in him, as he sat
in his cool study, grave, reverend, contented gentleman, there was an
aboriginal frisking of the blood that was not his; tree-top memories, like
undeveloped negatives, lay dormant in his mind; tree-top instincts awoke
and were trod down; and Probably Arboreal (scarce to be distinguished
• • 2from a monkey) gambolled and chattered in the brain of the old divine.
Here, Stevenson is referring, for the most part, to a 'science' of genealogy, in and
around which he develops a personal 'mythos', which, whether or not it has any
basis in biographical fact, is theoretically compact and, certainly, coincident with
nineteenth-century perceptions of heredity.3 In his essay 'Pastoral', meanwhile,
Stevenson deploys the same principles in creating a 'science' of genealogy which
theorises the transliteration of desire and creative force through narrative means and
locates them, finally, as the emergent properties of the 'aboriginal within us'.4
According to Stevenson, narrative is perpetuated by a desire to release or re-enter the
primitive emotional states which occasioned its utterance and which, through the
bonds of ancestry, can be intuitively traced to (and from) the originary forefather of
the Probably Arboreal. It is through romance especially, says Stevenson, that a
hereditary contact with primitive states is made possible,5 just as it is with Frye that
romance affords a visionary accession to the 'original awareness' ofMan prior to the
fall. Again, the quotation is long but, for the same reasons as before, ought to be
given in full. Writing of his acquaintance with a Lowland shepherd, John Todd,
Stevenson ruminates:
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A trade that touches nature, one that lies at the foundations of life, in
which we have all had ancestors employed, so that on a hint of it
ancestral memories revive, lends itself to literary use, vocal or written.
The fortune of a tale lies not alone in the skill of him that writes, but as
much, perhaps, in the inherited experience of him who reads; and when I
hear with a particular thrill of things that I have never done or seen, it is
one of that innumerable army of my ancestors rejoicing in past deeds.
Thus novels begin to touch not the fine dilettanti but the gross of
mankind, when they leave off to speak of parlours and shades ofmanner
and still-born niceties of motive, and begin to deal with fighting,
sailoring, adventure, death or childbirth; and thus ancient outdoor crafts
or occupations, whether Mr. Hardy wields his shepherd's crook or Count
Tolstoi swings the scythe, lift romance into near neighbourhood with
epic. These aged things have on them the dew ofman's morning; they lie
near, not so much to us, the semi-artificial flowerets, as to the trunk and
aboriginal taproot of the race. A thousand interests spring up in the
process of the ages, and a thousand perish; that is now an eccentricity or
a lost art which was once the fashion of an empire; and those only are
perennial matters that rouse us to-day, and that roused men in all epochs
of the past. There is a certain critic, not indeed of execution but ofmatter,
whom I dare to be known to be set before the best: a certain low-browed,
hairy gentleman, at first a percher in the fork of trees, next (as they
relate) a dweller in caves, and whom I think I see squatting in cave-
mouths, of a pleasant afternoon, to munch his berries - his wife, that
accomplished lady, squatting by his side: his name I have never heard,
but he is often described as Probably Arboreal, which may serve for
recognition. Each has his own tree of ancestors, but at the top of all our
veins there run some minims of his old, wild, tree-top blood; our civilised
nerves still tingle with his rude terrors and pleasures; and to that which
would have moved our common ancestor, all must obediently thrill.6
For Stevenson, a certain species of experience presents itself as the target object of
desire, which we can associate, broadly, with the serial ingredients of romance
('fighting, sailoring, adventure', and, interestingly, 'death and childbirth'). It is these
'things I have never done or seen' that, once again, appear to motivate Stevenson in
arranging the 'fortune' of his fictions. At the same time, these things undone or
unseen are the historical elements of an emotional pedigree of 'rude terrors and
pleasures' which the author and his readers contain in the form of 'ancestral
memories' and 'inherited experience^]'. As such, the author receives a creative
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impetus as a consequence of his own containment of inherited experiences which
remain inside of him as a kind of genetic residue: to revive them is to experience
them anew and, so, relocate 'the aboriginal taproot of the race' from which they
initially sprung. Overall, Stevenson suggests, the form of romance is impelled by the
genealogical input of the previous generations and is largely conceived as a
projection of their existential dynamism through the author-sibling, Stevenson
himself, who, in his desire to experience their experiences, is compelled to recreate
them through the appropriate narrative solutions. Taking it to its furthest point, as
Stevenson does, romance is conceived as a genetically preserved desire to release or
re-establish contact with a primordial zeal which, as originary source, inhabits both
him and his readers and which makes itself available through a genealogical
reservoir ofArboreal vitality.7
Stevenson presents us, then, with a genealogy of romance, rather than a
cosmology of romance, which provides the author with design-formations through
the genealogical inheritance of experiences that the author wishes to access
narratorially. It is the author's task, overall, to manufacture a design which is capable
of expressing these 'ancestral memories' and of enabling, through them, the recovery
and release of the Arboreal state of mind. The question presents itself, of course, as
to whether this is stylistically possible; as to whether the author can articulate the
'natural' inclinations of the Probably Arboreal (which he and his readers contain)
through the 'material' limitations and local difficulties of writing described by
Stevenson in other essays. It is chiefly this issue that will be addressed in the
following sub-sections, though there are some interesting contrasts between
Stevenson's account of romance and Frye's which need to be investigated further.
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After looking at these, we will examine that which becomes the crux of the matter
for Stevenson - namely, the means by which, within the context of fiction, he
transforms the structural conventions of romance in an attempt to admit the Arboreal
impulse, whereby he necessarily abrogates their archetypal value and disassociates
them from the ideological bases upon which they are formed.
Arboreality versus Structurality
In the previous chapter, Stevenson emphasised the author's inability to accurately
transcribe any desire- or design-formation when it undergoes its conversion from
'invisible' to 'visible' status. To this extent, Stevenson has inserted a point of
separation between those inherited experiences pertaining to the Arboreal impulse
and the materiality of the text that aims to admit or recreate it, so that narrative, in the
end, is perpetuated by a desire for something which, because of its material
condition, it cannot accommodate. This holds true when we consider the fact,
implied by Stevenson, that the characteristic condition of the Probably Arboreal is
incompatible with the condition of narrative. Stevenson, we recall, concedes that
narrative must be made intelligible, that it must follow 'a logical progression' and
'convey a definite conventional import'. Narrative, he says, 'is neat, finite, self-
contained, rational': it must acquire a sense of structurality which, we have seen, is
entirely artificial. Intelligibility, which is a requirement and a consequence of
structure, is likewise artificial, an effect without any foundational object or
substantive cause outside of itself. If we compare this to Stevenson's descriptions of
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the Probably Arboreal, there are some decisive contrasts. The Probably Arboreal is a
primitive agency, consisting of 'wild, tree-top blood' and 'tree-top instincts',
inclining towards 'rude terrors and pleasures' that continue to inhabit (or always
already inhere in) the 'civilised' condition of men, the condition, according to Frye,
that men aspire to through the practice of art. The Probably Arboreal is the origin and
object of romance which - Stevenson has said, referring again to a biological
fundament - responds 'to certain almost sensual and quite illogical tendencies in
man'. The impulse which perpetuates romance, then, does not accord to any formal
or intelligible designations: it is illogical, irrational, natural in the sense that it is
characterised by the disorder of the Arboreal world which it belongs to. The desire-
or design-formation is itself impelled by a primitive agency which finds its release
through logical linguistic stratagems that cannot contain or convert its 'illogical
tendencies'. In the case of romance, given that it is perpetuated by an illogical
impulse, narrative is bound by logical requirements which necessarily, and
paradoxically, make the illogical appear logical, the unintelligible appear intelligible,
the irrational appear rational, the sensual appear synthetic. As a consequence, the
Arboreal vitality that informs romance, when it reaches its communicable stage,
becomes something it is not, which means that romance itself (as an effort towards
an Arboreal vitality) becomes something it is not. Looking at this another way,
Stevenson shows that narrative structure is always already endowed with its opposite
quality, a lack of structurality, in that it is informed by a desire to return to the
Arboreal condition which occasioned its utterance - a condition, as it were, of pre-
structurality which cannot be represented through the structurality of language.
Romance, in this sense, consisting of a myriad of imperfect designs, presents a series
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of differential efforts towards an idea of Arboreal vitality that cannot be accessed
through the linguistic means at its disposal.
The complexities of this go further and can be summarised as follows.
Stevenson's advocacy of authorial autonomy or self-consciousness, we notice, occurs
at a purely linguistic level where the author can exert his inadequate command over
his linguistic resources. At the level of conception, however, autonomy is denied or,
rather, disseminated among a 'signifying chain' of ancestors. With Stevenson, any
work of romance is not a manifestation of the total order of words, but the local
precipitation of a diffused Arboreal urgency which the author has received from an
'innumerable army' of ancestral othernesses. In this sense, the author creates by
genetically receiving the creative impetus so that, in writing romances, he is
responding to an Arboreal impulse within himself but which, because he has received
it differentially, is not his own. In seeking access to the Arboreal level through
romance, then, Stevenson is seeking a kind of internal absence of himself through a
return to an Arboreal preconsciousness. The deficiency in our intellectual method
that Stevenson mentioned earlier - the 'abhorrent baldness' in our psychology, 'the
fault of our analysis rather than any poverty native to the mind', the fact that we are
bereft of 'the power to trace [the] springs' of 'a delicacy of sense finer than we can
conceive' - all of this can now be seen as referring to an over-developed
consciousness, pertaining solely to a linguistic environment, which has separated
itself from the Arboreal diffusion and self-absence which Stevenson seeks to relocate
through romance but which cannot be accessed through the linguistic apparatus
within which he consciously operates.
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Putting together all we have said, then, from this and the previous chapter,
Stevenson has positioned the Probably Arboreal in contradistinction to its linguistic
evolution through the concrete structurality of language. The naturalness of the
Arboreal impulse is necessarily expressed via the artificiality of narrative whereby a
dislocation is bound to occur between the (invisible) origins of the design-formation
and its (visible) linguistic eventuality. For Stevenson, then, the act of writing is
characterised by the aporia of having to actualise the Arboreal impulse at a moment
when it develops an expressive contact with a linguistic system which cannot support
it. Such are the inconveniences of language, as well as the inadequacies of authorial
method, that the Probably Arboreal as an originary source can never enter an
intelligible space or acquire a visible 'presence' within the domain of the text. In
contrast to Frye, Stevenson implements a closure on the transcendental imperatives
of literary structure and 'opens', instead, an aporetic tension between the
genealogical and artificial stages of narrative production.
In a moment we shall see how Stevenson attempts to resolve, or exploit, this
aporia, which he has openly declared, as opposed to Frye who maintains a
dependency on transcendental means of signification. The fact that Stevenson
undermines the efficacy of romance as a transcendental or metaphorical mechanism
is only one of a series of contrasts between the genealogical and cosmological
descriptions of romance. It is worth pausing to consider some of these contrasts in
detail for what they reveal of the motivations and solutions at stake in the
transformation of romance from a conventional to an 'aboriginal' model.
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Genealogy versus Cosmology
The quasi-Darwinian caricature of the Probably Arboreal is the closest we come with
Stevenson to exhuming an originary 'presence' from the midst of fiction. We are
consequently compelled to acknowledge a further correspondence between
Stevenson and Frye in that both establish an anthropological foundation for literary
form and function. In the event, Stevenson anticipates the archetypal critic's
dependency on theories of anthropology as a basis for literary study (such as those
derived from Frazer's The Golden Bough). But, as we should expect by now,
Stevenson raises some telling alternatives. The anthropological basis of story-telling
is one thing. But the ramifications of the genealogical model are such that its effect
on Frye's cosmology is more or less coincident with the impact of Darwinism on the
Bible.
Stevenson's descriptions of desire, for example, represent a negation of
Frye's allotment of desire to the attainment of civilised goals. Inasmuch as narrative
enables the transformation of the conditions of life into realisable goals, it is to allow
the re-emergence of the savage interior of civilised man. Romance, in this sense, is
far from accessing the metaphysical realms of some apocalyptic totality, approaching
only, through endless diversifications of imperfect text, an untranslatable stimulation
of 'rude terrors and pleasures'. That which for Frye is anagogical, the conceivable
limits of human imagination, becomes for Stevenson biological. The transmission of
desire does not occur via imaginative agency, but through the biological succession
of one generation superseding another. There are no metaphysical extensions in the
Stevenson 'mythos'. There is only 'the aboriginal taproot' of sensations which
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obliterate, rather than sublimate, the human subject, and which liberate the subject,
not through any ecstatic contact with God, but through an admission of preconscious
savagery.
By the same token, romance is not so much an attempt to re-establish contact
with the Logos as an attempt to enter narrative phases of unintelligible consequence.
The Probably Arboreal is motivated by dysteleological, rather than teleological,
imperatives, by those chaotic, nightmare attributes that Frye has associated with the
world of nature, the world from which the Probably Arboreal, as a product of natural
selection, has evolved. This way, romance represents a reduction of the metaphorical
potential of the mythical hero or Godhead to a strictly human level, to a level of
primitive zeal, biological primacy and animal gratification. If the 'Logos' is made
apparent through the narrative analogue of the 'man who is all men', then it is not
through the figure of the glorified-hero, the redeemer or Telos. It is through a single
cell of human evolution: not a Christ, but a primate. Frye, moreover, has spoken
about romance as signifying 'man's return to an original awareness', meaning his re¬
attachment to some cosmic order from which he has fallen. For Stevenson, romance
narrates man's return to his original awareness, but it is an Arboreal awareness, a
condition of being prior to consciousness, irrationality prior to rational method,
disorder prior to order, instinct prior to intelligibility. In the modern romance, man is
the only creator, and he has nothing to attain but the primeval absence of himself.
This said, we know that the articulation of the Arboreal impulse,
linguistically and structurally, is an 'impossible requirement'. The problem for
Stevenson, then, is in how to facilitate the Probably Arboreal as an emergent
property within the visible text whilst working under the constraints of a visible
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textuality. Turning our attentions to this now, it is possible to show how Stevenson
attempts to develop a mode of romance which enables the appearance of the
Arboreal vitality which occasioned its formation. Given that Stevenson is not seeking
to relocate a world from which we have fallen but to reify the aboriginal singularity
from which we have 'progressed' (and become separated), it is necessary for him to
effect the manipulation and erasure of the conventional strategies upon which the
(bogus) re-attainment of the world from which we have fallen is based. Stevenson, in
fact, deploys a number of counter-strategies in disqualifying the conventional model
of romance and admitting, instead, the unintelligible priority of the Probably
Arboreal. These will be explored in more detail in the following section through
extended structural analyses of Will o' the Mill and The Ebb-Tide, albeit they can be
summarised here and demonstrated, provisionally, with reference to some of
Stevenson's better known texts.
Arboreality and Fiction
These counter-strategies are effective simultaneously in that one necessitates the
occurrence of the other and receives the impact of all. It would be useful, then, to
summarise them briefly before exploring each successively in detail.
As a consequence of its resistance towards intelligibility, the genealogy of
romance allegorises the absence rather than the affirmation of the Logos as a
narrative object or centre of meaning, often acting, as we shall see in the course of
this and the following chapters, as a metaphorical illustration of the failure of
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metaphor. Locally conceived, it is a form of romance that divests itself of its
metaphysical referents and draws attention to its status as a structure without
foundation. One of the ways Stevenson exposes this lack of foundation (as implied in
the previous section) is by exposing the invalidity of the oppositional moral
postulates which, according to Frye, organise the structure of romance into an effort
towards an idea of the Logos. This, in turn, leads Stevenson towards an elimination
of the factitious analogues of mythical christs and demonic villains and the
implementation, instead, of locally conceived representations of 'aboriginality' - of
figures invested with savage import who, though artificially constructed, nevertheless
convey an invalidation of the mythopoeic formula. Bereft of their 'intrinsic'
archetypal values, these figures become unpredictable, not constrained to operate
according to this or that desirable or undesirable motive. They are, rather, 'morally'
equipped to act outside of any moral and, therefore, structural value-system. And this
in itself can be seen as part of an attempt by Stevenson to arrange his narratives in
such a way as they become material replications or embodiments of an original
absence of intelligibility, whereby a sense of aboriginality is effected through the
reduction of narrative to a singular condition of language without structure. For it is
often the case that Stevenson makes his narratives, in a purely material sense,
structurally and semantically irregular and indeterminate so that they become devoid
of any hermeneutic circularity or resolution (of a kind that Frye identifies with the
quest). To incorporate the Arboreal impulse within structure it is necessary to
abandon the structurality of structure, or to structurally re-admit the lack of
structurality which occasioned its formation. It is Stevenson's aim, in this sense, to
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formulate a 'language of romance'9 capable of functioning, as it were, prior to and
beyond the limitations of conscious method.
As suggested, then, one of the ways in which Stevenson collapses
conventional structure is by eliminating its moral designations. According to Frye,
we recall, the distribution of archetypal functions are embedded in the moral
dichotomy of that which is or is not desirable, of who or what represents good or
evil, of who or what is for or against the quest, and so on. Man, Frye maintains,
...lives in two worlds, the world of nature and the world of art which he is
trying to build out of nature. The world of art, of human culture and
civilisation, is a creative process informed by a vision. The focus of this
vision is indicated by the polarizing in romance between the world we
want and the world we don't want. (SS, p. 58)
The formal designations of the archetype are in this respect pre-ordained, as is the
moral bifurcation of desire which will determine the structure of romance prior to its
event as narrative. With Stevenson, however, the desirable and undesirable
alternatives become irregularised and immeshed, their oppositional modality deposed
in a radical abandonment of the traditional / ideological aims of romance. The
structure of romance is not informed by a vision but by irrational stimuli which
precede the polarisation of desire into apocalyptic and demonic counterparts. As
much is expressed in essays like 'A Gossip on Romance' where, having grounded
romance in 'the ideal laws of the daydream', Stevenson asserts:
It is not only pleasurable things that we imagine in our day-dreams; there
are lights in which we are willing to contemplate even the idea of our
own death; ways in which it seems as if it would amuse us to be cheated,
wounded or calumniated. It is thus possible to construct a story, even of
tragic import, in which every incident, detail and trick of circumstance
shall be welcome to the reader's thoughts. (GR, p. 164)
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It is symptomatic of Stevenson's romances, Penny Fielding observes in response to
the above remark, that 'differentiations are not clearly apparent: details become
blurred in a general feeling of enjoyment in which life and death, pleasure and pain
are not easily separable'.10 Crucially, with Stevenson, there is no moral bifurcation of
desire into that which is desirable and that which is not. Those things which have
been deemed desirable or undesirable according to a western metaphysical tradition
are, under the irrational designs of the Arboreal impulse, subordinated to an overall
need for rude terrors and pleasures. At the root levels of the Probably Arboreal,
dialectical oppositions are dissolved and romance responds to a primal inducement
which precedes the moral rationalisations of civilised man.
In Stevenson's fictions, the visionary manifestations of the world we want
and the world we do not want are obstructed by characters who, symbolically
speaking, have no referential basis outside of their own performative function.
Whereas, in the archetypal formula, heroes represent metaphorical analogues of
messiah figures, Stevenson introduces characters who are artificial configurations of
the Probably Arboreal. Without an efficacious bearing (as material representations of
primordial states), these figures are nevertheless indicative of the locality of
Stevenson's fiction, taking their place, not so much among the archetypal order, as
among the discursive matrices of a culture responding to modern theories of
evolution. On a lesser level we have characters like Long John Silver and Alan
Breck, at once attractive and terrifying because of their pre-structural capacity for
savagery and violence. Stevenson presents these characters as part human, part
animal, as men endowed with irrational or abnormal attributes which emphasise their
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nearness to 'the aboriginal taproot of the race'. On meeting Alan Breck for the first
time, we are told:
He was smallish in stature, but well set and as nimble as a goat; his face
was of a good open expression, but sunburnt very dark, and heavily
freckled and pitted with the smallpox; his eyes were unusually light and
had a kind of dancing madness in them, that was both engaging and
alarming....{Kidnapped, p. 48)
In contrast to Breck, Silver's 'dancing madness' is translated through his physical
deformity: 'His left leg was cut off close by the hip, and under the left shoulder he
carried a crutch, which he managed with wonderful dexterity, hopping about upon it
like a bird' (Treasure Island, p. 48).11
More to the point, though, are those localised figures who reflect explicitly
the Arboreal tendency in that they are often presented as undergoing a process of
becoming Arboreal. The most obvious among such figures is Henry Jekyll. Initially,
Jekyll is responding to the unsound ethical policy of removing evil from the soul of
man and, to this extent, reflects the dangerous opinion, prevalent after Darwin, that
Man could be improved through 'the infinite possibilities of biological
.,19
engineering'. Far from being an archetype, Jekyll is a localised personification of a
post-Darwinian zeal for 'transformationist eugenics' (positing 'the direct
manipulation of genetic material by tampering with the inheritance code'); and can
be seen to express what Peter Morton describes as 'the rather paradoxical optimism
that man, that product of blind forces, has been supplied by those forces with enough
intelligent insight into his condition to remedy or at least to reduce the consequences
. . 1 o
of his own deficiencies'. Unusually for a scientist, Jekyll's outlook is primarily
metaphysical in that he 'was driven to reflect deeply and inveterately on that hard
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law of life that lies at the root of religion'. His scientific pursuits, he explains, 'led
wholly towards the mystic and transcendental' (The Strange Case ofDoctor Jekyll
and Mr Hyde, p. 81); while it was, he says, 'on the moral side, and in my own
person, that I learned to recognise the thorough and primitive duality ofman' (p. 82).
Basing his argument upon such suppositions, Jekyll reveals the aim of his
experiments:
If each, I told myself, could but be housed in separate identities, life
would be relieved of all that was unbearable; the unjust might go his
way, delivered from the aspirations and remorse of his more upright
twin; and the just could walk steadfastly and securely on his upward path,
doing the good things in which he found his pleasure, and no longer
exposed to disgrace and penitence by the hands of this extraneous evil,
(p. 82)
What he discovers instead, however, is the fallacy of man as a creature formed
according to any positive moral criteria. The 'double' aspect of Man is not his
predisposition towards the metaphysical referents of good or evil, as Jekyll believes:
it refers to the aboriginal vitality that inhabits his civilised exterior and which exists,
not as a separate faculty of his being, but as one of his genealogical attributes.
Through a process which is purely biological, the chemical inducement of the potion
disperses the illusion ofman as a moral being and enables, through a physical as well
as psychological transformation, an impulsive indulgence of rude terrors and
pleasures through the homunculus of Hyde. Chief among the characteristics of Hyde,
we notice, is 'a complete moral insensibility' (p. 90), whereby 'his every act and
thought centred on self; drinking pleasure with bestial avidity from any degree of
torture to another...' (p. 86). Contrary to the metaphysical and moral rationalisations
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of Jekyll, the irrational interior of Hyde is motivated by an unintelligible
sensationalism. As Jekyll recalls, on experiencing his first transmutation:
There was something strange in my sensations, something indescribably
new and, from its very novelty, incredibly sweet. I felt younger, lighter,
happier in body; within I was conscious of a heady recklessness, a
current of disordered sensual images running like amill race in my fancy,
a solution of the bonds of obligation, an unknown but not an innocent
freedom of the soul. (p. 83 - 84)
It is important to stress that Hyde is by no means a demonic manifestation of Jekyll's
'evil' but, as intimated by Jekyll himself, an informative element of his genealogy.
On seeing his reflection as Hyde for the first time, Jekyll relates how 'I was
conscious of no repugnance, rather of a leap of welcome. This, too, was myself. It
seemed natural and human'(p.84). And, indeed, it is a natural and human aspect of
his humanity that it is plied with an Arboreal impetus which represents the
fundamental condition of the species to which he belongs. The point is emphasised
when, throughout the story, references to Hyde's Arboreal demeanour are noticeably
increased, as Jekyll's erroneous suppositions about moral duality are invalidated by
the emergence of 'the animal within me' (p. 92). In some ways, Hyde has more of
the cave-dweller than the tree-dweller in him, albeit he exudes the same primitive
inclinations. As suggested by Utterson: 'There is something more, if I could find a
name for it. God bless me, the man seems hardly human! Something troglodytic,
shall we say?'(p. 40). In the murder scene, meanwhile, the description of Hyde is
assuredly Arboreal: 'Mr Hyde broke out of all bounds, and clubbed him to the earth.
And next moment, with ape-like fury, he was trampling his victim under foot, and
hailing down a storm of blows, under which the bones were audibly shattered and the
body jumped upon the roadway' (p. 47). Likewise, as the story draws to a close,
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Jekyll is gradually overwhelmed by the 'ape-like tricks'(p.96) of Hyde, and by 'the
action of his ape-like spite'(p. 97), to the point that he is compelled towards a clinical
self-destruction. We could say of Jekyll that, in the process of being annihilated, he
accomplishes a condition of self-absence which has been achieved, in turn, through
the release and recovery of his Arboreal interior. He becomes, precisely, an
embodiment of that state of mind - the primeval absence of himself - that Stevenson
is seeking to recreate within the context of narrative.
In a similar sense, it is possible to trace an Arboreal vitality in the figure of
James Durie (The Master ofBallantrae), though he differs enormously from Jekyll or
Hyde. In the case of James Durie, the Arboreal impulse is conveyed through his
'deadly, causeless duplicity'14 which manifests itself as a dysteleological tendency to
act without motive. From the very beginning of the tale, in fact, the Master relies on
a method of resolution which precludes the possibility of anything being logically or
rationally resolved. The decision on who will undertake 'the quest' is not made on
the grounds of James's or Henry's suitability as a hero, but on 'the arbitrament of
chance' (p. 12) effected through the toss of a coin. The randomness of James's
method of resolution prefaces the randomness of the events he will participate in,
events which are subject, moreover, to the spontaneous enthusiasm of his
'restlessness and vanity' (p. 12). Likewise, it is impossible to associate him with any
pre-determined narrative function. Deliberately invested with an enigmatic tendency
to act without reason, the Master appears divested of any symbolic or semantic
resonances that may have enabled us to rank him alongside the 'glorified-heroes' of
other quests. In the Master, in fact, Stevenson sought to create a central character
who, even in the event of his numerous deaths and resurrections, would remain
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firmly detached from any mythical structure. Constructing a messiah-figure,
Stevenson relates in 'The Genesis of The Master of Ballantrae', was not in the
interests of his design-formation. And, in a remarkable contrast to the archetypal
credo, he explains:
The man who should thus be buried was the first question: a good man,
whose return to life would be hailed by the reader and the other
characters with gladness? This trenched upon the Christian picture and
was dismissed. If the idea, then, was to be of any use at all for me, I had
to create a kind of evil genius to his friends and family, take him through
many disappearances, and make this final restoration from the pit of
death, in the icy American wilderness, the last and grimmest of the
series.15
Stevenson, then, in his adaptation of the quest scenario, embarks on a direct violation
of the theme of death and climactic renewal, not only by rejecting the mythical
analogue of the hero-as-Christ, but by converting the function of the death / renewal
motif (which occurs several times throughout the novel) into a succession of abject
disasters. The Master's returns do not result in the revitalisation of the society from
which he departed, but in its anti-climactic extinction, which leads us to concur with
Adrian Poole's remark that it was 'just such a narrative of regeneration that The
Master invokes only to reject'.16 Causelessly disqualifying the mythical
determinations of plot,17 it is rather the case that the Master expresses an Arboreal
naturalness whereby, as he puts it himself, 'I go my own way with inevitable motion'
(p. 73). Like a force of nature, the Master displays a remarkable indifference towards
his fellow man and is easily capable of transcending the moral accusations and
arguments employed, for example, by Henry and Mackellar. The best that Henry and
Mackellar can do is to resort to the traditional valences of 'good' and 'evil' in
attempting to define a man who cannot be defined through overtly rational means;
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whereas the Master himself, as he suggests to Burke, is more properly disposed to a
condition of savagery that precludes such illusory values: '...if we are to have our
noses rubbed together in this course of flight, let us each dare to be ourselves like
savages, and each swear that he will neither resent nor deprecate the other. I am a
pretty bad fellow at bottom, and I find the pretence of virtues very irksome' (p. 34).
The Probably Arboreal is representative of the illogical convulsions of desire
pertaining to a modern idiom which, far from corresponding to Frye's idea of
romance, coincides more readily with Penny Fielding's description of 'the late
nineteenth-century fantastic with its dangerous yet desirable attraction to the deathly,
18
the sexual, the irrational, and the seemingly abnormal'. In her description of the
quest narrative of The Master, meanwhile, Fielding draws attention to a structural
admission of 'illogical tendencies' and, in doing so, locates the object of romance as
a return to primordial origins rather than the attainment of civilised goals. Among
other things, Fielding's appraisal of The Master demonstrates the way in which
Stevenson manipulates the conventional quest scenario in order to allow its Arboreal
transformation. Interestingly, though we have not the space to explore it here,
Fielding also draws our attention to the relationship, posited in romance, between
primordial mental states and the pre-rational states relating to children:
The masculine romance, with its similarity to the degenerate reading
matter for which it was supposed to be the antidote, is precariously
poised at the turning-point of this contradictory movement, enacting both
an impulse forward, in the quest structure and associations with
exploration and conquest, and a backward one in its promotion of
barbarism and promise of a return to childhood. And childhood itself
stands on in turn a border position between, on the one hand, the
embodiment of healthy imperialist values and, on the other, a site at
which the operations of unconscious fears and desires are more clearly
visible than in later life.19
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Seen this way, Stevenson constructs his narrative so as to enable the emergence of an
unadulterated impulse that is inherently barbaric and which disables the attainment of
civilised goals (in this case couched in the aims of colonialism) by allowing the
visible re-appearance of pre-structural fears and desires.
As in Jekyll and Hyde, it is possible to detect in James Durie a process of
becoming Arboreal, though, as Fielding implies, it is not confined to the Master
alone. It is a process which pervades the entire narrative and which is emphasised,
particularly, through 'The Journey into the Wilderness' of the final chapter. Amid the
literally Arboreal setting of the Adirondack forests, the story's characters are
exposed to and engage in a rampant savagery which threatens to consume the
narrative prior to its actual closure. Significantly, it is not only from within the
linguistic visibility of the text that the narrative receives or produces an Arboreal
impact. In the implied but undescribed figure of the nocturnal murderer, the
narrative, so to speak, is infiltrated by random forces emerging from an invisible
region of narrative activity. Following the death of Pinkerton and Hicks, Mackellar
tells us, via Mountain's testimony:
It was clear they had fallen into the hands of one of those matchless
Indian bravos, that will sometimes follow a party for days, and in spite of
indefatigable travel, and unsleeping watch, continue to keep up with their
advance, and steal a scalp at every resting-place. Upon this discovery, the
treasure-seekers, already reduced to a poor half-dozen, fell into mere
dismay, seized a few necessaries, and, deserting the remainder of their
goods, fled outright into the forest. Their fire they left still burning, and
their dead comrade unburied. All day they ceased not to flee, eating by
the way, from hand to mouth; and since they feared to sleep, continued to
advance at random even in the hours of darkness. But the limit ofman's
endurance is soon reached; when they rested at last it was to sleep
profoundly; and when they woke, it was to find that the enemy was still
upon their heels, and death and mutilation had once more lessened and
deformed their company, (p. 206)
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Undescribed, the rogue Indian remains an unintelligible element of structure that
produces an effect without having materialised as an element in itself. It represents,
therefore, the admission of an absence of structurality within a structure and, in this
sense, enables the Probably Arboreal as an emergent property within a visible
textuality that cannot, otherwise, support it.
The interruptive influence of the rogue Indian is symptomatic of The Master
as a story that, while it involves a quest, never achieves a structural unity or aspect of
completion. In The Master ofBallantrae the structure of the quest is pivotal, though,
properly speaking, it is divided into a series ofjourneys, as summarised by Stevenson
in a letter to E. L. Burlingame: 'The scene of that romance is Scotland - the States -
90
Scotland - India - Scotland - and the States again; so it jumps like a flea'. These
journeys, in fact, are hardly a series, hardly, that is, a sequential passage from point
A to point B. Viewed together, these journeys do not form a cyclical whole or logical
progression: they are geographically spliced and reflexive, temporally indeterminate
and narratorially sporadic; they are a random accumulation, says Stevenson, of 'great
spaces and voyages' occurring over 'a long evolution of time'. For it was his object
in structuring The Master 'to carry the reader to and fro in space over a good half of
«•••• 91
the world, and sustain his interest in time through the extent of a generation'. In
recalling how he was inspired by Marryat's The Phantom Ship, Stevenson gives
further indications as to the initial inducement and subsequent aims of The Master's
journey-structure: ' "Come," said I to my engine, "let us make a tale, a story ofmany
years and countries, of the sea and land, savagery and civilisation; a story that shall
have the same large features and may be treated in the same summary elliptic method
• • 99
as the book you have been reading and admiring" '. It is apparent that, in
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implementing 'great spaces', in scattering our attentions 'to and fro in space', in
issuing his design-formation through a 'summary elliptic method', Stevenson was
intent on constructing a narrative (not so much around a journey as) around absences
and omissions. Rather than creating a structure according to a point to point
unravelling of conventional associations, he sought to create a structure out of
disassociations, out of a lack of structurality, so that the structure would be
determined by its opposite quality - contained by that which it did not contain,
described by that which it neglected to describe. It would be a narrative that would
engender effects without a cause, that would sustain itself according to the absence
of any central emanation. It would be directed by its lack of direction and motivated,
as Adrian Poole suggests, by its disavowal of 'intelligible motive':
He [Stevenson] claimed to have taken inspiration from a supernatural
thriller of Captain Marryat's. The Phantom Ship (1839) tells a version of
the Flying Dutchman legend that sprawls promiscuously through time
and space, across oceans and continents. It was exactly this sense of the
fugitive and volatile that Stevenson wanted at the heart of his own novel,
a wild and erratic energy, virtually devoid of intelligible motive, swaying
on the edge of the crazy. This took the form of James Durie, the Master,
who is at home in peril on the sea, swinging up and down on the brink of
the elements.
Through his expressed manipulation of the traditional journey-structure, the idea of
the quest as a metaphor is negated by Stevenson. This is achieved, above all, by his
ability to effect the journey-structure as a movement without motive so that it is
divested, on the whole, of any archetypal basis for intelligibility. The Master of
Ballantrae evokes a dysteleological aberration of the teleological objectives of the
quest scenario and reworks the theme of the journey so that its contingent elements
(its conventional functions and ideological prerequisites) are obliterated. It becomes,
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instead, an illustration of the absence of order which, as a quest, it is meant to
convey.
It is as a consequence of the Arboreal urgency that inundates The Master that
the narrative itself, as a linguistic structure, becomes a material embodiment of the
preconscious absence of intelligibility that enabled its formation. The Master is a
fractured accumulation of contrasting accounts, a story that constantly undermines its
own validity and denies within itself any hermeneutic circularity or resolution. It is
based on biased correspondences, on gossip and hearsay; on Mackeller's priggish
rhetoric or the bombastic testimonies of Burke; or on the eye-witness accounts of
colonial desperadoes like Mountain, whose narrative is delivered second-hand (with
significant modifications) through the arch-narrator, Mackellar. Like its main
protagonist, the story is a shape shifter, capable ofmultiple modes of expression; but
it is nothing definite in itself. We notice, for example, how Mackellar frequently
undercuts Burke's narratives at the same time as including them among his own.
When Burke makes a passing reference to the marriage between Miss Graeme and
Henry, Mackellar, in a footnote, retorts: 'A complete blunder: there was at this date
no word of the marriage: see above in my own narration'' (p. 58). Similarly,
Mackellar is prone to making crucial editorial decisions that obscure our reception of
the events that 'unfold':
I drop the Chevalier's narration at this point because the couple
quarrelled and separated the same day; and the Chevalier's account of the
quarrel seems to me (I must confess) quite incompatible with the nature
of either of the men ... The tenor of the narrative (set aside a few
flourishes) strikes me as highly ingenuous, (p. 59 - 60)
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But not only is Burke's narrative undermined by Mackellar's. The same is true of
Mackellar's narrative when subjected to the editorial pretensions of Stevenson
himself:
[Editor's note. - Five pages ofMr Mackellar's MS. Are here omitted. I
have gatheredfrom their perusal an impression thatMr Mackellar, in his
old age, was rather an exacting servant. Against the seventh Lord
Durrisdeer (with whom ,at any rate, we have no concern) nothing
material is alleged. - R. L. S.] (p. 125)
The material disintegration of the text as a simulation of Arboreal singularity is
latterly emphasised as a material absence through the ultimate absence of death. This
death not only refers to the death of James and Henry, but to the 'death' of the text as
structure capable of delivering a logical series of meanings. It is the absence of any
intelligible motive that, finally, reduces the narrative to its 'true' condition - reduces
it, in other words, from organic totality to inorganic separation - when, as an epitaph,
it is conclusively reduced to the inanimate matter of stone:
J. D.
HEIR TO A SCOTTISH TITLE,
A MASTER OF THE ARTS AND GRACES,
ADMIRED IN EUROPE, ASIA, AMERICA,
INWAR AND PEACE,
IN THE TENTS OF SAVAGE HUNTERS AND THE
CITADELS OF KINGS, AFTER SO MUCH
ACQUIRED, ACCOMPLISHED, AND




AFTER A LIFE OF UNMERITED DISTRESS,
BRAVELY SUPPORTED,
DIED ALMOST IN THE SAME HOUR,
AND SLEEPS IN THE SAME GRAVE
WITH HIS FRATERNAL ENEMY.
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THE PIETY OF HIS WIFE AND ONE OLD
SERVANT RAISED THIS STONE
TO BOTH
As Penny Fielding has observed of this concluding passage, '...the language of the
inscription is itself impossible to pin down with exact meanings', and, in illustrating
the point, goes on:
Henry's epigraph says that he sleeps 'with his fraternal enemy', a phrase
as enigmatic as the earlier 'true illusion'. Does this mean that James and
Henry were brothers who were enemies, or that they were brotherly, in
the sense of friendly, enemies? Or, given the repeated doublings between
the brothers, should Mackellar's frequent associations of James with the
Devil be extended to Henry? The inscription would then suggest that the
brothers were alike in enmity, not of each other, but of humanity.24
In relation to Frye's idea of romance, the undecidable meaning of the headstone
suggests a point upon which the narrative must inevitably converge in its failure to
establish a metaphorical identification with the Logos. This failure is emphasised
further by the fact that our attentions have been deflected away from the quest object
of the buried treasure which, like the rogue Indian, remains an implied but
undescribed element of structure. In this sense, the quest structure hinges on an
absence which is asserted, firstly, through the failure to recover the quest object and,
secondly, through the subsequent ingression of the text upon an undecidable
meaning. The quest structure of The Master, in fact, becomes the reverse of
metaphor: it is the reduction of language to inscription and, from there, the reduction
of inscription to stone itself. It is a text that effects the literalisation of language -
language becoming one with something as impenetrable, as material, and as
meaningless as language is. Finally, it is the visible absence of meaning in the story,
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more tangible and immediate than any illusion of meaning, that produces a purely
material sensation of pre-structurality - that is, the Arboreal singularity of something
conceived without making sense.
A Summary
Where Stevenson does allow for a mythical expansion of the Arboreal impulse is
through its anecdotal association with the nature-god Pan. Nevertheless, the essay
'Pan's Pipes' expresses a pagan fundamentalism that denies the continuation of the
mythical structure described by Frye, advocating that 'Pan is not dead, but of all the
classic hierarchy alone stands in triumph; goat-footed, with a gleeful and an angry
9 f\
look....' Adapting myth as a means of describing the Arboreal tendency, Pan is
used as a figurative template for Stevenson's blurring of extremes - Arboreal terror
with pleasure, life with death, glee with anger. He is heralded, by Stevenson, as a
figure who precedes any moral reckoning and who, significantly, issues not the
undesirable or demonic repulsiveness of nature but its 'dangerous yet desirable
attraction'. These extremes are not apocalyptic either, but purely sensational,
representative of a primal euphoria from which the civilised man, in his meek pursuit
of civilised goals, has become detached. It is noticeable, moreover, that, as far as
Stevenson is concerned, the ideology at stake in the pursuit of civilised goals is not a
metaphysical but a purely capitalist one:
....to hold back the hand from the rose because of the thorn, and from life
because of death: this is to be afraid of Pan. Highly respectable citizens
who flee life's pleasures and responsibilities keep, with upright hat, upon
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the midway of custom, avoiding the right hand and the left, the ecstasies
and the agonies, how surprised they would be if they could hear their
attitude mythologically expressed, and knew themselves as tooth-
chattering ones, who flee from Nature because they fear the hand of
Nature's God! Shrilly sound Pan's pipes; and behold the banker instantly
concealed in the bank parlour! For to distrust one's impulses is to be
27
recreant to Pan.
From the dramatic perspective of Stevenson's fiction, the agonies and ecstasies of the
Arboreal impulse are not necessarily expressed or received through action and
violence alone. It is possible, in fact, to identify the introduction of the strategies
outlined above in one of Stevenson's earliest stories, Will o' the Mill, a story which
deliberately enables a textual immersion of the Arboreal impulse without recourse to
fighting, sailoring or similar such episodes of action and brutality. Interestingly, the
typical elements of romance (including love) are invoked in Will o' the Mill if only to
be denied their archetypal function. In this respect, Will o' the Mill is an oddity,
rather than an odyssey: it is a story in which nothing really happens and which is
never developed beyond its immediate circumstance, even though it is announced as
a romance and anticipates, in the act of refusing, the structural and semantic criteria
of the mythopoeic formula. But it is precisely the structural and semantic dynamic
underlying romance that becomes its overriding theme. In drawing attention to the
ways in which this dynamic is prone to deconstructing itself, Will o' the Mill
radically rejects the possibility of narrative as a means of expressing or gratifying
desires. Instead, and in an intriguing contrast to his later works, Will dramatises the
process of becoming Arboreal through the attempt to sustain a pre-structural
condition, which is not achieved through a dramatic realisation of the Arboreal
impulse. It is achieved, rather, through the actualisation of the aporia involving the
impossibility of admitting the Arboreal impulse through a visible textual medium.
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Will o' the Mill continually denies the passage of desire as something that can be
rendered intelligible and enables it, only and finally, through the unintelligible
representation of the passage of desire through death - the vanishing point of
narrative.
It is hoped that by exploring this, one of Stevenson's most neglected and,
arguably, most important works, and by uncovering some of the strategies at work
within it, we may be afforded a better understanding of the anomalies associated with
some of Stevenson's more renowned and more widely read compositions. Certainly
it is true that The Strange Case ofDr Jekyll and Mr Hyde more spectacularly, and
more famously, explores the drama of man in his evolutionary prime being reduced
to his pre-rational interior. The same too can be said for The Master ofBallantrae,
where the story violently abates in the primeval gloom of the Adirondack forests. But
it is possible to see how the principles and positions occurring in these narratives
were already being theorised and developed in Will o' the Mill. As one of his earliest
romances, Will o' the Mill sets a precedent for Stevenson's later ones. It is a story
that, more blatantly than any of his fictions, invokes the conventions of the
mythopoeic model if only to decode and expose them as unstable and invalid. It is a
story, moreover, that with explicit thoroughness metaphorically illustrates the failure
of metaphor. It is my intention, then, in the first part of the following section, to
embark on a detailed analysis which will not only draw attention to the remarkable
scope of the story itself, but will also demonstrate the importance of Will in relation
to Stevenson's fiction as a whole.
If Will can be said to set in motion Stevenson's ideas on romance as a modem
idiom, the story looked at in the second part of the following section, The Ebb-Tide,
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might be said to crystallise them. In The Ebb-Tide, Stevenson re-introduces the
theme of violence. He associates it, however, not with an Arboreal vitality but, in an
interesting twist, with the dialectical structure ofmythical values imposed against it.
It is a story that not only brings to bear on the mythopoeic formula its
unsustainability. In The Ebb-Tide, the same formula - the moral values it
incorporates and the effort towards an idea of renewal it sustains - is revealed as
immensely destructive or, at the very least, as a damaging distraction away from 'the
primitive and the barbaric which could never quite be left behind'.28 In The Ebb-
Tide, moreover, which is, of course, one of Stevenson's later works, the Darwinian
element is taken to an extreme: in its attempt to admit an Arboreal impulse, the
narrative stops, not at the Adirondack forests. Instead, we encounter the biological
fulcrum of the Pacific seas, as Herrick, the story's main protagonist, learns to accept
the dysteleological primacy of life for what it is - namely, an 'endless onward
process', extending to 'an often pained awareness of human beings as slight elements
within unstoppable motion and transformation'.29
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2 Robert Louis Stevenson, 'The Manse', Memories and Portraits, pp. 72 - 74.
3 For more on 'heredity' and the influence of Darwin on fiction in general, see Peter Morton's The
Vital Science: Biology and the Literary Imagination, I860 - 1900 (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1984). Theories of 'genetic determination' (The Vital Science, p. 175), well known to us today, began
to emerge in positive terms largely as a consequence of Darwin's theory of evolution. One of the
effects of heredity-theory was to show that 'man now stood as the latest and temporary product of
nature's assembly-line, a line which ran all the way back to the primordial ooze' (The Vital Science, p.
8). Its impact, as we shall see later in this thesis, often provoked pessimistic responses among authors,
mainly because of its implications regarding the diminished status of human selfhood. Already we can
see, however, that, for Stevenson, heredity was hardly of negative import. Under new and extremely
binding terms, it allowed a means through which he could consolidate his typically Scottish obsession
with ancestry; whilst offering, as we shall see now and throughout the rest of this thesis, a means
through which he could theorise romance as a modern phenomenon.
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Stevenson, of course, was not alone in seeing the function of romance as a means of admitting
primitive states. His friend and contemporary, Andrew Lang, referred to the 'few modem romances of
adventure' (of which Stevenson's were undoubtedly the best examples) as 'savage survivals'. As
Nicholas Daly has written, romance, for Lang (to whom Daly refers), 'is the raw meat that appeals to
the wild man within, variously described by Lang as "the natural man within me, the survival of some
blue-painted Briton or of some gipsy", "[T]he savage within us", "the old barbarian [concealed] under
our clothes" '. Andrew Lang, 'Realism and Romance', Contemporary Review, 52 (1887), pp. 683 - 93,
in Nicholas Daly, Modernism, Romance and the fin de siecle: Popular Fiction and British Culture,
1880 - 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 18. The difference between
Stevenson and Lang, I think, lies in the former's more explicit incorporation of Darwinian ideas into
his thinking about romance; whereas Lang, generally speaking, is more directly concerned with
psychoanalytic and anthropological interpretations of romance - of 'the surviving superstitions and
stories, the ideas which are in our time but not of it' or of 'the relics of a stage of thought, which is
dying out in Europe...'. Andrew Lang, Custom and Myth (Wakefield: EP Publishing LTD, 1974), pp.
11 and 13.
6 Robert Louis Stevenson, 'Pastoral', Memories and Portraits, pp. 63 - 64.
7 As an aside to the main analysis, it is worth remarking further on the nature of the author as the
author-sibling as envisaged by Stevenson. The idea of the author as a genetic composite is illustrated
in Stevenson's essay concerning two beggars - an old soldier and a knife grinder (depicted in the essay
'Beggars', in Virginibus Puerisque) - who personify, respectively, the qualities of linguistic artifice
and existential dynamism which are perceived by Stevenson as the essential requirements of the
authorial tendency. The old soldier, says Stevenson, 'loved the exotic, the unexpected word; the
moving cadence of the phrase; a vague sense of emotion (about nothing) in the very letters of the
alphabet: the romance of language' ('Beggars', p. 167). The knife grinder, on the other hand 'had a
vulgar taste in letters'; but, remarks Stevenson, 'if he had no fine sense of the poetry of letters, he felt
with a deep joy the poetry of life' ('Beggars', p. 169). To extrapolate the quality of each and
genetically combine them, Stevenson ruminates, would be to produce an author-sibling of the perfect
calibre for producing fiction:
We have here two temperaments face to face: both untrained, unsophisticated, surprised
(we may say) in the egg; both boldly charactered:- that of the artist, the lover and
artificer of words; that of the maker, the seer, the lover and forger of experience. If the
one had a daughter and the other had a son, and these married, might not some
illustrious writer count decent from the beggar-soldier and the needy knife-grinder?
('Beggars', p. 170)
It is the author as a biological product, or product of his or her inheritance, that appears to determine
his or her capacity for transmitting ideas for stories through the artificial medium ofwords. Crucially,
however, though he contemplates their coalescence, Stevenson maintains a decisive separation
between those inherited experiences pertaining to the Arboreal impulse and the materiality of the text
that aims to admit or recreate it, so that narrative, in the end, is perpetuated by a desire for something
which, because of its material condition, it cannot accommodate.
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An interesting parallel can be drawn overall between Stevenson's theory of the creative process and
the following one proposed by Roland Barthes (taken from 'Writing Degree Zero'). There are some
differences that ought to be pointed out, especially regarding the function of 'style', although the
similarities by far outweigh them. For Stevenson, we know, style represents a phase of self-conscious
mediation between the mysteries of personality and language - the point at which the creative forces
allotted at the hour of birth are subject to the material discrepancies of linguistic execution. For
Barthes, style is rather a contingent element of the creative forces allotted at the hour of birth: it is a
linguistic manifestation of the mysteries of personality rather than a trial and error accumulation of
inadequate acts of choice. Unlike Stevenson, then, Barthes does not imply a transitional rupture or
aporia between the mysteries of personality and language. He does, however, resemble Stevenson
with his inference that style becomes an ideolectic supplement of language expressing the
particularity, as Barthes describes it, of the 'the author's personal or secret mythology' (a phrase
which we can readily associate with Stevenson's descriptions of the author-sibling as the product of a
genealogical reservoir of 'inherited experiences'). The extract given previously from 'The Manse', in
fact, can be seen as an attempt by Stevenson to provide a genealogical map of his 'personal or secret
mythology':
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We know that a language is a corpus of prescriptions and habits common to all writers
of a period. Which means that a language is a kind of natural ambience wholly
pervading the writer's expression, yet without endowing it with form or content: it is as
it were an abstract circle of truths, outside of which alone the solid residue of an
individual logos begins to settle. It enfolds the whole of literary creation much as the
earth, the sky, and the line where they meet outline a familiar habitat for mankind. It is
not so much a stock of materials as a horizon, which implies both a boundary and a
perspective; in short it is the comforting area of an ordered space. The writer literally
takes nothing from it; a language is for him rather a frontier, to overstep which alone
might lead to the linguistically supernatural; it is a field of action, the definition of, and
hope for, a possibility.... [Style], imagery, delivery, vocabulary spring from the body
and the past of the writer and gradually become the reflexes of his art. Thus under the
name of style a self-sufficient language is evolved which has its roots only in the depths
of the author's personal and secret mythology, that subnature of expression where the
first coition of words and things takes place, where once and for all the great verbal
themes of his existence come to be installed. Whatever its sophistication, style has
always something crude about it: it is a form with no clear destination, the product of a
thrust, not an intention, and, as it were, a vertical and lonely dimension of thought. Its
frame of reference is biological or biographical, not historical: it is the writer's "thing,"
his glory and his prison, it is his solitude. Indifferent to society and transparent to it, a
closed personal process, it is no way the product of a choice or of a reflection on
Literature. It is the private portion of the ritual, it rises up from the myth-laden depths
and unfolds beyond his area of control... A language is therefore a horizon, and style a
vertical dimension.... Roland Barthes, 'Writing Degree Zero', in A Barthes Reader, ed.
Susan Sontag, pp. 31 - 34.
If we were to substitute Barthes's terms for the ones that we have used - 'vertical' for 'genealogical',
'biological', 'natural'; 'horizon' for 'artificial', 'material', 'linguistic' - a correspondence between the
two, barring their contrasting designations of the function of style, is highly evident (and we are
reminded of Glenda Norquay's insinuations regarding the correspondences between Stevenson and
Barthes referred to in chapter three). One other notable difference pertains to Barthes's dismissal of
the materiality of language, though he seems to echo Stevenson's insistence on the author's role in
giving language the form it lacks. Lastly, it should be said that Barthes seems to maintain a faith in
style as a linguistic expression of authorial presence, appearing, then, to rely on a metaphysics of
presence in a way that Stevenson, through his indication of a rupture between the Arboreal impulse
and the materiality of language, does not.
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Part Three
Will o' the Mill and The Ebb-Tide
Chapter Five
The Inversion of the Quest: Will o' the Mill
Will o' the Mill presents itself as a fable, as a folk tale, as a 'naive' abstraction of the
kind of 'sentimental' romances that Stevenson would later write - the more
'literarily' advanced, 'displaced' romances of Treasure Island, Kidnapped, Jekyll
and Hyde, The Master ofBallantrae, The Ebb-Tide and so on. It is tempting to see in
Stevenson's work a consecutive movement, which accords precisely to Frye's
scheme, ranging, in miniature, from the naive to the sentimental extremes of fiction.
Will (which is among his earliest stories) and The Ebb-Tide (with its contemporary
correspondences to Stevenson's own historical and cultural location) appear to
initiate and complete a linear shift which coincides with Frye's principle of
displacement.1 Stevenson's works do show a degree of increased sophistication
throughout his career, of generic, stylistic and thematic expansion. They do amount
to something like a series of displacements. But Will o' the Mill, as I will presently
show, begins from a position which purposively scrambles the structural integrity of
naive romances. It is a story, in this sense, that provides us with a useful prelude to
the narrative anomalies encountered in the more 'sophisticated', sentimental
developments, such as those we have identified in Jekyll and Hyde and The Master,
and those we shall see in The Ebb-Tide.
Fables and folk tales, according to Frye, represent the structural bases of
narrative. They explicitly reveal the same archetypal formulae that are implicitly
encoded in the more complex forms designated by Frye, through their various stages,
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as displacements. Deliberately aligned by Stevenson as a fable, Will o' the Mill
should be seen to perform a similar range of functions, and to work according to the
same principles of abstraction and formulaic arrangement.2 Likewise, it should be
seen (if we are strictly adhering to Frye) to demonstrate the same motivations and
ideological solutions at stake as narratives do when they pass from, and through,
their archetypal to their anagogic phases. Frye, we recall, has summarised these as
'the polarisation of ideal and abhorrent worlds, which we have seen as central to
romance' (SS, p. 80).
If Will o' the Mill is to conform to the structural criteria of romance as
formally stated by the archetypal critics, then the basic, comparative models offered
here by Frye and Joseph Campbell should offer, in return, an adequate model for Will
o' the Mill. Extrapolating the structure of romance in its most rudimentary format,
both Frye and Campbell have established three essential stages constituting the
narrative 'organism' or, in Campbell's words, the 'nuclear unit' of romance. The
two roughly correspond, as we shall see, to fuse a mythopoeic (Frye) or monomythic
(Campbell) embryo of narrative structure which determines the generic design of all
myths and romances over time, ranging from preliterate fables to the most modern
science-fictions. First, we have Campbell's 'nuclear unit of the monomyth':
A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of
supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a
decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious
adventure with the power to bestow boons on hisfellow man.4
Secondly, we have Frye's mythopoeic formula:
The complete form of romance is clearly the successful quest, and such a
completed form has three main stages: the stage of the perilous journey
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and the preliminary minor adventures; the crucial struggle, usually some
kind of battle in which the hero or his foe, or both, must die; and the
exaltation of the hero. We may call these three stages respectively, using
Greek terms, the agon or conflict, the pathos or death-struggle, and the
anagnorisis or discovery, the recognition of the hero, who has clearly
proved himself to be a hero even if he does not survive the conflict. (AC,
pp. 186- 187)
Both critics assert similar criteria: a preliminary entry into the world of adventure; a
medial stage of climactic struggle; and a conclusive stage involving the hero's
messianic transfiguration. These, then, are the fundamental bases from which the
archetypal and anagogic framework takes form.
Will o' the Mill is a story which inscribes its generic status upon every
narrative level. Its opening sentence - 'The Mill where Will lived with his adopted
parents stood in a falling valley between pine-woods and great mountains' (p. 175) -
is not so much an opening sentence as a declaration of generic intent. The following
extracts, taken from some fables and folk tales collected by Andrew Lang, offer a
range of'authentic' variables:
An old couple once lived in a hut under a grove of palm trees, and they
had one son and one daughter.
In the middle of a great forest there lived a long time ago a charcoal-
burner and his wife.
A long time ago a little town made up of a collection of low huts stood in
a tiny green valley at the foot of a cliff.
Once upon a time there were a man and a woman, who had an only
daughter.5
Seen in this context, Will o' the Mill's opening sentence is a motif, a signal, an
archetypal assertion of pre-quest domesticity, the integral components of which are
clearly stated as work, family and home. Coinciding with Campbell, it is the
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'common day'' world in which the story begins; and it is only in keeping with our
generic expectations that Will should outgrow the narrative embryo of domestic
irrelevance and emerge as 'the one who has deliberately undertaken the difficult and
dangerous journey beyond the village compound'.6 Likewise, on an anagogic level,
the opening paragraph - as a tautological derivation of the once-upon-a-time motif -
is effectively telling us that this story exists in a state of abstraction and refinement,
that it lies closer to a world of myth than of secular experience. It only remains for
the hero, Will, to surmount the various obstacles set against him and to establish an
omnific contact between the fallen world of domestic irrelevance and the cosmic
totality from which it, and he, has fallen.
As if these signals are not enough, Stevenson sign-posts his narrative by
attaching separate headings to each of its three sections, each heading acting as a
semiotic abstraction of each particular section, in a move which externalises the
structural interior of the narrative so as to reveal, prior to our involvement as readers,
the story's structural sequence as it is liable to occur. This way, Will o' the Mill
foreshadows, corresponds to or pre-empts the three essential stages of the
mythopoeic / monomythic formula, as this provisional synopsis suggests:
a) In 'The Plain and the Stars' we have an immediate grounds for a
preliminary entry into the world of adventure made possible by a prospective conflict
between oppositional values. Such a suggestion might seem over-pitched if it wasn't
for the fact that, in the plain and the stars, we recognise the oppositional modality of
the fallen, or real, and cosmic, or ideal, worlds. Will's quest will evidently arise out
of a conflict of values embedded in each - his repugnance for the plain (bearing in
mind that for 'plain' we could also read 'commonplace', 'mundane', 'quotidian')
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versus his apocalyptic yearning for the stars (the cosmic or heavenly). Prelusively,
we have an appropriate site for 'the conflict of desire and reality' (AC, p. 105) which
Frye has asserted as the structural determinant of romance. The opening sentence
seems to emphasise the potential spectacle in drawing attention to Will's homestead
as being situated above a 'falling valley' (italics mine), as if, in being where he is,
Will is positioned just above a lower world and just below a higher one, apparently
occupying a middle ground of precarious neutrality between a higher world of
heaven and a lower world of hell. We recognise already, then, the anagogic
significance of Will o' the Mill, which begins by asserting Frye's romance criterion
of 'a contrast between two worlds, one above the level of ordinary experience, the
other below it' (SS, p. 53), with the character ofWill poised between the two.
b) In 'The Parson's Marjory' it is possible to envisage a medial stage of
climactic struggle involving the hero's attempt to attain a suitable quest-object, in
this case personified in the figure of Maijory. Having defined the relation between
the structural and semantic components of the archetypal scenario, Frye suggests
that, on one level of meaning, 'the quest-romance is the search of the libido or
desiring self for a fulfilment that will deliver it from reality' (AC, p. 193). Maijory,
then, appears to be the catalyst for Will's 'romantic thrust of sexuality and wish-
fulfilment' (SS, p. 58), the attainment of which will deliver him from the undesirable
realities of his domestic situation. On another level, however, Maijory acquires an
anagogic significance in that, as the parson's daughter, she is instantly imaged as
religiously chaste - analogous, in this sense, to 'the archetype of all romantic virgins
who marry and live "happily" ever after'. As such, she is announced in advance as a
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symbolic object of cosmic renewal, representative 'not only of a descent from a
higher world but a permanent return to it' (SS, p. 87).
c) 'Death' implies some kind of apocalyptic transfiguration, involving the
apotheosis or exaltation of the hero - albeit the suggestion is that the hero does not
survive the conflict overall. Given the semantic rigidity of the section heading
'Death', however, we cannot be certain as to whether or not Will succeeds in
bestowing boons upon his fellow man or in activating a cosmic regeneration of the
cyclical world of nature.
In the section headings, then, Stevenson has established a series of structural
stages which, as we have seen, correspond to the mythopoeic / monomythic formula
provided by Frye and Campbell. But, in so doing, Stevenson problematises the
implications of an archetypal reading. In the first place, he has extrapolated the
archetypal interior of his narrative and, in the form of signatory headings, positioned
it on the outside of his text. What Frye calls the 'symbolic spread' (SS, p. 59) of
archetypes is brought to the surface, decoded and exposed, no longer a central
mechanism or core of 'irreducible' meanings from which the archetypal and
anagogic phases assume the complexities of form. The narrative structure of Will o'
the Mill has, in effect, been turned inside out: it is structurally coherent on the
outside; what remains to be seen is whether it is structurally coherent on the inside.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate otherwise, that Will o' the Mill
deliberately works against the grain of the assumptions it asserts, that it purges itself
of the archetypal referents which, even at the moment of inscribing them upon a
visible textual surface, it shows to be unstable, inadequate and lacking in absolute
foundation.
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This chapter, then, will engage in an archetypal reading of a story that makes
such a reading impossible. It will show how Stevenson theorises in Will o' the Mill
that which, in his later works, becomes repeatedly pronounced, namely, a calculated
dislocation of the values upon which the mythopoeic formula sustains itself
metaphorically. This, though, is no abject demolition. It is a move to unhinge the
structural and semantic efficacy of conventional forms and formulae by means of
moving inside of them, of entering a kind of quantum level of narrative activity and
exposing the singularities, as opposed to the incorruptible certainties, which inhabit
their interior. In response to this manoeuvre, Stevenson disqualifies the metaphorical
unity of romance as a means of expressing or satisfying desire and, from there,
inundates the vacuum of meaning at its centre, which he reveals, with an aboriginal
condition ofpre-structurality and self-absence.
'The Plain and the Stars'
Will o' the Mill begins by entering the established modality of romance, accentuating
in and around the figure of Will the conflict between desire and reality according to
which romance conventionally operates. With the movement 'of people going in one
direction... tending downward like the river that accompanied their path' (p. 175), a
teleological order is evoked whereby the narrative appears likely to be determined by
what it describes. Will desires to enter this order but, in being confined to the
domestic irrelevance of the mill, is painfully aware of his exclusion from it. On the
outbreak of the 'disastrous war' (p. 175), the 'weariness, pity and wonder' (p. 176)
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he feels is not for the sake of the war-torn legions: it is an emotional expenditure
arising from his need to pursue, like them, an undisclosed eventuality: 'Whither had
they all gone? Whither went all the tourists and pedlars with strange wares? whither
all the brisk barouches with servants in the dicky? whither the water of the stream,
ever coursing downward and ever renewed from above' (p. 176)? But it is through his
observations of nature that Will begins to define his position of exclusion more
sharply:
Even the wind blew oftener down the valley, and carried the dead leaves
along with it in the fall. It seemed like a great conspiracy of things
animate and inanimate; they all went downward, fleetly and gaily
downward, and only he, it seemed, remained behind, like a stock upon
the wayside. It sometimes made him feel glad when he noticed how the
fishes kept their heads up stream. They at least stood faithfully by him,
while all else were posting downward to the unknown world, (p. 176)
Among Will's surroundings, water forms the most powerful imagery and, in the case
of the river, is especially consistent with the quest scenario. It is easy enough to read
in the river a symbolic projection of Will's desire to traverse the plain according to
the same linear / cyclical tendency. However, while the river represents a point of
identification for Will, it is a very tenuous one: his strongest point of identification is
not with the river, but with the fish - with those elements, in other words, that resist
the teleological mainstream from whichWill, like the fish, is excluded.
In the fish, it is possible to recognise the emergence of tangent metaphors that
disrupt, rather than regulate or conjoin, the metaphorical uniformity of Will o' the
Mill. These incendiary elements are neither for nor against the anticipated quest,
neither diametrically determined nor representative of any conventional value. The
fish, remaining static with heads upstream, occupy a position of neutrality in relation
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to the order they inhabit. Already, then, there is an unevenly balanced simultaneity -
a dysteleological counter-action acting from within the story's resident teleology -
which, in the course ofWill's predicament, becomes increasingly pronounced.
At the same time, the symbolic status ofwater is raised to a level of anagogy,
as Will o' the Mill continues to expand its mythopoeic potential. The fact that the
river, as the miller explains, 'turns a power ofmills', 'waters the great corn country,
and runs through a sight of fine cities', appears to correspond, analogously, to Frye's
summary of river-imagery as featured in myth: 'In apocalyptic symbolism we have
the "water of life", the fourfold river of Eden in the City of God.... Apocalyptically,
therefore, water circulates in the universal body like blood in the individual body'
(AC, p. 146). These symbolic resonances are given substance by what we learn of the
river's ultimate destination, presented in such terms as we recognise, not only the
sea, but a site of omnific totality. In answer to Will's query, 'And what is the sea?',
the miller exclaims:
Lord help us all, it is the greatest thing God made! That is where all the
water in the world runs down into a great salt lake. There it lies, as flat as
my hand and as innocent like as a child; but they do say when the wind
blows it gets up into water-mountains bigger than any of ours, and
swallows down the great ships bigger than our mill, and makes such a
roaring that you can hear it miles away upon the land. There are great
fish in it five times bigger than a bull, and one old serpent as long as our
river and as old as all the world, with whiskers like a man, and a crown
of silver on her head. (p. 177)
As God's greatest creation, the sea is at once invested with a mythical amplitude,
appearing as a kind of nexus between the fallen and cosmic worlds. It represents, that
is to say, the origin and eventuality of the river's symbolic course of action, in being
both its source (as a consequence of the water cycle) and its ultimate destination. In
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keeping with Frye and Campbell, it is possible to think of the sea as a mythical
boundary that stands between 'The Plain and the Stars', or as a purgatorial divide
between Will's phases of descent and ascent that needs to be crossed if his secular
degradation is to be successfully transformed into cosmic revival. It is apparent,
again, that the water imagery in 'The Plain and the Stars' offers a symbolic
projection of the course of action Will ought to take as the prospective hero of the
quest. To overcome the natural and supernatural perils that inhabit the sea should
enable him to establish a contact with the omnific source and, by his heroic return or
Messianic self-sacrifice, to meliorate the fallen world with regenerative boons.
Having said this, the Miller's description of the sea is based on a rather
complex set of allusions. And this, perhaps, problematises our attempts to situate
Will o' the Mill within the archetypal schema. Will o' the Mill is to a large extent an
encyclopaedic story, drawing on imagery both from the Christian and pre-Christian
traditions. Both traditions are retained at the expense of the other in terms of their
absolute value, for no absolute value is offered. While the Christian imagery
pertaining to the sea, as God's greatest creation, is furthered somewhat by the
Leviathan trope of the 'great fish in it five times bigger than a bull', it is oddly offset
by the arrival of an immortal sea monster whose presence pertains more to maritime
legend or pagan mythology. The sea, then, appears to contain an amalgamation of
incompatible mythical fields, resembling, not so much a purgatorial divide or
apocalyptic limit, as a region in which the apocalyptic and demonic alternatives are
reduced to a point where neither acquires a positive / negative value to any decisive
effect. The sea, we notice, is not only a source of life (in being the ultimate source of
the river), but a harbinger of death. It is as equally capable of affecting child-like
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innocence as it is of implementing mortal catastrophe: it is both apocalyptic, in its
expression of eternity, and demonic, in its expression of the transience of human life.
Perhaps the most outstanding feature of neutrality, however, is the androgynous
figure of the sea serpent itself, which is both a gargantuan phallus 'with whiskers like
a man' and a matrilineal deity 'with a crown of silver on her head'. Given the cross-
referential texture of its symbolic composition, the sea, like the fish, appears to
establish a tangent metaphoricity which cancels, rather than sustains, the archetypal
designations of the mythopoeic structure.
Will o' the Mill, in many ways, is a story about neutrality, and it seeks, as we
shall see, to activate neutrality on a variety of narrative levels, not least through the
character ofWill. To see the sea as a site of omnific neutrality, rather than totality, is
to see it, as yet, as an ultimate source, but one that reveals an absence of intelligible
structure (by revealing an absence of intelligible goals) which, in turn, gradually
pervades the narrative and expends, by extruding, the archetypal functions that refer
to it centrally. Instead of producing itself, the narrative is reducing itself to a singular
condition; instead of asserting the presence of the Logos, it is asserting the absence
of the Logos by purging itself of its logocentric structure.
This becomes clear, however, only after the allure of the plain has had its
fullest impact on Will. For Will, the plain is on the opposite end of the spectrum to
the fish. The fish represent a point of identification for Will, but only because they
appear to share his experience of domestic inaction. The plain, which becomes his
object of desire and, so, becomes a more elaborate, less immediate and hitherto
unknowable point of identification, has a converse effect: by gradual stages, it
scrambles his identity. On reaching 'the hill-top that overlooks the valley and the
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plain' (p. 177), Will experiences a visionary apprehension of the apocalyptic order
from which he is excluded. But the experience is as agonising as it is ecstatic; and
Will's alerted fascination for the plain quickly gives way to an infantile distress:
Everything was defined and glorified in golden light.... An overmastering
emotion seized upon the boy, soul and body; his heart beat so thickly that
he could not breathe; the scene swam before his eyes; the sun seemed to
wheel round and round, and throw off, as it turned, strange shapes which
disappeared with the rapidity of thought, and were succeeded by others.
Will covered his face with his hands, and burst into a violent fit of tears...
(p. 177)
The significance of this scene, from an archetypal point of view, is notable for its
correspondence to the mythical trope of a
...symbolic presentation of the point at which the undisplaced apocalyptic
world and the cyclical world of nature come into alignment, and which
we propose to call the point of epiphany. Its most common settings are
the mountain-top, the island, the tower, the lighthouse, the ladder or
staircase. (AC, p. 203)7
Anagogically speaking, Will's epiphany is analogous to 'the mountain vision of
Pisgah, the end of the road through the wilderness from which Moses saw the distant
Promised Land...' (AC, p. 204). But whereas the point of epiphany normally, and
climactically, secures an alignment between the two worlds, in Will o' the Mill it
drives them apart or, more accurately, begins to distance Will from the alignment he
requires. On the one hand, Will's apprehension of the 'Promised Land' has
intensified his desire to enter into it:
From that day forward Will was full of new hopes and longings.
Something kept tugging at his heartstrings; the running water carried his
desires along with it as he dreamed over its fleeting surface... It did not
matter what it was; everything that went that way, were it cloud or
187
carriage, bird or brown water in the stream, he felt his heart flow out after
it in ecstasy of longing, (p. 178)
On the other hand, however, the moment of revelation Will has received becomes a
torture rather than an insight. What begins as an inducement to the quest is lessened
by Will's growing confusion towards his object of desire so long as it remains
unattained. In his continued idealisation of the world below, Will begins to sicken,
his personality wilt: his epiphany has not so much provided him with inductive
powers of heroism as with an Arboreal mania of unsatisfied lusts:
He was transplanted and withering where he was; he lay in a strange
country and was sick for home. Bit by bit, he pieced together broken
notions of the world below; of the river, ever moving and growing until it
sailed forth into the majestic oceans; of the cities full of brisk and
beautiful people.... of the great churches, wise universities, brave armies,
and untold money lying stored in vaults; of high-flying vice that moved
in the sunshine, and the stealth and swiftness of midnight murder, (p.
179)
It is clear, in view of his torment, that Will's moment of epiphany has occurred
prematurely and has become, as an archetype, structurally and semantically void. It
occurs at a stage where Will, as yet, is disengaged from the process of the quest, so
that it 'reveals' nothing except a sense of something in the world which is 'there' to
be discovered, but which lies outside of his experience. As a consequence, Will
superimposes upon the plain an array of 'broken notions' which are not so much an
apocalyptic actuality as a series of metaphorical substitutions for the absence of any
definite object of desire. We soon suspect that Will is focusing his desires on
misconceptions, exaggerations and fallacies, that he is, in short, creating a romance
of the plain which is not so much a visionary apprehension as the product of his
estrangement from the thought of the world he craves. It is a measure of his emergent
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neutrality, meanwhile, that the images of paradise he associates with the cities are
accompanied by a desire for material indulgences, prostitution and homicidal
violence. Will fuses everything together in a general picture of pleasure and excess:
he begins to idealise the demonic as well as apocalyptic alternatives and, as a result,
cancels their value as desirable or undesirable objects of the (anticipated) quest. For
Will, the objects of his desire are envisaged but undecidable. They are the efforts, not
ideas, of a 'hero' who is unable to reconcile himself to non-existent mythical targets
and whose desire, finally, begins to assume its natural - that is, its Arboreal - aspect.
Later, we notice, Will exposes the characteristic neutrality of his desire during his
counsels with the 'fat young man': 'But you would not have me die like a dog and
not see all that is to be seen, and do all that a man could do, let it be good or evil?' (p.
182).
And these, perhaps, are symptoms of a character who, existing prior to and
outside of the teleological mainstream of the quest, inhabits a pre-structural condition
that precedes the world as made intelligible and presentable through the conventional
structure of romance. The narrator's own analysis implies as much: 'I have said he
was sick as if for home: the figure halts. He was like someone lying in twilit,
formless pre-existence, and stretching out his hands lovingly towards many-coloured,
many-sounding life' (p. 179). By 'constructing' his imagined impressions of life on
the plain, Will is attempting to compensate for his absence from it; but, because of
his absence, he cannot make his impressions intelligible. He is constructing a
romance of the world around and beyond him that undermines the conventional
criteria of romance and, in this way, is doing from within what Stevenson is doing
from without, constructing a romance that, in effect, is deconstructing itself.
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In being unaware of this, Will continues to project his unintelligible 'design-
formation' upon a world that cannot support it. Like an accustomed metaphysician,
however, he invests the absence of decidable meaning with transcendental
significations which, while they 'exist' outside of his experience, ratify (within the
context of his imagination at least) an available truth or 'true life': '... he was... full
of desires and aspirations, itching at the fingers, lusting with the eyes, whom the
whole variegated world could not satisfy with aspects. The true life, the true bright
sunshine, lay far out upon the plain' (p. 179). And, in this respect, Will is behaving a
bit like Frye and Campbell, accepting the validity of the Logos as a narrative object,
even while it remains outside of his referential and experiential range. He fills the
vacuum of absence with an imaginary presence of truth, substitutes the 'possible
attempt' of the sign for 'an impossible conception', and in this way constructs a
vision of the world as traditionally conceived through romance.
Will, of course, is unaware of what he is doing. We, however, are given
conclusive evidence of the absence ofmeaning that inhabits Will's prospective quest
through the narratorial interlude of the fable within the fable. The fable within the
fable is an allegory that illustrates the failure of allegory, outlining, in general terms,
that which is outlined privately by Will - namely, the human tendency to
superimpose on the world ofman and nature an erroneous world ofmythical values:
That divine unrest, that old stinging trouble of humanity that makes all
high achievements and all miserable failure, the same that spread wings
with Icarus, the same that sent Columbus into the desolate Atlantic,
inspired and supported these barbarians on their perilous march. There is
one legend which profoundly represents their spirit, of how a flying party
of these wanderers encountered a very old man shod with iron. The old
man asked them whither they were going; and they answered with one
voice: 'To the Eternal City!' He looked upon them gravely. 'I have
sought it,' he said, 'over the most part of the world. Three such pairs as I
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now carry on my feet have I worn out upon this pilgrimage, and now the
fourth is growing slender underneath my steps. And all this while I have
not found the city.' And he turned and went his own way alone, leaving
them astonished, (p. 179)
Again, Stevenson is taking us into the archetypal core of his work in order to oust
and eliminate its archetypal values. And Will, we find, begins to do the same.
Following Stevenson, Will begins to sign-post the 'narrative' of the world
that lies beyond his immediate experience, so that, like a reader, he begins to
recognise its metaphorical inefficacy. Though he maintains a reverence for the
teleological world-order, Will begins to sense that this order is not a real one, that it
is not a 'literal' world, but a world made up of factitious symbols. Accordingly, the
symbolic determinations of the narrative are placed outside of his experience, much
in the same way as they are placed outside of our reading experience in their
abstracted state as section headings: 'Hitherto the traffic on the road had passed by
Will, like something seen in a picture... but for the most part it had been a mere
symbol, which he contemplated from apart and with something of a superstitious
feeling' (p. 180). So far, Will's superstitions are the same as those of a metaphysician
like Frye, where the elected symbols are assumed to naturally contain and convey the
metaphysical objects they refer to. But it is in the figure of Will himself wherein the
archetypal fallacy is finally revealed.
Will, we have said, inhabits a pre-structural neutrality. At the circumference
of his experience is an imagined teleology in relation to which he, as protagonist, is a
kind of detached centre. His absence from this order mirrors the absence within it of
any intelligible object of desire so that, in Will o' the Mill, the quest structure is
enclosed, on either side of its (non-existent) duration, by absence. In his eventual
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realisation of this, Will's involuntary absence from the quest becomes a voluntary
absence. This realisation, however, does not come to him of his own accord. It is
prompted by a passing stranger, a 'fat young man', who draws attention to the fact
that, in his present condition, Will is wishing for 'a great many things which you will
never get' (p. 181). In explaining the matter, the fat young man does two things:
firstly, he contrasts the real universe with the mythical one in order to negate the
validity of the latter; and, secondly, he evokes a mythical means of interpretation in
order to illustrate the failure, precisely, of mythical means of interpretation. Of 'the
worlds turning about each other in the midst of space', the young man says:
We do not know what there may be in any of them; perhaps the answer to
all our difficulties or the cure to all our sufferings: and yet we can never
reach them.... We may climb the highest mountain, and we are no nearer
to them ... The mountain and the mouse. That is like to be all we shall
ever have to do with Arcturus or Aldebaran. Can you apply the parable?
(pp. 182 - 183)
The argument, finally, is overwhelming. If the mythical universe exists, then it is out
of reach of human knowledge and experience and, like the names of the stars
'Arcturus' and 'Aldebaran', can only be inadequately expressed through signs or
symbols which, in themselves, are without self-present meaning. Crucially, Will's
reaction to the young man's analogy of absence is one of acceptance. In summarising
the parable in his own words, he repudiates the mythical definition of the world as he
formerly saw it by restricting its metaphorical exorbitance to a nullifying cliche: ' "I
see," he said, turning to the young man. "We are in a rat-trap" ' (p. 183). This
admission signals Will's conscious abstention from the world of conventional
romance. While his imagined environment has provided him with a structural model
for the quest, Will, the most necessary element of the quest, has finally 'inserted' his
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absence. In the same way that Stevenson has effected an extrusion of the archetypal
order by placing it on the outside of his narrative, Will has effected an extrusion of
the archetypal order from within the narratorial core of his own experience. Like an
author, he has conceived of a desire- / design-formation which he cannot replicate in
the 'narratorial space' of his life because his life, like writing, is subject to material
limitations. Viewed metaphorically, then, we discover in 'The Plain in the Stars', not
an individual manifestation of the mythopoeic formula, but the failure of romance to
sustain its status as 'man's vision of his own life as a quest' (SS, p. 15).
'The Parson'sMarjory'
Contrary to what the section headings implied, the parson's Marjory was not, as it
happened, the catalyst for Will's initial 'romantic thrust of sexuality and wish-
fulfilment'; and this is a further indication of Stevenson's determination to disrupt
our expectations of romance. However, if Will has forgone the quest inasmuch as it
involves 'leaving the village compound', he is presented with a secondary quest-
object in the prospective sexual union with the parson's daughter. This, at least,
seems likely if we consider Frye's suggestion that there are, among the mythical
topoi, some 'analogous forms of the point of epiphany', one of which, he relates,
'may be presented in erotic terms as a place of sexual fulfilment, where there is no
apocalyptic vision but simply a sense of arriving at the summit of experience in
nature' (AC, p. 205). There is a definite sense in which Will, in pursuing Maijory,
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may accomplish a regenerative contact with the mythical universe; especially so if
we recall the symbolic latitude ofMarjory as the parson's daughter.
As a structural element, Maijory acts as a substitution for the apocalyptic
goals which came to Will, previously, as broken notions. This time, however, the
object of his desire appears decidable and, for the most part, attainable, falling well
within the limited range of his knowledge and experience. As such, Will o' the Mill
appears to have reasserted its archetypal foundations, and in such as way as may lead
us to anticipate further developments along the lines of 'a grammar of conventions'.
A ritual ratification of sexual union, culminating in the archetype of the marriage
ceremony, would seem the most appropriate scenario, given, as Frye suggests, 'that
most romances exhibit a cyclical movement of descent into a night world and a
return to the idyllic world, or to some symbol of it like a marriage...' (SS, p. 54). It is
apparent that if 'The Parson's Maijory' is to take us closer to a traditional model of
romance then it ought to convey either the imminent success of Will's climactic
union with Maijory or his glorious failure to achieve it with a happy outcome. But it
is rather the case that Stevenson, having dislocated the mythopoeic formula in terms
of its involving a geographical quest, presents the archetype of sexual union as an
emotional quest, if only to prepare the grounds for its dislocation also.
Our expectations of a burgeoning love interest between Will and Marjory are
at once enhanced in the opening paragraphs of 'The Parson's Marjory'. However, as
with the tangent metaphors in 'The Plain and the Stars', there are tangent indications,
here, of a disruption in the metaphorical fabric of tale. While Maijory appears to
have preserved her chastity for Will, it is noticeable that she is not untainted by
rumours and petty scandal: 'She held her head very high, and had already refused
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several offers ofmarriage with a grand air, which had got her hard names among the
neighbours' (p. 184). There is an element of immoral cunning associated with the
parson, moreover, which further undermines the integrity of the emergent marriage
motif. On inheriting 'the inn, and the mill, and the old miller's savings', Will has
become 'a man of substance', so that, on choosing to live there, it is reckoned,
'among their ill-wishers, that the parson and his daughter had not chosen their
temporary lodging with their eyes shut' (p. 184). Ultimately, it is economic greed
that underlies the parson's motives for initiating a sexual union between his daughter
and Will, in a move which, in effect, subordinates her moral chastity to an abject
materialism. Hardly representative of a permanent return to a higher world,
Marjory's symbolic function appears infected at root with its opposite quality.
Similarly, tangent indications abound of Will's unsuitability as the hero of a
love tale in that, having abstained from the quest, he has become 'full of notions'
which are not so much broken as they are impenetrable and dogmatic. He has
become, by now, 'a kind, talkative, inscrutable young man', who 'kept calling the
plainest common sense in question' and 'soon began to take rank in the district as a
bit of an oddity' (p. 183). This is not the Will of old, consigning himself to aimless
fantasies; so much so that, in spite of the parson's surreptitious designs,
...Will was about the last man in the world to be cajoled or frightened
into marriage. You only had to look into his eyes, limpid and still like
pools of water, and yet with a sort of clear light that seemed to come
from within, and you would understand at once that here was one who
knew his own mind, and would stand to it immovably, (p. 184)
It is significant that Stevenson has re-applied the water-imagery of the first section to
symbolise, in this instance, not a teleological mainstream or omnific source, but, in
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the form of isolated pools grown apart from rivers and oceans, Will's intractable
neutrality and wilful disengagement from the cycle of renewal.
If not to be duped so easily into marriage, Will's libidinal desires are
nevertheless aroused by Maijory. It is a measure of the extent to which Will,
previously, had superimposed his own factitious design-formation on the world of
nature that, on the arrival of the metaphorical substitute of Marjory, nature relapses
into its actual absence of intelligible structure:
...the remainder of created things became no more than a blot by
comparison; and if Will glanced away from her to her surroundings, the
trees looked inanimate and senseless, the clouds hung in heaven like dead
things, and even the mountain-tops were disenchanted, (p 185)
In his obsessive regard for the parson's daughter, Will reapplies his design-formation
or, rather, 'displaces' it from one object of devotion to another. Re-invoking the
epiphany of his youth, he begins to fashion a context for Maijory as the omnific
source in human form:
He became conscious of a soul beautifully poised upon itself, nothing
doubting, nothing desiring, clothed in peace... To Will, her presence
recalled something of his childhood, and the thought of her took its place
in his mind beside that of dawn, of running water, and of the earliest
violets and lilacs. It is the property of things seen for the first time after
long, like the flower in spring, to re-awaken in us the sharp edge of sense
and that impression ofmystic strangeness which otherwise passes out of
life with the coming of years; but the sight of a loved face is what renews
a man's character from the fountain upwards, (p. 185-186)
Marjory's state of undesiring represents the ultimate point of attainment for Will who
appears confident that, by 'waiting patiently in his own narrow valley, he also had
attained the better sunlight' (p. 186). It is, however, a hollow assumption on Will's
behalf that he is bound to undergo his apocalyptic transfiguration prior to its event.
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For, while he seems to have abandoned his characteristic neutrality and to have
discovered in Maijory a valid object of desire, his subsequent course of (in)action
proves otherwise.
Will's conduct towards Marjory appears to contradict his image of her as an
object of omnific renewal. While the visionary Maijory 'was never out of Will's
mind for an instant'(p. 187), Maijory herself is kept at a certain distance: "Tis as if
there were a circle round me, which kept every one out but you; I can hear the others
talking and laughing; but you come quite close' (p. 186). Sitting at the table, she
comes 'quite close', but never fully enters into his imagined mythical tableaux.
Indeed, in 'The Parson's Daughter' we are offered two versions of Maijory: the
idealised Maijory of Will's imagination and the actual Marjory of his experience.
Will is unable to reconcile the two; and if, at first, he gives no explicit
acknowledgement of this, his actions indicate otherwise:
The most enchanting thoughts presented themselves unbidden in his
mind. He was so happy that he could not sleep at night, and so restless
that he could hardly sit still out of her company. And yet it seemed as if
he avoided her rather than sought her out. (p. 188)
In 'The Plain and the Stars', Will attempted to project his desire upon objects of
attainment which did not exist. With Marjory, though she exists, he is doing
something of the same. He invests her with a factitious mythical agency which, in
reality, she does not possess, creating an image of attainment that supersedes the
actuality of attainment. As an object of attainment, she by no means offers a
climactic resolution, but only accentuates, by embodying, its actual absence and, so,
cancels rather than manifests the permanent return to a higher world which she is
meant to represent. In response to this rupture which he has imposed on himself,
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Will, having learnt from his experiences in 'The Plain and the Stars', begins to
theorise a position of neutrality which can work to his advantage. Realising that the
possession ofMarjory can only expose the absence of the mythical one, Will stages a
strategic avoidance of Marjory (once as a matter of course, now as a matter of
principle). He attempts to sustain, through its postponement, the illusion of mythical
renewal, rather than confront the reality of its impossible conception, and, to this
effect, is able to indulge his desire for omnific renewal without experiencing its anti-
climactic erasure. The principle suggests itself to Will after discussing with Maijory
her reasons for picking flowers which, he says, Took a great deal better off where
they are...':
'I wish to have them for my own,' she answered, 'to carry them near
my heart, and keep them in my room. They tempt me when they grow
here; they seem to say, "Come and do something with us"; but once I
have cut them and put them by, the charm is laid, and I can look at them
with quite an easy heart.'
'You wish to possess them,' replied Will, 'in order to think no more
about them. It's a bit like killing the goose with the golden eggs. It's a bit
like what I wished to do when I was a boy. Because I had a fancy for
looking out over the plain, I wished to go down there - where I couldn't
look out over it any longer. Was not that fine reasoning? Dear, dear, if
they only thought of it, all the world would do like me; and you would let
your flowers alone, just as I stay up here in the mountains', (p. 188)
Having recovered his dogmatic swagger, it occurs to Will that the moment of
attainment is always already inhabited by its opposite quality - absence. Following
the analogy of the golden goose, to fully possess the object of desire is not to renew,
but to annihilate. To see it this way, the moment of attainment is simultaneous with a
moment of loss. And marriage too, Will realises, means possession, the revelation of
absence - not, as Frye defines it, the return to a higher world. Knowing that, should
they marry, the charm would be laid and the desire annihilated, Will tells Marjory:
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I do not think getting married is worth while. I would rather you went on
living with your father, so that I could walk over and see you once, or
maybe twice a week, as people go to church, and then we should both be
all the happier between whiles. That's my notion, (p. 190)
It is noticeable that, in order to avoid absence, Will, again, has inserted his absence
within the structural relations of romance, though under very different conditions to
those in 'The Plain and the Stars'. Confident (mistakenly) that his notions have been
properly received by Marjory, and seemingly reciprocated, Will is able to exploit his
position of self-absence. There is no absolute gratification in this pre-structural
condition, no fulfilment or unfulfilment; only a kind of stimulating neutrality which
is maximised to full effect by Will, who cunningly intensifies his desire by
ritualistically denying its (im)possible fruition:
For nearly three years Will and Maijory continued on these terms, seeing
each other once or twice a week without any word of love between them;
and for all that time I believe that Will was nearly as happy as a man can
be. He rather stinted himself the pleasure of seeing her; and he would
often walk half-way over to the parsonage, and then back again, as if to
whet his appetite, (p. 194)
The advantageous neutrality of Will's position, however, proves
disadvantageous when his attempts to defer the closure of his desire are met by
Maijory's refusal to remain a surrogate object of his desire. While she is 'quite close'
and unpossessed, Marjory remains a focus for the postponement of Will's
unattainable mythical goals. But when, in the first instance, she tells her father that
'we should do better to leave Mr. Will's house for the present' (p. 191), 'Will was
put entirely out of countenance' (p. 192), having committed himself to a condition of
desiring which, with the removal of Marjory, brings to bear on itself its indigenous
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lack. Will's response to this is a kind of neurosis whereby he begins to read in
Marjory the same kind of neutrality that he read, as a youth, in the plain and the sea,
investing her with both apocalyptic and, now, demonic alternatives, which emerge as
equally attractive to Will. It is apparent, again, that Will's desire is directed at root by
unintelligible motives so that, when the non-existent mythical targets are revealed as
such, it begins to assume its essentially Arboreal character:
He thought he recognised a fine, perverse angel in that still soul which he
had never hitherto suspected; and though he saw it was an influence that
would fit but ill with his own life of artificial calm, he could not keep
himself from ardently desiring to possess it. Like a man who has lived
among shadows and now meets the sun, he was both pained and
delighted, (p. 192)
When 'Maijory played him a sad trick by suddenly marrying somebody else' (p.
194), Will's unpossessed object of desire is removed outright and his notion of
postponement is shown, like the mythopoeic formula, to be unworkable within the
context of his literal experience. However, it is only after this that Will begins to
accept certain realities pertaining to Marjory which, finally, overwhelm his imagined
mythical projection of her. Alerted by his bitterness, he now sees Maijory as we have
seen her - as the Maijory of marital conspiracies and material greed who 'plainly
knew little of her own mind, and, in spite of a deceptive manner, was as fickle and
flighty as the rest of them' (p. 194). If a little crass, this assessment of Marjory is
accurate in that Will, for the first time, sees her for what she is, not the undecidable
(un)eventuality of his apocalyptic desires, but an ordinary woman with ambitions
tending towards the domestic security of the common fold.
Will, to begin with, is 'reasonably displeased' by Marjory's elopement,
'moped a good deal for a month or two, and fell away in flesh, to the astonishment of
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his serving-lads' (p. 194). But while, on a personal level, Will is forced to contend
with the removal, once and for all, of his surrogate object of desire, on an archetypal
level, Maijory's elopement represents the critical dislocation of the marriage motif
from the core of the story and, with it, the erasure of its function as a ritual re-
enactment of apocalyptic renewal. 'The Parson's Marjory' serves as yet another
example of Stevenson's extrusion of archetypes from the interior of his narrative. But
it also shows us that romance, more generally, can only indicate the Logos
inadequately through a range of metaphorical substitutions; or, alternatively, that it
can only, like Will, incorporate the postponement, rather than the revelation, of the
transcendental significations which it is meant to signify. Rather than adhere to the
archetypal order of conventions, 'The Parson's Daughter' has denied that order and,
in doing so, has revealed the absence which exists within and around it. It is an
absence which, in Will, can no longer be postponed and, as we shall see, necessitates
his retreat into a condition of neutrality that not only pre-exists the structural
apparatus of romance. Unable to satisfy or sustain his desire, Will's untenable
mythical urgencies finally give way to an Arboreal yearning for a condition of
neutrality that pre-exists desire itself. And it is with this in mind that we approach the
final section of the tale, 'Death'.
'Death'
Will o' the Mill is a narrative whose forward movement (remembering Fielding's
remarks on The Master of Ballantrae) is accompanied by a backward one. This
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backward movement, as suggested, pertains mostly to Will's regression into an
Arboreal condition that pre-exists desire, more of which will be said in due course.
But it also pertains to the narrative structure, its content and setting. The section
'Death' begins with an elliptical description of the passing of time as it has occurred
in the anticlimactic aftermath ofWill's liaisons with Marjory. In doing so, it makes
an important distinction between the former locus of Will's aspirations, the plain,
and the habitat within which he remains a constant feature, the falling valley. This
distinction is not only important for what it says ofWill's final withdrawal. It is the
decisive juxtapositioning of contingent settings which, having previously occupied a
collateral teleology (through the environmental metaphor of all things tending in one
direction), have become polarised into unconnected scenes of urban chaos and rural
degeneration. Of the cities it is said:
Year after year went away into nothing, with great explosions and
outcries in the cities on the plain; red revolt springing up and being
suppressed in blood, battle swaying hither and thither, patient
astronomers in observatory towers picking out and christening new stars,
plays being performed in lighted theatres, people being carried into
hospitals on stretchers, and all the usual turmoil and agitation of men's
lives in crowded centres, (p. 195)
Put at a distance from Will, the cities retain a libidinal urgency. They each represent,
however, a self-contained libidinal flux that precipitates violence, rather than
renewal, with each perpetuating an aimless, disposable cultural and political activity
that, in the passing years, 'went away into nothing'. The 'crowded centres' of the
cities, moreover, seem inversely proportionate to the cities as we had seen them
connected by the umbilical bond of the river. There is not one but many centres, each
confined to its own frenetic space. No longer parts of a collateral teleology, these
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cities seem to incorporate the revolutionary turmoil of nineteenth-century continental
Europe, emphasising the collapse of the ancien regime and the ascendancy of a
modern epoch of urban life. We appear, then, to be reaching a part of the core of the
work in which we discover, not an archetypal correlation, but a historical and cultural
realisation of civic depravity and unrest, of a kind that was contemporaneous with
Stevenson and which he would later explore in Jekyll and Hyde.
In contrast, the falling valley is placed outside of any historical or cultural
context. It occupies instead a kind of vacuum of presence, representing a different
kind of dysteleology: it is timeless, remote, almost absent, having no direction within
or outside of itself, a wilderness, only, ofArboreal motions:
Up in Will's valley only the wind and seasons made an epoch; the fish
hung in the swift stream, the birds circled overhead, the pine-tops rustled
underneath the stars, the tall hills stood over all; and Will went to and fro,
minding his wayside inn, until the snow began to thicken on his head,
(p. 195)
If the cities represent the dysteleological passage of desire through time, the falling
valley, in its detachment from the urban centres, is immersed in a kind of
dysteleological ambience that pre-exists the mobility of desire. In this sense, Will
(appearing as an extension of his environment) is put at a pre-libidinal distance from
the meaningless, libidinal discord of the plain.
Prior to desire, nothing is desirable - not even life. Thus, forWill, the natural
consequence of a state of undesiring is a virtual death. When offered the chance of
journeying into the plain, Will responds:
You come too late... I am a dead man now: I have lived and died already.
Fifty years ago you would have brought my heart into my mouth; and
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now you do not even tempt me. But that is the object of long living, that
man should cease to care about life. (p. 196)
The paradoxical manipulation of logical criteria - being dead whilst living, living
long so as to cease to care about life - signals the regression of the narrative upon an
Arboreal singularity which is conclusively revealed when Will's virtual death
becomes an actual one.
In his actual death, Will, like the soldiers marching to their death at the
beginning of the story, enters a vanishing point of narrative. Unlike the soldiers,
Will's departure is prolonged, not sudden, partly described, rather than undescribed;
and, in fact, describes a phase of Will's experience which, strictly speaking, cannot
be described. Similarly, Will's transition from virtual to actual death is anti-
climactic, painless and unspectacular - anything but an apotheosis or exaltation of
heroic deeds. It begins with phantasmagoric recollections of past and present
acquaintances and scenes, where the real and the unreal, the literal and the
imaginary, become no longer distinguishable as separate categories of Will's
experience:
The dead themselves were with him, not merely taking part in this thin
show of memory that defiled before his brain, but revisiting his bodily
senses as they do in profound and vivid dreams.... But about the middle
of the night he was startled by the voice of the dead miller calling to him
out of the house as he used to do on the arrival of custom. The
hallucination was so perfect that Will sprang from his seat and stood
listening for the summons to be repeated; and as he listened he became
conscious of another noise besides the brawling of the river and the
ringing in his feverish ears. It was like the stir of the horses and the
creaking of harness, as though a carriage with an impatient team had
been brought up upon the road before the courtyard gate. (p. 196 - 197)
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As with Will, the narrative itself is impacting upon an emergent singularity, no
longer sure of the validity of that which it describes, no longer capable, in being
channelled entirely through Will's point of view, of giving us omniscient, elliptical
summaries. As a summary of events, the text, as it were, has become only partly
visible, having been infiltrated by invisible aspects of narrative - by ghosts, dreams,
hallucinations; and there is a sense in which, as the story comes to an end, it is
undergoing a transition from visible to invisible status. Structurally, meanwhile, the
text becomes a material embodiment of the untranslatable phase of narration it
attempts to convey so that, on reaching the interior of the work, there is no
anagogical correspondence between the text and the referential anchorage of the
Logos, but only the perforating absence of any logical foundation.
The present \ absent combinations of characters and scenes culminate in the
arrival of a gentleman traveller, Death, who is presented in terms which are wholly
undecidable: '...[Will] tried in vain to turn the light into his face; either he handled
the lamp clumsily, or there was a dimness over his eyes; but he could make out little
more than a shadow at table with him' (p. 199). Significantly, Stevenson resists a
transcendental or transfigurative death in that, as Death tells Will, 'I am a natural
law... and people call me Death'(p. 201). In Will o' the Mill, the archetype of death
as an apotheosis is superseded by the Arboreal priority of death as a law of nature -
not an apocalyptic crescendo, but a biological eventuality, a consequence of entropy
in the existing life form. And yet, it is by passing 'backwards' through the
unintelligible phase of death that Will's desire, having been denied its journey in life,
re-emerges as a journey into afterlife.
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Will o' the Mill began with the prospect of a journey and, in this sense,
seemed certain to follow the conventions of romance. As we have seen, however, the
joumey-motif has been invoked if only to be invalidated within the context ofWill's
narratable experience. Having impacted upon the Arboreal singularity of death, the
prospect of the journey presents itself for a second time: 'God knows I am tired
enough of it all; and when the times comes for a longer journey than ever you dream
of, I reckon I shall find myself prepared'. Death's response is final: 'The time has
come!' (p. 200). But if a journey is imminent, it is immanent through death, and can
only be made 'intelligible' within the context of an invisible textuality, outside of
Will's narratable (or 'conscious') experience. Will's desire, in other words, can only
be expressed and met, and an Arboreal vitality issued and received, outside the
material frontiers of language, beyond the constraints of a visible stmcture which
cannot contain or convey its 'illogical tendencies'. Hence, the journey begins where
the narrative ends: '... when the world rose the next morning, sure enough Will o' the
Mill had gone at last upon his travels' (p. 201). The fact that the journey begins
where the narrative ends emphasises the pre-structurality of Will o' the Mill: it is a
narrative that cannot accommodate the Arboreal impulse which occasioned its
formation and, in attempting to do so, can only describe the fact that it must close
prior to describing what it seeks to describe.
A Summary
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The distinction between Frye's interpretation of the journey motif and Stevenson's
'adaptation' of it is a telling point of departure between Frye's summary of
conventional romance and Stevenson's development of romance as a modern idiom.
By way of summarising Will o' the Mill, then, it would be useful to refer to an essay
by Frye which deals specifically with the journey motif in order to demonstrate the
full extent ofWill o' theMill's inversion of conventional structure.
Frye's interpretation of the quest motif is founded, not unreasonably, on the
principle of the journey as metaphor, which is as much as to say that the quest is
capable of symbolic, allegorical, mythical or anagogic expansion in ways already
described. The journey as metaphor is not so much a matter open to authorial choice
as a matter of course, a hermeneutic necessity. Frye dedicates an entire essay to the
subject, called, appropriately enough, 'The Journey as Metaphor', in which he
summarises the concept of the journey as a metaphor for life:
Journey is a word connected with jour and journee [French words for
"day"], and metaphorical journeys, deriving as they mostly do from
slower methods of getting around, usually have at their core the
conception of the day's journey, the amount of space we can cover under
the cycle of the sun. By a very easy extension we get the day's journey as
a further, perhaps more concentrated, metaphor for the whole of life, life
being thought of as a cyclical process ofbirth, death, and renewed life.8
In literary structure, the metaphor of the journey finds its most amplified expression
in romance, says Frye, although he is quick to indicate the position of romance as a
secondary extension ofmyth:
A journey is a movement from here to there, from point A to point B, and
as a metaphor for life the two points are obviously birth and death. But
this is true only of the individual: the containing way or direction is
cyclical. When the cyclical movement enters the individual life, we have
the form of journey we call the quest, where a hero goes out to
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accomplish something, kill a dragon, deliver a heroine from a giant, help
destroy a hostile city, or what not. The hero of the quest first of all goes
"away": that is, there must be some direction for his movement. Home,
as Eliot says, is where one starts from. If the quest is successful, he
normally returns home, like a baseball player, the great model for this
returning journey being of course the Odyssey ... The genuine quest-cycle
is of the type in which the conclusion is the starting point renewed and
transformed by the quest itself.9
Whether or not we agree with Frye's interpretation, it is difficult to imagine the
journey / quest motif as anything less than potentially metaphorical, difficult, that is,
to reflect on any given example that is autonomous in the absolute sense of being
narratorially exclusive, confined to literality or restricted to some kind of private
level of signification. Within any given narrative, the quest transcends its local
circumstance and becomes imbued with symbolic resonances which exceed the
limitations of its literal environment. Metaphorically expanded, it forms a structural
and semantic totality across an abundance of narratives which are otherwise
historically, culturally and materially distinct.
Or so it would seem. With Will o' the Mill, however, the journey is not a
metaphor for life, but an undisclosed and inaccessible 'metaphor' for death.
Principally - and this is the crux of the matter - Will is a narrative that invokes the
journey motif as an ulterior effect of its visible duration, as something which is
generated but which remains outside of the text and which makes itself unavailable
to any interpretative or hermeneutic procedure. Consequently, Will o' the Mill
deactivates the structural and semantic integrity of the journey as metaphor. It is a
text which, by employing some of the principles and positions expressed by
Stevenson in his theoretical essays, effects the disassociation of Will from any
archetypal correlation and, this way, reduces the metaphorical potential of the
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journey to a private level of signification. Without a visible journey-structure, there
is no way of configuring Will's attachment to a secondary stage of communication,
no way of validating the metaphorical correspondences between it and other texts. It
is the absence of the journey as a narratable event that, finally and dramatically,
reduces Will o' the Mill from organic totality to inorganic separation.
Situating the journey as an ulterior effect, Stevenson has comprehensively
extrapolated the archetypal interior of his narrative and positioned it on the outside of
his text. The extra-positioning of archetypes as signatory headings is paralleled by
the extra-positioning of archetypes from within the story's structural 'core' itself.
Previously, we drew attention to the fact that, while Will o' the Mill appeared
structurally coherent on the outside, it remained to be seen whether it was
structurally coherent on the inside. Clearly, it is not. In the first instance, there has
been no durational teleology, involving the disclosure of archetypal stages via the
quest. There has been no spatial teleology, culminating in the climactic moment of
vision, triumph or marriage. The anticipated archetypes are envisaged but,
ultimately, evaporated, as the narrative continually retreats into a pre-structural
singularity that precedes and exceeds its event as a conventional structure. It can be
said of Will o' the Mill that, in removing the mythopoeic formula from the context of
romance, it has paved the way for the Arboreal transformation of romance. It has
theorised and made possible those anomalies which we have explored in Jekyll and
Hyde and The Master, creating the conditions that allow for romance as a modem
idiom.
On one level, then, that of the elimination of the mythopoeic formula, Will o'
the Mill works as a metaphor for the failure ofmetaphor, showing how the archetype
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of 'renewed life' cannot be accessed through the inadequate means of a visible
structure. Just as the 'renewed life' cannot be experienced within the context of life,
so it cannot be literalised within the context of narrative. In illustrating this, Will has
caused some confusion among its recipients, having been accepted for publication,
Roger Swearingem explains, 'with reservations about the story's indeterminate
hovering between realism and allegory'.10 What is regarded, rather sheepishly, as
'realism' by the publishers is really the refusal of Will to enter into the structural
determinations of the traditional romance and to admit, instead, an indeterminacy
which, far from being some kind of unresolved flaw, is rather a 'description' of the
metaphorical vacuum at the core of allegory. It is, precisely, an indeterminacy arising
from an extrusion of conventional elements which are always placed at an
unconquerable distance from the thought of the Logos they are meant to represent;
and, finally, it is an indeterminacy that enables Stevenson to describe the inversion of
Will upon a point of singularity that enables, in turn, the unintelligible fruition of the
Arboreal impulse - not its admission and recovery as a visible or narratable presence,
but its admission and recovery as an ulterior effect of narrative.
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Chapter Six
The 'Mobile Nature at Our Feet': The Ebb-Tide
Written at the end of Stevenson's career, The Ebb-Tide seems as far away
generically, as well as chronologically, from Will o' the Mill as we could get. If Will
presents itself as a fable or folk tale, lying nearer a mythical fundament which it
progressively rejects, The Ebb-Tide 'displaces' any such mythical relations, replacing
them with a mimetic rigour that immediately distances the story from any
mythopoeic site of origins. Like Will, the opening sentence of The Ebb-Tide appears
as a declaration of generic intent; though, this time, the mythical overtones of Will
are supplanted by factual data that range from the geographic to the social to the
biological: 'Throughout the island world of the Pacific, scattered men of many
European races and from almost every grade of society carry activity and
disseminate disease' (p. 173). The definite location in time and space,
contemporaneous with Stevenson's own lifetime, presents an absolute contrast to the
timeless pastoral exuberance of Will. And while the latter begins by asserting a
teleological agenda which it continually refutes, The Ebb-Tide appears to do the
opposite in asserting a fragmentary world of islands, men and diseases which, in
being focused on 'the tiny pagan city' (p. 173) of Papeete, is at once disassociated
from any western metaphysical context. Similarly, in being clustered around 'the
disorder ofmerchandise', it is a world of dysteleological squalor empowered by the
dynamic of colonialism which, far from expressing any mythical values, is
empowered, in turn, by commercial exploitation and material greed, the excesses of
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which are bound to produce a surplus of vagrants such as 'the three most miserable
English-speaking creatures in the whole of Tahiti' (p. 174), Herrick, Davis and
Huish.
Having said this, The Ebb-Tide reverses the initial premise of dysteleological
squalor by incorporating the teleological orientations of the quest scenario and, to
this extent, corresponds to the structure of romance in a way that Will does not. The
contrast, then, is a strange one: where Will evokes a mythopoeic structure, it never
engages one; while The Ebb-Tide, which appears far from mythopoeic, does.
However, if The Ebb-Tide stands opposite Will o' the Mill by visibly admitting the
quest structure, its development of that structure as a mythical analogue is one that
renders it, not only unsustainable, but ideologically unsound.
In her introduction to the The Ebb-Tide, Jenni Calder characterises the story
as an exploration of 'what happens when men are deprived of a moral framework'.1
The consequences of this are an attempt by 'the trio' to deliver themselves from their
economic and social depravity which, in Herrick's case, is accompanied by an
attempt to restore to his life a moral framework through which he is able to acquire
his moral salvation. Will o' the Mill, we recall, took us further away from any such
model. In The Ebb-Tide, Stevenson reverses the process and confronts the possibility
of allowing a narrative to form around the recovery of a structural model of
apocalyptic renewal. But it is, precisely, through this manoeuvre that Stevenson
rather tests the efficacy of the redemptive quest by placing it within the context of a
corrupt colonial underworld where the manifestation of apocalyptic values proves an
impossible requirement of the story's literal contingencies. In Will, the trans-
historical structure of romance is placed at an unconquerable distance from the
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actuality of Will's experience and superseded by an Arboreal singularity. In The
Ebb-Tide, the trans-historical structure of romance is restricted to a level of historical
and cultural locality within which the mythical associations of structure, and their
inherent moral values, cannot be actualised or literalised, but only revealed as
damaging illusions, not least in the sense that they can be used to legitimise the
activities of a ruthless imperialist like Attwater.
In The Ebb-Tide, meanwhile, Stevenson resists the allure of the Arboreal
impulse as we have seen it in The Master and Jekyll and Hyde. Instead, it is theorised
on the basis of preceding and superseding the antithetical standards ofmorality, law
and religion particular to a Victorian ethos, where the revelation of the primitive
interior of civilised man is not in itself destructive. It is charged, rather, with the
Arboreal vitality of preserving life for life's sake, regardless of the moral
consequences; which means that, in Herrick's case, it is the illusory moral
framework which he aspires to that, when imposed against his basic drives, proves
destructive. Jenni Calder observes, accurately, that 'Herrick, and to a lesser extent
Captain Davis, retain some degree of moral sensibility, although self-preservation
dominates'.2 I wish to go further by suggesting that self-preservation not only
dominates but, eventually, obliterates Herrick's moral sensibilities; and to such an
extent that he is able to acquire the 'redemption' he craves - though under terms
which are Darwinian rather than mythical.
The Trio
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There is, in the section heading 'The Trio', something of a mythical irony respecting
the unholy trinity of Herrick, Davis and Huish to whom it refers. And this is
indicative of the tone of the occasional mythical references in The Ebb-Tide: they are
not to be taken as symbolic abstractions of the universe of archetypes, but as
allusions only which are devoid of any metaphorical content. These allusions are
arbitrary, pertaining less to a transliteral bond of archetypes than to a private level of
signification contained within the narrative's historical and cultural scope. The
Virgilian chorus so often relied upon by Herrick in his moments of despair no longer
refers to the ancient creeds of lost civilisations, but to the imperial heartland of
modem England and the Etonian splendours of Herrick's youth:
...visions of England at least would throng upon the exile's memory: the
busy schoolroom, the green playing-fields, holidays at home, and the
perennial roar of London, and the fireside, and the white head of his
father. For it is the destiny of those grave, restrained, and classic writers,
with whom we make enforced and often painful acquaintanceship at
school, to pass into the blood and become native to the memory; so that a
phrase of Virgil speaks not so much of Mantua or Augustus, but of
English places and the student's own irrevocable youth, (pp 174-175)
The dislocation of the significative values ofmyth in The Ebb-Tide is paralleled by a
dislocation of values in general - by deceptions, lies, masquerades, humiliations,
fantasies, all of which are compounded or made necessary by the poverty, illness and
starvation of the protagonists. Each of the trio have been 'shamed into the adoption
of an alias' (p. 174). In being linguistically unaccountable they are also ontologically
so, having adopted signs without the efficacy of the presences they refer to: 'they
knew next to nothing of each other, not even their tme names' (p. 174). The act of
writing is devalued by the letters they write to their families back home, the values of
which are negligible anyway because they remain unsent. But to write them, at least,
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is considered by Davis as a matter of sound moral policy: 'it may be hard to write,
and to write lies at that; and God knows it is; but it's the square thing... and if you
don't I'll tell you what I think it is -1 think it's about the high-water mark of being a
brute beast' (p. 189). That Herrick's refusal to prevaricate bogus reassurances is
construed by Davis as a species of depravity is indicative of the extent to which the
moral efforts of the characters have become detached from any fixed standard.
Davis' outrage at the gross exaggerations of Huish's letter stresses the point. '
"That's what you did with the paper that I went and begged for you?" he roared' - as
if to imply that there a certain standards to be observed within the boundaries of their
dishonesty where, in a relative sense, one mode of lying is more honest than another.
The referential status of The Ebb-Tide is as volatile as the world it describes,
with neither the mythical evocations of Virgil nor the moral pretensions of the
protagonists having any absolute value.3 In The Ebb-Tide, such values are unfixed
and purely relative, or else devoid of meaning altogether. They are regularly
displaced and reasserted according to the expediencies with which the 'three sops of
humanity' (p. 183) are faced, not least by Herrick who, in being a man 'of kindly
virtues' (p. 174), is desperate to maintain a fixed standard of self-worth - though the
attempt proves unsustainable in view of his emergent needs. When Davis performs
an impromptu jig in begging for breakfast, 'Herrick looked on heavy-eyed, hunger
for that moment conquering all sense of shame...' (p. 185). In the throes of hunger,
all sense of morality is deposed. It is only after Herrick has eaten that he is able to
remonstrate with himself as regards the unacceptable lows to which he has stooped: '
"I can't beg!" he screamed, and again threw himself prone' (p. 188). As Calder
points out: 'Herrick still relates himself to Victorian England and his respectable
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background', an environment from which 'he cannot liberate himself.4 He retains, in
other words, a moral framework appropriate to England but unworkable within the
context, as Nicholas Rankin calls it, of 'the rough edge ofEmpire'.5
While The Ebb-Tide explores what happens to men when they are without a
moral framework, it also reminds us that such a framework can only be sustained
under favourable conditions of economic and social stability. In The Ebb-Tide,
morality issues, not from any metaphysical source, but from the individual in relation
to his material assets. (Attwater, we notice, is able to maintain a puritanical standard
of religious devotion, a fact not inconsistent with his command of the pearl industry).
Herrick, of course, has no material resources upon which he can rely and is
compelled to inhabit a moral vacuum. He is forced to confront the absence of values
pertaining, not only to his material situation, but to himself. In the letter intended for
his sweetheart, he asks: 'I have always unceasingly loved, but what's my love worth?
And what was I worth?'(p. 190). Herrick's sense of worthlessness is the catalyst for
his suicide which, under the standards he has retained, becomes the only 'moral'
option open to him. But there is a sense in which, from the surge of vanity felt in
writing his mock Virgilian epitaph, Herrick has recovered something of worth in
recognising that 'it was the bare sense ofhis existence prompted him; the sense ofhis
life, the one thing wonderful, to which he scare clung with a finger' (p. 194). Brought
to its minimal point, the bare sense of existence is morally void, possessing a value
which precludes the moral arguments ofwhether or not he should prolong his life. As
such, Herrick discovers an underlying desire for existence as the only 'value' upon
which his existence rests. At this stage, however, it is a discovery that cannot be
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reconciled with his insistence on retaining a moral value-system which is
incompatible with his needs.
The tension between an assertion of moral values and the bare sense of
existence that precedes them is extended throughout the story's structure which, on
assuming the form of the redemptive quest, begins from a position of Arboreal
priority that prohibits its mythopoeic expansion. It is a structure, moreover, already
infected with the arbitrariness of the values it relies on. The quest itself - initiated
under circumstances of economic and, ultimately, biological necessity - is dependent
on an act of colonial transgression. Values, again, are manipulated to suit the
circumstances at hand as Davis side-steps the dubieties of their action with
arguments concerning the welfare of his wife and kids: 'What matter laws, and God,
and that? My folks are hard up, I belong to them. I'll get them bread or, by God! I'll
get them wealth if I have to burn down London for it' (p. 199). Herrick, meanwhile,
complies after accepting the possibility of returning home with his dignity intact,
having initially felt that 'We could never do that' (p. 200). Davis's rejoinder is
compelling: ' "We could," said the other. "Captain Brown couldn't, nor Mr Hay, that
shipped mate with him couldn't. But what's that got to do with Captain Davis or Mr
Herrick, you galoot?" '(p. 200). The opportunity of restoring his individual worth (by
restoring his name) is irresistible to Herrick, in spite of the fact that it can only be
achieved at the expense of committing a robbery which had appalled him to the point
of preferring 'a few strokes in the lagoon - and rest' (p. 199). Before it has started,
the redemptive quest is reliant on an act of deception, and the desire for salvation
upon a theft, with Davis insisting that, if they 'sell that liquor off at the pier-head,
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and the schooner after that' (p. 198), Herrick will 'go home (as like as not) a
millionaire' (p. 200).
The beginning of the quest, through a sudden proliferation of symbolic
innuendoes, augurs badly. The Farallone, 'flaunting the plague-flag as she rolled', is
a 'forbidden ship' (p. 202), still smitten by 'the effects of the dead men' (p. 203).
Performing the same function in The Ebb-Tide as the tangent metaphors in Will o'
theMill, The Farallone is a symbolic exterior of the internal frailties of the crew who
will sail her; though it is true that, having obtained the Farallone, Herrick, Davis and
Huish have been mythically upgraded from the inglorious status of 'three sops of
humanity' to the glorious one of 'co-adventurers' (p. 203). The status, however, is a
false one, and is seen as such almost immediately. Herrick is so unnerved by the
prospect of addressing the crew for the first time that 'he racked his brain, and
overhauled his reminiscences of sea romances for some appropriate words' (p. 205).
Herrick is a fraud and the adventure, already, a sham, a fact born out by his response
to the captain's command of 'Mr Hay, we'll up anchor, if you please': ' "For
heaven's sake, tell me some of the words," ' whispered Herrick' (p. 200). Without
the legitimate linguistic resources, Herrick is unable to facilitate his role as an
adventurous seaman and, to this extent, is epistemologically estranged from the
archetypal designations of the mythical quest. The journey notwithstanding, Herrick
begins from a position of pre-structurality which precludes his entry into the
mythopoeic formula.
Far from inhabiting a conventional model, The Ebb-Tide continues to emerge
from a welter of falsehoods and deceptions. For Herrick, the matter is brought to a
head when, presented with a spread of delicious foods, he is forced to consider with
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compunction the terms by which they have undertaken their journey. Accordingly,
the food becomes a test of his moral resolve against the Arboreal priority that
underlies it:
It was impossible after these months of hopeless want to smell the rough,
high-spiced sea victuals without lust, and his mouth watered with desire
of the champagne. It was no less impossible... not to perceive, with
sudden bluntness, the gulf where he had fallen. He was a thief among
thieves. He said it to himself. He could not touch the soup. If he had
moved at all, it must have been to leave the table, throw himself
overboard, and drown - an honest man. (pp. 209 - 210)
In the end, it is a futile resistance to 'the bare sense of his existence' which precedes
his moral reasoning, the value ofwhich he rejoices in with repeated exclamations, we
notice, concerning its 'worth':
'It's too late to hesitate,' he thought; his hand took the mug instinctively;
he drank, with unquenchable pleasure and desire of more; drained the
vessel dry, and set it down with sparkling eyes.
'There is something in life after all!' he cried. 'I had forgot what it was
like. Yes, even this is worth while. Wine, food, dry cloths - why, they're
worth dying for, worth hanging for! Captain tell me one thing,: why
aren't all the poor folk foot-pads? ' (p. 210)
Paradoxically, however, the acquisition of food and material comforts enables
Herrick to reconstruct a moral framework (and, with it, a sense of guilt proportionate
to his present course of action) of a kind that was impossible to sustain under the
constraints of basic needs. As he admits to Davis: 'Another week and I'd have
murdered some one for a dollar. God! And I know that? And I'm still living?' (p.
210). And, to this extent, Herrick has arrived at a moral impasse. By partaking of ill-
gotten gains and growing in strength, Herrick is able to assert values which are
grounded, precisely, in the acquisition of ill-gotten gains. It is the clearest insight yet
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into that which Herrick refuses to acknowledge - that, in The Ebb-Tide, morality has
no transcendental or metaphysical value, but only an illusory one which is
completely relative to biological and material conditions. Herrick, instead, continues
to judge himself according to a logic of morality that requires his death or
condemnation, having now become fully complicit in the transgressive action of
stealing a boat and its valuable cargo. Any prospect of renewal, he knows, has been
denied in advance, though it is a prospect which he continues (with some success) to
project upon his situation. But if a mythopoeic formula is allowed to form, it must
always be from a position of having already been invalidated, so that Herrick's
reassertion of moral values, as we shall see, can only intensify, rather than resolve,
his moral impasse.
Having reached this impasse, Herrick determines to sacrifice his moral for his
economic salvation, seeing nothing for it but 'to carry through this business if it
might be carried; pluck profit out of shame, since shame at least was now
inevitable...'(p. 213). But, as if to compensate for his moral losses, Herrick's
determination to see the business through is quickly superseded by the more virtuous
aim of recovering Emma, his former lover: 'all stirred him to the roots of his
manhood. "I will win her,' he thought, and ground his teeth. 'Fair or foul, what
matters if I win her?" ' (p. 214). The resolution is an impressive one, although, in
Emma, he has assigned himself an object of attainment which he has already failed to
attain. Through his friendship with the Kanakas, however, Herrick acquires a refuge
from his moral impasse and, through their influence and good will, the moral stamina
to pursue his resolution: 'The fact that he was held in grateful favour by these
innocents served like blinders to his conscience, and there were times when he was
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inclined, with Sally Day, to call himself a good man' (p. 218). A fuller entry into the
conventions of the redemptive quest now seems possible, whereby Herrick, though
painfully conscious of his own guilt and alarmed at 'the doom that seemed to brood
upon the schooner', has nevertheless acquired a sense of purpose and resourcefulness
that, because unproven, might best be described as quasi-heroic:
He who had proved his incapacity in so many fields, being now falsely
placed amid duties which he did not understand, without help, and it
might be said without countenance, had hitherto surpassed expectation;
and even the shameful misconduct and shocking disclosures of that night
seemed but to nerve and strengthen him. (p. 220)
With this, Stevenson has formed the crux of a conventional structure, according to
which Herrick, though aware of his illegitimacy, is able to invest in the world, and to
a lesser extent in himself, a range of conventional values. He has asserted an object
of renewal in the figure of his former sweetheart, Emma; he has enlisted the help of
the agents of good in the form of the Kanakas; and he has been forced to contend
with Davis and Huish as the obstacles set against him in his attempt to re-enter the
world from which he has fallen. There is even a sense in which Herrick is able to
assume the role of a redeemer figure capable, in the case of Davis, of converting the
forces of evil to those of good: 'Herrick, if you see me put a glass to my lips again
till we're ashore, I give you leave to put a bullet through me; I beg you to it!' (p.
224).
If a design-formation has been asserted by Herrick, then it is bound to be
unstable, given that the values he has assigned to it, in coming from him, are as
illegitimate as he is. Herrick's awareness of this means that the teleological
orientations of the quest remain firmly planted in the dysteleological fluctuations of
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his conscience. As much is revealed when he is called upon to respond to the
approaching squall. Rather than compelling him to act as becomes the hero of a 'sea
romance', the squall compels him to a state of suicidal inaction: 'The greatness of the
peril and his own alarm sufficed to silence him. Pride, wrath, and shame raged
without issue in his mind; and he shut his teeth and folded his arms close' (p. 221).
Pride, wrath and shame contend for Herrick's character so that, having consolidated
the forces of 'good' around himself, the captain and the Kanakas, he proves unable to
consolidate the discrepancies within himself. His outburst against Huish - 'I hope I
shall die very soon; but I have not the least objection to killing you before I go (p.
233) - attests not only to his wrath, but to the prevalence of his shame which, via the
hope 'to die very soon', attests, in turn, to his despair of himself as a worthless fraud.
As such, his redemptive powers are always already infected at root, albeit the effect
of his shame perversely sustains him and, because it makes him careless of life, gives
him the courage to act wrathfully, as his confrontation with Huish proves. That his
shame sustains his moral courage at the same time as undermining it emphasises the
paradox upon which the structure of the quest in The Ebb-Tide is founded, where the
formulation of a dialectical structure becomes, as it were, 'an impossible
requirement'. There can be no distribution of archetypal values while Herrick
perseveres in accomplishing the crime upon which he has embarked; and, especially
so, where he is quick to reprimand Captain Davis, not only for his debauchery, but
for 'stealing my profits and drinking my champagne that I gave my honour for?' (p.
224).
The complexities of Herrick's tortuous moral exertions, his Existential
stupors, his suicidal bouts, are the ingredients of a remarkable character and a far
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more alluring portrait of disrupted personality than, as Calder suggests, 'the
straightforward duality'6 ofJekyll and Hyde. It is remarkable too, in view of this, that
Herrick succeeds in restoring order where disorder has reigned. He has almost
succeeded, even, in realigning the disorientated aims of their journey with the
structural aims of the conventional romance. The order, however, is fleeting and
eradicable, and the projection of conventional values an illusion which cannot be
sustained in a world of colonial racketeering.
If the teleological aims of the quest have been reasserted, they simultaneously
descend into randomness following the discovery of the non-existent cargo of
champagne. In The Ebb-Tide, deception emerges from deception, so much so that the
'quest' has been founded, not on the deception of the main characters, but on one
which has preceded theirs'. With the discovery of the bogus champagne comes the
realisation that 'Wiseman and Wishart were to be paid for casting away this old
schooner and its cargo' (p. 229) as accessories to an insurance fraud. One deception
quickly gives way to another as Davis realigns the aims of their quest through the
idea of taking up the insurance scam from where their predecessors left off: 'Down
goes the Farallone, and good-bye to her!... the Consul packs us home, at Uncle
Sam's expense, to 'Frisco; and if that merchant don't put the dollars down, you come
to me!' (p. 230). This secondary realignment, however, has been pre-emptively
thwarted by Davis's debauchery and subsequent failure to 'keep the run of the stores'
(p. 231). Again suspended, the journey has become an indeterminate flux.
Supposedly bound for Sydney, the outcasts selected Peru instead. When Peru is
negated, they aim for 'Frisco via Samoa. Samoa is out of the question because of the
inadequate supplies, which means that 'Frisco', the ultimate terminus, is also
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excluded. This way, the projected aims of the quest are progressively cancelled and,
finally, rendered aimless by the invulnerable obstacle set against it - not demonic
evil, but necessity. Under the constraints of the need for self-preservation, the
journey they have undertaken will not coincide with the conventional aims of
renewal which they have ascribed to it. And while it is their belief, upon the
fortuitous discovery of Attwater's island, that they may 'fill up with fish, and
coconuts, and native stuff, and carry out the Samoa scheme hand over fist' (p. 235),
it is rather the case that this, too, is a deception. When a destination emerges, it is a
highly uncertain one and one which, from its uncertified status in Findlay's directory,
is epistemologically unaccountable:
New Island. According to M. Delille this island, which from private
interests would remain unknown, lies, it is said, in lat. 12° 49' 10" S.,
long. 133° 6' W. In addition to the position above given, Commander
Matthews, H. M. S. Scorpion, states that an island exists in lat. 12° o' S.,
long. 133° 16' W. This must be the same, if such an island exists, which
is very doubtful, and totally disbelieved by South Sea traders, (p. 235)
Impacting on Attwater's island, the 'quest' becomes one of unintelligible
consequence. And, while the suggestion abounds of an available boon in the prospect
of pearls, it is also the case that this is a 'pearling island the government don't know
about' (p. 245). This island appears as a transgressor's paradise where no laws, no
standards need apply: it lies outside the constraints of Herrick's England. And, yet,
through the figure of Attwater the tension between traditional values and the bare
sense of existence is finally brought to a head, with varying results for each of the
characters - none ofwhich conform to the mythopoeic formula.
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The Quartet
'Attwater's island', says Vennessa Smith, 'is a place replete with poetic
possibilities... and metaphoric abundance'.7 On reaching it, Herrick seems to have
discovered an apocalyptic solace from his present dilemma. As he approaches the
shore, 'a sense of the eternal weighed on his mind' (p. 236). The impression is
furthered by the mythical imagery of the arrival of dawn where 'the hollow of
heaven was filled with daylight' (p. 236); and, likewise, by the almost religious awe
with which Herrick regards the scene: 'The isle - the undiscovered, the scarce-
believed in - now lay before them and close aboard; and Herrick thought that never
in his dreams had he beheld anything more strange and delicate' (p. 236). Touched
by an apocalyptic reverence for the island, Herrick seems to have transcended his
world of biological and material dependencies:
Herrick stood transported. In the gratified lust of his eye he forgot the
past and the present; forgot that he was menaced by a prison on the one
hand and starvation on the other; forgot that he was come to an island,
desperately foraging, clutching at expedients, (p. 238)
Appearing to Herrick as an 'exotic paradise', Jenni Calder observes, the island is
o
'full of all the tempting ingredients of a restorative, unspoilt escape'. But Herrick is
deceived and his impressions founded on illusory mythical values, which are
revealed as such when 'suddenly the curtain was raised' and they 'beheld, with an
astonishment beyond words, the roofs of men' (p. 239). The feeling of having
transcended the world of his delinquency is removed from Herrick by symbolic
indications both of his homeland, through the 'flagstaff at the pier-head' on which
'the red ensign of England was displayed', and its moral institutions, through the
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'building with a belfry' which 'might be thought to mark it out for a chapel' (p. 239).
It appears, then, that the island presents, not the opposite of England, but England in
miniature, and that the standards implicating Herrick's delinquency have been
zealously preserved here.
This, however, is another deception. For it is rather the case that the standards
of Herrick's England, and especially those of religious significance, have been
appropriated by men like Attwater in order to serve the distorted aims of the imperial
conquest. The values thus derived from a western metaphysical context are seen to
be relatively associated with the unethical transactions of a 'real, first-rate, copper-
bottomed aristocrat' (p. 246). Not so much referring to a mythical site of origins,
they are limited to a historical and cultural locality, sustained only as illusions by
Attwater as a means through which he is able to exploit the natives, to the overall
effect of extorting a 'moderate fortune' (p. 259). And where Herrick as yet retains a
precarious faith in the possibility of mythical redemption (as his initial response to
the island suggests), his meeting with Attwater compels him, as we shall see, to
admit the bogus nature both of the values he aspires to and the mythical means of
redemption he craves.
Attwater is close to admitting his appropriation of Christian values when
explaining to Herrick that '...I have had a business, and a colony, and a mission of
my own. I was a man of the world before I was a Christian; I'm a man of the world
still, and I made my mission pay' (p. 253). Attwater's rhetoric is such that the aims
of religion and imperialism (or myth and materialism) cannot be separated. His
religious beliefs, whether or not they are delivered in earnest, cannot be regarded, in
practice, as anything other than devices employed for the accumulation of wealth.
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And, while they give to Attwater an aura of apocalyptic wrath, it is impossible to
qualify his mythical status when it is immured in the literal activities of what Davis
has accurately described as 'this racket of Mr Attwater's' (p. 246). Indeed, in his
ambiguous remark to Herrick, that 'I am a plain and very literal man' (p. 259),
Attwater seems to emphasise that he is nothing more or less than his literal
appearance suggests. Not so much as a 'dark apostle' (p. 256), it is through his
possession of firearms, his size and his aptitude for armed combat that he has been
able to exert his invulnerable superiority.9
The inconsistencies of Attwater's character - his 'uncompromising pursuit of
his own interests', his 'religious zeal' (p. 252) - have an immensely confusing effect
on Herrick: 'Attwater intrigued, puzzled, dazzled, enchanted and revolted him'
(p.256). By the end of their 'Better Acquaintance', however, his confusion gives way
to more stupefying mortal dread, whereby he begins to liken Attwater to a symbolic
embodiment of apocalyptic retribution:
The object of his terror had become suddenly inverted; till then he had
seen Attwater trussed and gagged, a help less victim, and had longed to
run in and save him; he saw him now tower up mysterious and menacing,
the angel of the Lord's wrath, armed with knowledge and threatening
judgement, (p. 260)
Herrick's fear is aroused in equal measure with his guilt, upon which Attwater has
the profoundest effect, not only by invoking but by seeming to personify 'the grace
of your Maker and Redeemer' (p. 251). To this extent, Attwater appears to offer
Herrick a redemptive outlet from his moral impasse and even goes so far as to offer it
outright. Interestingly, however, Herrick refuses:
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[Attwater] spread out his arms like a crucifix; his face shone with the
brightness of a seraph's; in his voice, as it rose to the last word, the tears
seemed ready.
Herrick made a vigorous call upon himself. 'Attwater,' he said, 'you
push me beyond bearing. What am I to do? I do not believe. It is living
truth to you; to me, upon my conscience, only folk-lore. I do not believe
there is any form of words under heaven by which I can lift the burthen
from my shoulders...'
...The rapture was gone from Attwater's countenance; the dark apostle
had disappeared; and in his place there stood an easy, sneering
gentlemen, who took of his hat and bowed. It was pertly done, and the
blood burned in Herrick's face.
Attwater's sudden change of manner from ecstasy to irony seems to convey the
accomplishments of an actor and is perhaps the clearest evidence yet of his phoney
religious exterior. If at present oblivious to this, Herrick has nevertheless began to
show signs of apprehending the fallacy of apocalyptic renewal: in spite of Attwater's
supplications, he labels religion a species of folk-lore; his resistance to the Christian
ideal of repentance is final. It is, however, through his realisation of Attwater's abuse
of the religious tenets he aspires to which enable Herrick, in the end, to recognise the
illusory quality, not only of Attwater's mythical pretensions, but those of his own. In
the event, Herrick's teleological aspirations are reduced to an acceptance of the
dysteleological literality of life, where the desire for apocalyptic renewal is revealed
as an expendable extension of the most fundamental biological drives.
Attwater's faith and alleged fatalism have given him the grounds upon which
to act with impunity in administering 'justice' on the island. On the colonial fringes,
the institutionalised laws of England no longer apply. Attwater, then, in yet another
realignment of values, has become a law unto himself. For Herrick, however,
Attwater's account of killing one of the natives for having broken the Taws' of the
island amounts to murder. Having broached the laws of religion, under the pretext of
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applying his own, Attwater, as far as Herrick is concerned, has exposed himself for
what he is - a fraud: ' "It was a murder!" he screamed, "a cold-hearted, bloody-
minded murder! You monstrous being! Murderer and hypocrite - murderer and
hypocrite - murderer and hypocrite -" ' (p. 268). In the aftermath of his outburst,
Herrick no longer sees Attwater in his metaphorical capacity as the angel of the
Lord's wrath, but rather sees him in his plain and literal aspect as a 'sinister man' or
'that man there with the cat' (p. 270). Recognising also, as regards their sinister plot,
that Attwater 'sees through all' (p. 270 - 271), Herrick is adamant that 'there's
nothing for it, there's nothing to be done: all gone; life, honour, love' (p. 271). This,
for Herrick, appears to be the end of his bitter exploit. He has gone as far as he can
go in his attempts to fashion from depravity an available means of renewal; and, such
is his despair, that he is moved to renounce life altogether: 'Oh my God, my God,
why was I born?' (p. 271).
However, having elected suicide as the only satisfactory means of
redemption, Herrick finds that the life he wishes he never had has too great a value in
itself to be relinquished under the constraints of however great a moral burden. In
attempting to drown himself, he experiences an epiphanic contact, not with a world
from which he has fallen, but with the world of which he is an integral part - the
natural world. It is a world within which the illusory values he has aspired to are
preceded and superseded by an aboriginal vitality which renders those values, finally,
invalid:
The shock of the immersion brightened his mind immediately. The
events of that ignoble day passed before him in frieze of pictures, and he
thanked 'whatever Gods there be' for that open door of suicide. In such a
little while he would be done with it, the random business at an end, the
prodigal son come home.... Why should he delay? Here, where he was
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now, let him drop the curtain, let him seek the ineffable refuge, let him
lie down with all races and generations of men in the house of sleep. It
was easy to say, easy to do. To stop swimming: there was no mystery in
that, if he could do it. And he could not. He knew it instantly. He was
aware of an opposition in his members, unanimous and invincible,
clinging to life with a single and fixed resolve, finger by finger, sinew by
sinew; something that was at once he and not he - at once within and
without him.... To any man there may come at times a consciousness that
their blows, through all the articulations of his body, the wind of a spirit,
not wholly his; that carries him whither he would not. It came now to
Herrick, with the authority of a revelation. There was no escape possible.
The open door was closed in his recreant face. He must go back into the
world and amongst men without illusion, (p. 276 - 277)
The passage featuring Herrick's abortive suicide, in fact, is remarkable for the way in
which it illustrates his transition from an acceptance to a rejection of metaphysical
values - for the way, that is, that Herrick's redemptive efforts are quickly overcome
by biological responses which are not, he senses, his own, but those, as it were, of a
'man who is all men' emerging from his Arboreal interior. This way, Herrick has
discovered that which Stevenson is seeking to re-discover through romance - a
diffused Arboreal urgency received from an 'innumerable army' of ancestral
othernesses. On the one hand, then, he has aroused an Arboreal preconsciousness that
reveals to him the internal absence of himself. But, on the other, he has made contact
with an aboriginal vitality which, in the end, rejuvenates and makes him fit for life. It
is noticeable too that Herrick's repudiation of the mythical universe has occurred at a
point where, in attempting to drown himself, he returns, not to the apocalyptic world
from which he has fallen, but to the primordial world from which his species has
emerged - 'the empire of molluscs', as Gillian Beer has written, where, 'instead of
the garden at the beginning, there was the sea and the swamp'.10 The title of the tale,
meanwhile, refers to the inward motion of the sea upon itself, which is reflected in
Herrick as one who has 'complied with the ebb-tide of man's affairs' (p. 257).
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Herrick has undergone his own inward motion upon himself or, rather, upon 'the
form of some remote progenitor, irrecoverable because precedent to history or
anterior to consciousness'.11 But Herrick has recovered his remote progenitor - not in
itself, but in its latent manifestation as a part of himself 'not wholly his'. Going
further than the characters we have examined in the other texts, Herrick reaches
through the Arboreal interior into an aquatic one, one which precludes the
organisation of desire into oppositional values and perpetuates, only, a desire to live.
Herrick's 'epiphany' corresponds to the climactic archetypal scenario given
previously by Frye as the 'symbolic presentation of the point at which the
undisplaced apocalyptic world and the cyclical world of nature come into
alignment...' (AC, p. 203). But Herrick's epiphany is not apocalyptic; it is purely
biological. Far from securing an alignment between two worlds, it brings to bear on
the one the absence of the other. The world ofmyth and metaphor is revealed, not as
an idea in itself, but as an effort at one which, under the constraints of biological
necessity, is instantly dissolved. It is with an 'incredible simplicity of submission to
ascertained fact' (p. 277) that Herrick accepts his biological rank and re-enters the
world of men without illusion, the emphasis on 'fact' (both here and below)
suggesting that he has finally acceded to a world of literal actuality. The myth of
apocalyptic renewal, personified in the figure of Christ, can no longer serve as
anything more than the localised trope of his ignominious capitulation to 'the bare
sense of his existence':
With the fairy tale of suicide, of a refuge always open to him, he had
hitherto beguiled and supported himself in the trials of life; and behold!
That also was only a fairy tale, that also was folk-lore. With the
consequences of his acts he saw himself implacably confronted for the
duration of life: stretched upon a cross, and nailed there with the iron
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bolts of his own cowardice. He had no tears; he told himself no stories.
His disgust with himself was so complete, that even the process of
apologetic mythology had ceased. He was like a man cast down from a
pillar, and every bone broken. He lay there, and admitted the facts, and
did not attempt to rise.
In the introduction to this chapter, it was said that The Ebb-Tide incorporates the
teleological orientations of the quest scenario and that, by visibly admitting the quest,
it confronts the possibility of allowing a narrative to form around the recovery of a
mythopoeic model. Herrick's 'epiphany', in fact, carries the quest structure, which
has consistently deflected away from available goals, to its climactic verge - if only
to expose it as unworkable within the context ofhis literal experience.
In spite of his initial torment and, indeed, through having 'nothing left that I
believe in' (p. 279), Herrick's revelation becomes a kind of liberation and, even,
renewal in the sense, firstly, that he is able to renounce his moral obligations to Davis
and Huish, which are liable, after all, to result in his destruction. Having emerged
from among layers of deception, Herrick's repudiation of mythical values coincides
with a rejection of those values as appropriate solutions for his predicament. Where
once, between himself, Davis and Huish, 'there was an implied bond of loyalty in
their cohabitation of the ship and their past miseries; to which Herrick must be a little
true or wholly dishonoured' (p. 257), there now exists, in Herrick, an indifferent
submission to the stronger party, Attwater, coupled with a willingness to assist him
in thwarting the diabolical schemes of his former comrades. It is an act through
which Herrick is assured of his survival, in spite of 'my living horror ofmyself '(p.
279); but it is only after the death of Huish and, especially, the 'redemption' of
Davis, that Herrick's sense of Arboreal renewal becomes more positively conveyed.
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It is through Herrick's contrast with Davis, in fact, that we learn to appreciate
the consequences of the mythopoeic structure as personally reductive, false and
damaging. If Herrick eventually recognises the illusion of myth, Davis comes to
parody the acceptance of it. He is excessively superstitious - 'Superstition rules all
men; semi-ignorant and gross natures, like that of Davis, it rules utterly' (p. 291) -
and, in being so, goes the opposite way of Herrick: instead of apprehending the
fallacy of mythical values, he adopts them obsessively. The signs are ominous when,
on contemplating his expulsion from the island, Davis relies on mythical sources in
attempting to explain his present misfortunes:
There came over Davis, from deep down in the roots of his being, or at
least from far back among his memories of childhood and innocence, a
wave of superstition. This run of ill-luck was something beyond natural;
the chances of the game were in themselves more various; it seemed as if
the devil must serve the pieces. The devil? He heard again the clear note
of Attwater's bell ringing abroad into the night, and dying away. How if
God...? (p. 282)
Huish's malicious proposal 'to see that man and chuck this vitriol in his eyes' (p.
290) has an even greater effect on him. Though adamant about Attwater that 'I want
to see him dead' (p. 284), Davis nevertheless insists upon maintaining a standard
relative to their predicament, declaring, 'No! It can't be! It's too much; it's
damnation. God would never forgive it'(p. 290). His resolve, however, is gradually
weakened by the belief that, in Huish, 'He had raised the devil, he thought' (p. 287).
At the same time, the prospect of accomplishing riches through vile deeds is afforded
a measure of justification by Davis's ultimate objective of providing for his wife and
kids: 'The stakes were so high - the pearls on the one hand - starvation and shame on
the other. Ten years of pearls! The imagination of Davis translated them into a new,
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glorified existence for himself and his family' (p. 288). Davis has been brought to his
own moral impasse. Unlike Herrick, however, he concedes to the illusion of the
mythical universe and, in accepting Huish's proposal as the only workable course of
action, prepares to meet his doom accordingly:
For murder he had been prepared; but this horror of the medicine in the
bottle went beyond him, and he seemed to himself to be parting the last
strands that united him and God. The boat carried him on to reprobation,
to damnation; and he suffered himself to be carried passively consenting,
silently bidding farewell to his better self and his hopes, (p. 291)
If Herrick has stepped outside of an illusory moral framework, Davis has become
immeshed in it. And, having been spared his life in the botched encounter with
Attwater, he abandons himself to the mythical universe once and for all: 'With
trembling hands he seized hold of the man whom he had come to slay; and his voice
broke from him like that of a child among the nightmares of fever: ' "O! Isn't there
no mercy? O! What must I do to be saved?" ' (p. 298).
Davis is, as Attwater points out, 'the true penitent' (p. 298), a man suspended
among illusions who becomes not only corrupted but isolated by them. In the end
scene, Herrick is free to leave; Davis, however, is compelled to remain: '...you
mayn't just see the way that I view it in, but I'd most rather stay here upon this
island. I found peace here, peace in believing' (p. 300 - 301). In relation to this
closing scene, Jenni Calder has remarked:
In choosing to remain with Attwater, Davis has rediscovered a structure,
but it implies a morality that is destructive to the individual. It demands
his complete subservience, it takes him out of the real world of choice
and conflict and challenge, the real world, and it involves the
renunciation of his wife and children.12
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To this we might add that the structure Davis has rediscovered is a mythopoeic one -
a structure which, in being incompatible with the literal expediencies of life, has
diverted him from his Arboreal role as a provider for his wife and kids. Where once
Davis was capable of adjusting values relatively to given situations, he has now
committed himself to a rigid formula of apocalyptic renewal. It is one through which
he has not been liberated but existentially marooned. There is even a sense in which,
by committing himself to 'fables', Davis has found an excuse through which he can
renounce - without compunction - his moral obligations towards his family. The
structure he has entered, which the story has approached and invalidated, proves the
most effective deception of all: for Davis, it is not penitence, but a moral evasion.
While Davis, as Jenni Calder suggests, 'trades life for belief, Herrick, in
contrast, 'chooses life' and has learnt to accept life on its own terms so that, as
Calder goes on, if 'the story ends on so tentative a note there is at least a hint of
affirmation'.13 This may seem a strange thing to say, given the fact that Herrick has
suffered utter humiliation in being unable to die and by submitting himself to
Attwater. However, if on the one hand he is 'only a puppy dog with a broken leg'
(p.279), it is noticeable on the other that, in his 'failure' to commit suicide, there
'was a courage in this which he could not appreciate; the ignobility of his cowardice
wholly occupying him' (p. 277 - 278). Herrick's cowardice is felt through an
inability to confront the moral consequences of his actions, which dictate that he
should die for his sins. By refusing to accept these consequences, however, Herrick
has demonstrated a courage both in opting for life (and the liberation that life
affords) and in rejecting, once and for all, the moral framework which necessarily
entailed his self-destruction. That an affirmation is achieved through this choice is
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clearly stressed in the story's 'tail-piece', where Herrick, after succumbing
throughout the tale to an insufferable mixture of pride, wrath and shame, suddenly
reveals a capacity for humour. There are symbolic indications of this in the ritualistic
burning of the Farallone, an event which signifies his emergence from his moral
torpor into a state of some relief. As Herrick sets the Farallone alight, the 'flames
broke forth' and 'burned gaily' (p. 299), as if to reflect his own rekindled mood. But
it is on hearing Davis that his capacity for humour is more directly expressed:
...measuring the progress of the flames, he found himself embayed to the
northward of the point of palms, and here became aware at the same time
of the figure of Davis immersed in his devotions. An exclamation, part of
annoyance, part of amusement, broke from him... It was not impossible
for him to overhear the suppliant's petitions, which he listened to some
while in a very mingle mood of humour and pity... (p. 300)
Interestingly, Herrick's good humour is accompanied by other emotions of an
oppositional cast, which seems to suggest that, in life, there are no determined states,
but only a general vitality of irresolvable or indeterminate responses to given
situations. The same is suggested, more broadly, by the linguistic closure of the story
which, as Alan Sandison has said, 'is abrupt, almost perfunctory...'.14 While Davis is
left suspended among illusions, Herrick has accepted life on its own terms: its
courses are uncertain and as undesigned as anything we know about his future at the
close of the narrative. To this extent, he has reached a point that precedes the
structuralisation of life into antithetical systems which, under life's conditions, are
unnatural to it. For Herrick, life has superseded the illusion of order so that he comes,
in the end, to affirm the underlying lack of structure that has prevented his attempts
to raise one.
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The ending, then, as Herrick prepares to evacuate the island, is as much a
beginning, reflecting 'perpetual variation',15 'the physical world as endless onward
process', the position 'of human beings as slight elements within unstoppable motion
and transformation'.16 It becomes, in this sense, a material embodiment of that which
it describes - the return to a pre-structural condition - in Herrick's case, a realisation
of 'the aboriginal within us' which cannot be traced through linguistic means. Instead
of entering the unintelligible singularity of death, like Will, he enters the
unintelligible singularity of life - and, for him, life is the vanishing point of narrative,
something that cannot be structured narratorially because it exists prior to the
orientations of structure. The fact that the narrative closes so abruptly serves as a
truer reflection of what it has asserted - not the finite resolution of an organised plot,
but the 'mobile nature at our feet' which, Stevenson has said, 'the arts, like
arithmetic and geometry, turn away their eyes from...' (HR, pp. 172 - 173).
A Summary
From the ending, it becomes possible to view The Ebb-Tide in its entirety as an
illustration of the demise of the conventional mechanisms of romance under the
emergence of a Darwinian mobility, where the narrative has been, 'as it were, self-
propelled, unfolding according to laws of nature with no initiating intention and no
ultimate objective...'.17 The same, Vennessa Smith implies, has been conveyed
through the fact that 'the cargo of champagne aboard the Farallone initially
represents bounty to the three beachcombers. These bottles, however, contain wine
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turned to water...'. The reduction of bounty to common essentials, of wine to water
(itself a reversal of the Christian myth), signifies the metaphorical reduction of The
Ebb-Tide to a world of literal sensations, apparent in 'the sign of absence, water, the
featurelessness of which is verified by each of their senses'.18 It is water-imagery in
The Ebb-Tide that emphasises its underlying Darwinian tenor - not only through
Herrick's return to the primordial depths but, more subtly, through the story's
incidental descriptions. When the 'Farallone gave one of the aimless and nameless
movements which (even in an anchored ship and even in the most profound calm)
remind one of the mobility of fluids' (p. 289), we are reminded, in turn, of those
Darwinian 'motifs' identified by Gillian Beer - of 'forms in a flux' or a
'consciousness of the fluent', or of the realisation of 'so absent a beginning and so
bleak and prodigious an extension of time...'.19 The sea underlies the Farallone's
journey in time, 'unstoppable motion' the active pursuit of fixed goals. 'In one hour's
time,' says Herrick, 'the waters would have closed over the stolen ship' (p. 300). Yet,
having began her journey from 'well out in the jaws of the pass' (p. 202), the
Farallone has always been destined for being consumed, just as the narrative must be
consumed by the timeless mobility that underlies its own duration.
If 'Darwin's theory thrust the human into nature',20 a narrative like The Ebb-
Tide, having dislocated itself from its mythopoeic origins, reflects this. It is not a
story that signals, ritualistically, the triumph of man over nature, nor the demonic
triumph of nature over man, but the position ofman as an integral part of nature. It is
a narrative that is 'describing a new place for man in nature' and, because of this, is
'disruptive of established social and moral categories'.21 But, if it is disruptive, it is
not so pessimistically, as Herrick's affirmation, underlined by humour, suggests.
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Stevenson is remarkably undaunted by theories of evolution. Certainly, he plays on
public fears of 'the ape-theory' and 'degeneration', but differs immensely from those
authors of the fin de siecle with whom he is sometimes, erroneously, associated. For
Oscar Wilde, for example, the idea of the human subject as a composite form of
countless othernesses is a matter of grave consequence:
By revealing to us the absolute mechanism of all action... the scientific
principle of Heredity... has shown us that we are never less free to act
than when we try to act. It has hemmed us round with the nets of the
hunter, and written upon the wall the prophecy of our doom. We may not
watch it, for it is within us. We may not see it, save in a mirror that
mirrors the soul. It is Nemesis without her mask. It is the last of the
Fates, and the most terrible.22
Stevenson, however, glories in the prospect of the new science and uses it to
legitimise the function of romance. Romance could act as a means of restoring to
modem life those inherited experiences which are not so much removed from
modem life as they are a living part of it. The possibility of an Arboreal foundation
could help define romance as something more than mere escapism. Romance could
become part of a project of discovery, a way through which to establish an emotive
contact with primitive bases in a way that science could not. Romance could become
a means of theorising 'the charm and terror of things',23 those areas of interest off-
limits to empirical reasoning. It could add to the evolutionary theory the substance it
lacked by exploring the sensational and emotional territory of human life, whereas
science could only concern itself with inscribing the facts:
Science writes of the world as if with the cold finger of a star-fish; it is
all true; but what is it when compared to the reality it discourses? where
hearts beat high in April, and death strikes, and hills totter in the
earthquake, and a thrill in all noises for the ear, and romance herself has
made her dwelling among men?24
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For Stevenson, science was too detached from what it sought to explain to be able to
encompass the full breadth of it, too much restricted by the rigours of objectivity. It
had confined its matter to a textual world of epistemological categories, and was
unable to contain or convey the experiential impact of what it described:
A fact is not called a fact, but a piece of gossip, if it does not fall into one
of your scholastic categories. An inquiry must be in some acknowledged
direction, with a name to go by; or else you are not inquiring at all, only
lounging... There is certainly some chill and arid knowledge to be found
upon the summits of formal and laborious science; but it is all about you,
and for the trouble of looking, that you will acquire the warm and
palpitating facts of life.25
Science could not engage in 'the great Theorum of the Liveableness of Life',26 but
could only regard life lifelessly, as an object to be explored from the outside rather
than inside. Romance could move inside the object, make the object its subject: it
could immerse itself in the dysteleological fluency of life that science had implied
but could not rationalise:
There is an uncouth and outlandish strain throughout the web of the
world, as from a vexatious planet in the house of life. Things are not
congruous and wear strange disguises.... There are moments when the
mind refuses to be satisfied with evolution, and demands a ruddier
presentation from the sum of man's experience. Sometimes the mood is
brought about...by the spirit of delight, and sometimes by the spirit of
terror. At least, there will always be hours when we refuse to be put off
by the feint of explanation, nicknamed science; and demand instead some
palpitating image of our estate, that shall represent the troubled and
uncertain element in which we dwell and satisfy reason by means of art.27
Admitting the dysteleological impetus of the aboriginal foundation,
meanwhile, was certainly viewed by Stevenson as more conducive to romance than
the semblance of order said to characterise its function. It gave him the grounds upon
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which to realise his belief 'in a greater part of life as chance' as a workable
'method' of fiction, bearing in mind that, for Stevenson, romance ought to convey a
'poetry of circumstance', the sense that '[N]ow we are conscious of a great command
over our destiny; anon we are lifted up by circumstance, as by a breaking wave, and
dashed we know not how into the future' (GR, p. 153). To this extent, Stevenson
does through romance that which has been claimed by scholars as the object of
realism. The old distinction summarised by George Levine - that 'romance implies
an ordered, stable, almost static universe', while 'the novel implies a growing,
changing, disordered one'29 - is done away with by Stevenson. Not that it was his
aim to replicate, merely, the natural laws that science had inferred: rather, it was to
reactivate a psycho-dynamic priority that science had suggested but was unable to
convey beyond the limitations of the inscribed 'fact'. Nevertheless, through his
adaptation of Darwinian principles, Stevenson was able to close the ill-defined gap
between realism and romance and, by playing out the tensions between them, to
deliver fiction from arguments that impeded its growth.30
It is partly because of its generic uncertainty that The Ebb-Tide has caused a
deal of confusion among Stevenson's critics, who have reacted unfavourably to a tale
which, had it been written by Conrad, would probably have received a great deal of
praise. Questions, above all, relating to the story's structure, to its ending and to its
• • • • 91
apparent 'failure' to satisfy the conventional expectations of romance, have
disconcerted both past and present reviewers.32 These same reviewers, however, have
rather demonstrated a failure on their own behalf to come to terms with a modern
form of romance that refuses to inhabit, and in fact dissolves, any copybook formula.
In struggling with The Ebb-Tide, it could be said that some critics, in the event of its
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immediate publication, have proved more astute than they were aware of, showing a
marked disapproval of certain 'weaknesses' in the narrative which, under the terms
we have described it, can now be seen as strengths. As one unsigned reviewer
remarked:
All through the narrative there is a recurrent suggestion of the
undeveloped.... The suggestion of the undeveloped is a radical weakness
in the story, since it inevitably brings with it to the imaginative reader
processes of development that must have raised the story to the first rank
of fiction, yet are absolutely neglected. Brilliant as are the successive
incidents of the narrative of the voyage that forms the first part, 'The
Trio', there is something of sterility, when looked at collectively and
retrospectively from the final scene of the story. They have not the air of
inevitableness. They seem to have been designed independently of the
end in view, and tend towards no tremendous culmination....33
Enamoured by his own conventional expectations of what should occur in the
narrative, this reviewer does not recognise the accuracy of his remarks as
descriptions of the effects that Stevenson was seeking to achieve. The same can be
said of another reviewer who complained that The Ebb-Tide 'is badly constructed, a
mere random series of adventures, sliced out of a chain of heterogeneous episodes
that might have gone on forever'.34 To this we might answer - precisely; while it
becomes clear that Stevenson was creating effects for which his immediate auditors
had no clear means of explanation, given that, as Sandison has said, The Ebb-Tide is
Stevenson's 'most complicated book' which 'complicates things in a new way'.35 If
The Ebb-Tide's dislocation of the mythopoeic formula has sparked disapproval
amongst most, there have been those, like Israel Zangwill, who saw that, in
dispensing with conventions, Stevenson had in fact 'struck a blow for the literary
artist's independence, for his freedom to choose his own subject irrespective of
tradition and conventional expectations'; and that the story ought to be commended
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for having rejected 'the parlour-game formula to which the stock British novel
invariably reduces itself.36 Zangwill's recommendations point out that the alleged
failures of The Ebb-Tide have been founded on a failure to appreciate, or to tolerate,
what it is doing with conventional methods of storytelling. Notwithstanding this,
critics may be forgiven for their scepticism in view of the fact that Stevenson
himself, if on more positive grounds, was somewhat confused by the tale he had
created. As he remarked in a letter to S. R. Crockett:
The Ebb Tide ... is really a singular work. There are only four characters,
and three of them are bandits - well, two of them are, and the third is
their comrade and accomplice. It sounds cheering, doesn't it? Barratry,
and drunkenness, and vitriol, and I cannot tell you all what, are the beams
of the roof. And yet - I don't know - I sort of think there's something in
it.37
Interestingly, Stevenson appears somewhat overawed by the singularity of his work,
to such an extent that he, himself, can hardly be sure of what it stands for. This,
however, goes some way to substantiating his essentially Arboreal claim - that
romance is capable of producing effects for which we have no direct means of
explanation, effects which cannot be accessed or interpreted through the
epistemological means at our disposal; and not only in relation to fiction but, as the
following conclusion will presently reveal, in relation to science also.
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What critics like Steuart fail to appreciate is that 'violent' was exactly how Stevenson wanted it. As he
wrote Marcel Schwob, using the original name for The Ebb-Tide, The Pearl Fisher: ' I have two huge
novels on hand - The Wrecker and the Pearl Fisher... the latter, the Pearl Fisher, I think highly of,
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for a black, ugly, trampling, violent story, full of strange scenes and striking characters' (Stevenson,
Letters, vol II, p. 198).
The answer to Steuart's query, meanwhile, 'Why all this violence?' might be said to lie in
Stevenson's own experiences of the South Seas during a tour in 1890. As Nicholas Rankin points out:
'They met all kinds of traders on this trip: men who were destitute, anaemic, ill, one with leprosy: men
who had married natives, men who lived off natives, men who drank, and men who had murdered'
(Dead Man's Chest, p. 310). Clearly, The Ebb-Tide was partly a response to what Stevenson himself
had seen of a corrupt colonial underworld. Joseph Conrad was to do a similar thing in writing Heart of
Darkness, a text which was in many ways a response to his Congo journey made, coincidentally, in
1890. As Edward Garnett informs us: 'Conrad's Congo experiences were the turning point in his
mental life... The sinister voice of the Congo with its murmuring undertone of human fatuity, baseness
and greed had swept away the generous illusions of his youth, and had left him gazing into the heart of
an immense darkness.' The effect on his mental life being such, says Garnett, 'it may be said that
Africa killed Conrad the sailor and strengthened Conrad the novelist'. Edward Garnett, Letters From
Conrad, 1895 - 1924, in Daphne Erdinast-Vulcan, Joseph Conrad and the Modern Temper (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 96.
32 One recent commentator on the text, Peter Gilmour, seems to have missed the point altogether in
looking, it appears, for an archetypal resolution to Herrick's predicament:
What it means to be or to feel free, expressed in a move from a lower condition to a
higher, never becomes part of Stevenson's world. The portrait of Herrick as a man
knowing one form of humiliation after another... has been vivid, but nothing is made of
his wish to change, to seek restitution, transcendence even. Perhaps Stevenson believed
that such a wish was a delusion, but, if so, it can only be said that this is not shown
either. Peter Gilmour, 'Robert Louis Stevenson: Forms of Evasion', in Andrew Noble
(ed.), Robert Louis Stevenson (London: Vision Press, 1983), p. 199.
Gilmour's last remark is particularly baffling. The entire story has shown that the idea of restitution
and transcendence is a delusion, spelling it out quite patently during Herrick's abortive suicide scene.
Gilmour's disappointment, one can only assume, springs from the fact that The Ebb-Tide refuses to
satisfy the aims of the mythopoeic formula and its narrative movement from a lower to a higher
condition.
33
Unsigned review, in Maixner (ed.), The Critical Heritage, p. 454.
34
Unsigned review, in Maixner (ed.), The Critical Heritage, p. 461.
35
Sandison, Stevenson and the Appearance ofModernism, p. 317
36 Israel Zangwill, in Maixner (ed.), The Critical Heritage, p. 460.
37
Stevenson, Letters, vol. II, p. 288.
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Conclusion
Ulterior Motives: The Language of Romance'
Having demonstrated the extent to which Stevenson detaches romance from its
traditional bases, it is worth considering, by way of summarising all that has been
said, further reasons as to why he felt impelled to do so. By the same token, it is
necessary to consider the broader and more lasting implications of Stevenson's
radical re-interpretation of the function of romance. On the one hand, as we have
seen, Stevenson's development of a particularly modern form of romance was in
many ways a response to concerns arising prior to and during his lifetime. We have
tended to focus on a Darwinian influence in Stevenson's thinking. We might also be
inclined to suggest, retrospectively, that Stevenson's reasoning of romance is not
incompatible with a Nietzschean disqualification of truth as 'a mobile marching army
ofmetaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms,' and that his approach to fiction
readily coincides with a Nietzschean polemic that 'truths are illusions of which one
has forgotten that they are illusions'} In Stevenson's case, the same degree of
scepticism is applied to romance as a means of sustaining, through metaphors and
metonymies, a teleological world-view that, through the illusory logic of linguistic
structures, tends towards an absolute value or truth-foundation. We might also allude
to Stevenson's work, as critics have noted, as a prelude to Freud's development of
psychoanalysis as an independent field of study. As Malcolm Bradbury has said of
Jekyll and Hyde: '...the book engaged with increasing scientific curiosity about the
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unconscious self, the hidden "id", unspoken in an age of repression and strict
morality, that Freud would soon explore'.2
It may be possible, in view of this, to situate Stevenson among those notable
personalities who undertook an inauguration of new ideas which, in the twentieth
century, have been expanded within the context of post-Modernism. Not
acknowledged as such, the suggestion involves a certain amount of risk in that, if
Stevenson is not acknowledged as such, then how can his influence be determined as
significant? We might be tempted to say that, while he shows an adherence to certain
innovations, he plays a subordinate role in their expansion overall. However, in this
concluding chapter I wish to demonstrate two things: that it was indeed Stevenson's
intention to initiate, through romance, new ideas about fiction; and that his influence
on a post-Modern disavowal of traditional methods is more significant than we,
within the context of Scottish or English literature at least, have tended to think.
In introducing the illogical predispositions of the Arboreal impulse,
Stevenson could be accused of perversely indulging in the demonic alternatives
described by Frye as the antithetical impediments of the apocalyptic order. But
Stevenson, it should be stressed, in restricting the operations of narrative to
genealogical levels, is introducing a version of the irrational or illogical that remains
outside of, and demolishes, any metaphysical model. Irrational in this sense is not
antithetically relative to the rationalisations of western logicians and metaphysicians
like Frye, who regards the irrational as negative - as nightmare, evil and bondage, or
as a characteristic feature of man in his fallen state prior to making a garden out of
nature. Stevenson is fashioning an altogether different context, one that works
outside of any rigid system of this or that positive or negative value. Nor is
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Stevenson advocating disorder and the detachment from any stable foundation as
something to be indulged in for its own sake. Stevenson, in fact, introduces the
intriguing possibility that, because of its detachment from any rationalised
conventional order, romance acquires a unique position among contingent forms of
writing as a frontier discourse capable of producing the as yet unrealised 'discourse-
formations' of the future idiom. The proposition is strange, but fascinating, and,
more than anything, shows us that, as far as Stevenson was concerned, romance was
far from being a form, merely, of irrational self-indulgence.
In 'Victor Hugos's Romances', Stevenson begins to theorise some of his
paradoxical positions and simultaneities more sharply, while at the same time as
expanding on them, to the point, in fact, that we find in this essay some of his most
remarkable statements about the function of romance. Hinting again about romance
as an activity that necessarily exceeds the rationalisations of structuralist method,
Stevenson takes the matter further, as Glenda Norquay points out (with reference to
Stevenson) in her introduction to R. L. Stevenson on Fiction:
Romance, he appears to argue, is a means of embodying ideas that cannot
be formulated in analytical words: 'It is not that there is anything blurred
or indefinite in the impression left with us, it is just because the
impression is so very definite after its own kind, that we find it hard to fit
• • • T
exactly with the expressions of our philosophical speech'.
The fact that romance is capable 'of embodying ideas that cannot be formulated in
analytical words', has profound implications. It implies, in the first place, that
Stevenson feels romance is capable of realising the irrational tendencies of the
Arboreal impulse which, accordingly, cannot be expressed through any analytical or
rational medium, and that romance is capable, after all, of acting outside the required
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constraints of intelligible textuality. At the same time, and in yet another paradoxical
twist, Stevenson insists that romance is by no means acting outwith our grasp; only,
that it inhabits a space outwith the reach of conscious method. The intimation that
romance by no means conveys a 'blurred and indefinite impression' but an
impression 'so very definite after its own kind' seems to confirm the point; but it also
begs the question as to what exactly Stevenson means by romance as something so
very definite after its own kind.
What Stevenson is suggesting is the idea of a 'language of romance'4 which
is capable of creating its own, independent idiom. Having suggested the elimination
of special categories of writing, Stevenson takes a revisionary twist in affording
romance a special function: that is, as a phase of discourse which exceeds the
rationalisations of the present idiom and, in doing so, begins to assert the formative
processes of linguistic form and signification occurring beyond it. In this sense,
romance, according to Stevenson, continually manufactures a condition of pre-
structurality through which it begins to formulate the 'primordial' traces of an
epistemological and conceptual ulteriority. Again, we notice, in the extract below,
Stevenson's appeal to the irrational impulses of the subject as an originary means of
structural production, the suggestion being that the rationalisations of the future
idiom are ultimately dependant on the irrational accessions of romance. Beginning
more broadly, with a general proposition on the relation of romance to philosophy
and science, Stevenson explains:
It is this change in the manner of regarding men and their actions first
exhibited in romance, that has since renewed and vivified history. For art
precedes philosophy and even science. People must have noticed things
and interested themselves in them before they began to debate upon their
causes or influence. And it is in this way that art is a pioneer of
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knowledge; those predilections of the artist he knows not why, those
irrational acceptations and recognitions, reclaim, out of the world that we
have not yet realised, ever another and another corner; and after the facts
have been thus vividly brought before us and have had time to settle and
arrange themselves in our minds, some day there will be found the man
of science to stand up and give the explanation.5
Romance, then, does not elicit meanings from any symbolic resonance of archetypes
which pre-exist its linguistic duration; it issues local and indeterminate meanings
which are deferred through discursive phases and latterly conceived within the
appropriate epistemological categories. Romance throws into strange relief those
aspects of knowledge and experience which are as yet off-limits to conceptual
verification, but which can latterly be assimilated through a process of signification
and reified, thereafter, as epistemological givens.6 Existing on the forefront of a
linguistic assimilation of conceptual elements, romance is thus a point at which these
elements are preconsciously encrypted. But more than this, Stevenson suggests,
romance is capable of assimilating conceptual elements which are potentially out of
reach of language altogether, and which have a tendency, instead, towards creating
'effects', rather than meanings, which, according to any analytical or rational
diagnostic, are impossible to pin-down:
The artistic result of a romance, what is left upon the memory by any
really powerful and artistic novel, is something so complicated and
refined that it is difficult to put a name upon it; and yet something as
simple as nature. These two propositions may seem mutually destructive,
but they are only so in appearance. The fact is that art is working far
ahead of language as well as of science, realising for us, by all manner of
suggestions and exaggerations, effects for which as yet we have no direct
name; nay, for which we may never perhaps have a direct name, for the
reason that these effects do not enter very largely into the necessities of
life. Hence alone is that suspicion of vagueness that often hangs about the
purpose of romance: it is not clear enough to us in thought; but we are
not used to consider anything clear until we are able to formulate it in
words, and analytical language has not been sufficiently shaped to that
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end... It is this idea which underlies and issues from a romance, this
n
something which it is the function of that form of art to create...
To see it this way, romance is the formulation of linguistic effects that come prior to
language and which are inaccessible within their immediate field of operation. In
effect, then, the language of romance is language in its Arboreal state: language prior
to epistemology, realisation prior to rationalisation, subject / object prior to
signification. And while, certainly, romance operates within an intelligible realm of
textuality, at the same time, it is also capable of initiating an unintelligible textuality
that may never acquire an intelligible status. Its tendency is to produce effects that
are bound to an ulterior site of conceptual possibility so that, as far as any
epistemological or interpretative rubric is concerned, romance is constructed out of
absences of meaning that may or may not acquire 'presence' within an intelligible
category.
If it is the function of romance to create 'effects for which as yet we have no
direct name', then we have a complete reversal of Frye's premise that romance
retains over time the conventions of form and maintains, as a consequence, the
stability of a tradition. According to Stevenson, romance is the very opposite of a
tradition: it is not so much grounded in an archetypal foundation as aspiring towards
the unaccountable objects of its immediate design. It is not rooted in anything so
solid as 'conventions' but, rather, locates and assembles itself outwith the range of
any analytical or linguistic system that enables us to consolidate the idea of
'conventions'. In Jekyll and Hyde, The Master ofBallantrae, Will o' the Mill and The
Ebb-Tide, we have seen how romance can acquire an effectiveness, not by
reproducing conventional narrative strategies, but by reinventing itself according to
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its capacity to supersede them. And it is perhaps the characteristic aspect of
Stevenson's narratives that, rather than deconstructing by revealing absences and
ruptures throughout the text, they are generating certain 'effects' that can be
construed as absences only inasmuch as they cannot appear directly to any means of
signification. Looking at his essays and fictions in total, in fact, Stevenson seems to
be seeking to reify or make visible the ulteriority of language by allowing it to
accumulate as an effect and, this way, is proposing, not a method of deconstruction,
but a method of preconstruction. Romance, he tells us, works by asserting a
preconstructive ambience or violation against the limits of enunciation and, this way,
consolidates the primordial bases of the ulterior idiom, generating narratives without
the guarantee of form and effects without the guarantee ofmeaning. With Stevenson,
romance is not a process of ritual re-attainment, but of sustained creativity, not
cyclically or teleologically determined but, by its method of pealing back the
undisclosed eventualities of form, only perpetuates one possibility after another. It is
not so much an abstract manifestation of some literary totality as a multiplicity of
exceeded limits.
In stories like Will o' the Mill and The Ebb-Tide, the elimination of
archetypes and the attempt to admit an Arboreal vitality can be seen as part of the
effort towards creating effects for which we have had no direct name, but which
perhaps, a century or so later, can be described according to the means available
through the language of post-Modernism. That is to say that, as regards the singular
instances occurring in Stevenson's fiction, we may have since devised an idiomatic
range which is capable of rendering them into analytical clarity. Along these lines,
Stevenson's speculations on romance are remarkably suggestive of some up-to-date
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descriptions of what we nowadays call the 'post-Modern' condition. Jean-Francois
Lyotard's assessment here, for example, could stand as a good summary of what has
been intimated so far by Stevenson:
The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the
unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of
good forms, the consensus of a taste which would make it possible to
share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches
for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a
stronger sense of the unpresentable. A postmodern artist or writer is in
the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are
not in principle governed by pre-established rules, and they cannot be
judged according to a determining judgement, by applying familiar
categories to the text or the work. Those rules and categories are what the
work of art itself is looking for. The artist and the writer, then, are
working without rules in order to formulate the rules ofwhat will have to
be done.8
In view of all this, we can begin to define Stevenson's role in the
development of fiction more accurately. It has been noted by critics, as we have seen
through Ian Duncan, that Northrop Frye's 'totality of fictions' has come to represent
'the view from a belated and ironic modernism that thinks it has nowhere to look but
back, unless upward to an apocalyptic horizon'.9 Stevenson has introduced an
alternative perspective, closer to Duncan's, where romance, in constantly recreating
and redefining itself, looks directly forward in its effort to breach the undisclosed
eventualities of the future idiom. To modify Duncan's analysis of Scott in relation to
Stevenson, it is possible to offer a conclusive context for Stevenson's romances. It is
argued by Duncan that Scott's work, as a recreation of former modes, allows us to
identify 'the condition of romance as modernity's vision of worlds it has superseded,
charged with a magic of estrangement, peril and loss'.10 Stevenson, coming after
Scott, takes a similar position, albeit, with Stevenson, the position is reversed. Where
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Scott establishes 'romance as modern culture's construction of a symbolic form prior
to itself,11 Stevenson establishes romance as modern culture's construction of a
symbolic form ulterior to itself. Juxtaposed against Scott, Stevenson's theory of
romance takes a hundred and eighty degree shift in focus, moving from prior forms
to eventual forms, replacing a conception of what has been with the preconception of
what will be. With Stevenson, the condition of romance becomes modernity's vision,
not of worlds it has superseded, but of worlds that supersede it. Similarly, Duncan's
summation of the position of romance at the beginning of the nineteenth-century may
act as a firm basis for describing the alteration we see in romance, through
Stevenson, by the end of the nineteenth-century: 'Once the prehistoric origin against
which the novel redefined itself antithetically, romance may now be revived as a
historical tradition - with which modern fiction is in turn to revive itself.12 In
Stevenson's case, romance is revived as the deconstruction of a historical tradition
and the preconstruction of ulterior forms through which modern fiction may continue
to revive itself; but it will do so by invoking aspects of itself as yet to be revealed.
The idea of romance as a mode in which modern fiction, in the early
nineteenth-century, revived itself can be reapplied in the sense that, arguably, it is
through romance that fiction revives itself in the post-Modern epoch. It is possible to
see this in the legacy of a writer like Stevenson who, following on from the
Modernist period which saw his exclusion, proves to be an enormous influence on
those writers emerging in the aftermath of Modernism. Robin Gilmour has
summarised Stevenson's position perfectly:
[Stevenson] points the way, not to the Modernists - who might have
learned from him, but were put off by the romantic legend ofR L S - but
to a later generation of novelists living in the aftermath of the Victorian
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and Modern novel. Writers as different as Graham Greene and Jorge
Louis Borges have found his narrative skill and formal self-
consciousness, as well as his 'romance conferred on doubtful actions',
liberating. If there is life after Joyce, Stevenson has an honoured place
among those who have helped novelists find it.13
In his essay 'Borges and I', Borges, in assessing his foremost pleasures, proclaims: 'I
like hourglasses, maps, eighteenth-century typography, the roots of words, the taste
of coffee and the prose of Stevenson'.14 It is a sentiment echoed by other prominent
authors of the post-Modem period, including Vladimir Nabokov and Italo Calvino.
Nabokov, as Nicholas Rankin observes, had a particular infatuation with Jekyll and
Hyde which led him to declare it 'a masterpiece' that 'belongs to the same order of
art as, for instance, Madame Bovary or Dead Souls' }5 Italo Calvino, meanwhile,
shows an alike regard, declaring that, 'Among the writers I have always read and,
willy-nilly, have taken as a model is R. L. Stevenson'.16 Given the extent of
Stevenson's influence on these authors, it is strange to think that he has been mostly
ignored and often disparaged in terms of his significance as a writer. Nevertheless,
there is a sense in which Nabokov, Borges and Calvino, on the opposite side of
Modernism to Stevenson, seem to be picking up the threads from where he left off.
Calvino's story 'The Cloven Viscount', with its explicit adaptation of the Jekyll and
Hyde 'motif, appears not only to demonstrate but to declare the point.17 The 'magic
realism', 'metafiction' or 'fabulation' perpetuated by Borges, meanwhile, does the
same, with its tendency towards 'experiments with subject matter, form, style,
temporal sequence, and fusions of the everyday, the fantastic, the mythical, and the
nightmarish, in renderings that blur the traditional distinctions between what is
• 18
serious or trivial, horrible or ludicrous, tragic or comic'. It is a description that
could stand as equally well for Stevenson's work. Clearly, these authors recognise
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something in Stevenson which has went largely unrecognised among authors and
• • • 1 *19
cntics in the main.
The failure to recognise or to critically describe Stevenson's fiction can
perhaps be attributed to the fact that he sought, precisely, to create effects for which
we have had no direct name. His peculiarity being such, it would not be unfitting to
suggest of Stevenson the same as Jacques Derrida has of Stephane Mallarme.
Mallarme's own admiration for Stevenson gives weight to this claim which, because
of the way we are conditioned to think about Stevenson, might otherwise seem off
the mark:
Is there a place for Mallarme in a history of literature? Or, to begin with:
does his text take place, take its place, in some over all picture of French
Literature? We have been reading him for close to a century now: we are
only beginning to glimpse that something has been contrived (by
Mallarme? in any case in terms of what passes through him, what
traverses him, as it were) in order to elude the categories ofhistory and of
literary classification, of literary criticism, and of all kinds of philosophy
and hermeneutics. We are beginning to glimpse that the disruption of
categories is also the effect ofwhat was written by Mallarme.20
To think of Stevenson as he stands in relation to the modern development of fiction
is to think of a writer whose writing evades critical and historical classifications, and
as one who outmanoeuvres, as a consequence of the nature of his work, any formal
or systematic category. The romance of Stevenson, like the poetry of Mallarme,
disconcerts the critic's capacity to regulate or register anything definite about its
place in 'the canon'. It is a form of romance, as we have seen, that eludes description
and, in creating effects 'for which we may never perhaps have a direct name', may
continue to elude our descriptive faculties and repeatedly disrupt them. In a
comparable way, it could be said of Stevenson that he introduces, to appropriate the
258
term used by Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, a 'pagan' vitality into
his writing, a term which coincides readily with Stevenson's admission of the
Arboreal impulse and his idolisation of the nature god Pan:
Postmodern (or pagan) would be the condition of literatures and arts that
have no assigned addressee and no regulating ideal, yet in which value is
regularly measured on the stick of experimentation. Or to put it
dramatically, in which it is measured by the distortion that is inflicted
upon the materials, the forms and the structures of sensibility and
thought.21
Similarly, with Stevenson, we find a form of fiction with no regulating ideal other
than that of a primal irregularity, whose value, precisely, can be measured according
to the distortion it inflicts on the materials, the forms and the structures of sensibility
and thought within which it operates. This is not to say that Stevenson in some way
initiates a post-Modem development, but that he is one among others who makes
such a development possible: he stands in relation to post-Modemism in the same
way that Mallarme does, not as one who announces but as one who provokes its
advancement. More than anything, if the testimonies of Nabokov, Borges and
Calvino are anything to go by, Stevenson plays a significant role in the emergence of
romance as a form which is capable of acting outside of the terms by which Frye
describes it. Stevenson apprehends, explores and to a large extent explains the
conventional model described by Frye; but, acting prior to Frye, he dismantles it
through the theoretical and practical application of romance as a modem idiom. And
if Frye, in describing, has sought to inscribe this model as an institutionalised one, it
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